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Faced with declining union density and a growing immigrant workforce, the U.S. 
labor movement has begun to realize the importance of organizing Latino immigrant 
workers. However, the “conventional wisdom” among many within the movement is that 
these workers are “unorganizable.” Labor scholar Ruth Milkman (2002), for example, 
explains that the “conventional wisdom” is that immigrants are vulnerable, docile 
persons, intensely fearful of any confrontation with authority, who accept substandard 
wages and poor working conditions because their standard of comparison is drawn from 
their home countries, and who therefore are extremely unlikely to unionize. Through an 
in-depth study of a successful organizing campaign among Latino immigrant workers in 
South Omaha, this thesis challenges such “conventional wisdom.”
It studies a collaborative campaign between the United Food and Commercial 
Workers Union (UFCW) and Omaha Together One Community (OTOC) to organize 
meatpacking workers. In doing so, it explores the complexity of factors likely to affect 
Latino immigrant unionization. Specifically, it examines Latino immigrant workers’ 
propensity to support unionization based on a number of their individual and group 
characteristics. These include: 1) legal status; 2) length of time residing in the United
States and intended length of stay in the country; 3) prior union experience; 4) ethnicity 
and/or nationality; 5) gender; and 6) age. Regardless of such characteristics, however, 
this thesis finds that these workers are highly receptive to unionization. Furthermore, it 
suggests that what is most important in organizing these workers is not so much their 
individual and group characteristics, but rather the labor movement’s commitment and 
determination to unionize them. Moreover, it suggests that in order to effectively 
organize such workers, unions should not only commit to organize them, but also should 
reach out to community-based organizations which have an established relationship with 
Latino immigrant workers.
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1Chapter I
Organizing Latino Immigrant Workers in South Omaha’s Meatpacking Industry 
Introduction
It has already become a truism that the United States has experienced a renewal o f 
mass immigration. In fact, the latest U.S. Census figures demonstrate that this country 
has experienced the largest immigration increase since the 1920s, and for the first time 
since the 1930s, one out o f every ten Americans is foreign-born. Whereas most U.S. 
immigrants prior to World War II were European, post-war immigration has been 
increasingly composed of individuals from Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, with 
the majority being from Latin America. This increase in Latin American immigration has 
resulted in Latinos being not only the fastest growing minority group in the United States, 
but also the largest one, comprising 37 million individuals (Torrez 2003:8).
Also well established is the fact that union density (percentage of the workforce 
that is unionized) in the United States has reached its lowest point since the early 1930s. 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2000 alone, the number of union 
members in this country declined by 200,000 to 16.3 million, which is its lowest point in 
over six decades. In fact, with only 8.5 percent of the private sector workforce organized, 
unionization is now at its lowest level since it peaked at 35 percent in the mid-1950s 
(Bronfenbrenner 2003:21). This decline has resulted in shrinking bargaining power and a 
loss of political clout for American workers. A problem further augmented by the fact 
that Latinos, whom are the least likely of all U.S. workers to belong to unions, are the 
fastest growing members o f the U.S. workforce. As labor organizer Jose La Luz and
2labor scholar Paula Finn (1998:172) explain, “Although the Latino workforce in the 
United States has increased by nearly two-thirds over the past ten years, Latino workers 
today actually make up a lesser percentage of unionized workers. In 1989, Latino 
workers accounted for one in ten union members; they now amount to about one in 
twelve.”
According to a recent report by the National Council of La Raza, it is projected 
that the number of Latinos in the U.S. workforce will grow by as much as 3.1 percent a 
year and by 2006 it is projected that more than 17.4 million Latinos will be in the U.S. 
labor market, representing nearly 12 percent o f the country’s workforce (Perez 2000:12). 
Moreover, recent figures from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the number 
of immigrant workers in the United States jumped to 15.7 million in 2000, up 17 percent 
from three years earlier, and that they now make up 12 percent o f the country’s 
workforce. However, many scholars estimate these figures to be much higher, since the 
numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics do not adequately reflect the number of 
undocumented immigrants in the United States and therefore underestimate the true 
extent of the Latino presence in the country (Milkman 2000; Bacon 1999; Torres 1995).
Given the increase in both the Latino population and its labor force participation, 
it is evident that if the U.S. labor movement is to survive and be an effective force in the 
twenty-first centuiy, it must organize both immigrant and native-born Latinos who have 
historically been excluded and underrepresented within the movement. In fact, several 
labor scholars and organizers (Trumpbour and Bernard 2002; Milkman 2000; Cameron 
2000; Delgado 2000; Sherman and Voss 2000; Kelley 1999; Mantsios and Sweeney
31998; La Luz and Finn 1998; Flores and Ibarra 1998; Wong 1995) argue that in order to 
revitalize the U.S. labor movement, unions must incorporate immigrants, as well as 
native-born Latinos, into their ranks. For example, sociologist Ruth Milkman, (2000) 
asserts:
At the end o f the twentieth centuiy, the challenge o f recruiting immigrant 
workers into union ranks has become increasingly central to the larger 
project of rebuilding the United States labor movement, which has been in 
a downward spiral for decades....Labor movement decline has accelerated 
even as the immigrant population has swelled....Thus recruiting 
immigrants is an increasingly urgent imperative for the besieged labor 
movement.” (P. 1)
Likewise, La Luz and Finn (1998:148) argue “In order to survive, unions will have to 
organize large numbers o f Latinos and immigrants and, at the same time, change 
institutionally to accommodate these new members.”
These trends, renewed mass immigration and declining unionization, are 
transforming the character o f the U.S. economy and will undoubtedly have profound 
implications for the country’s working class. What happens to the country’s newest 
immigrants will certainly have a critical effect on the future of the U.S. labor movement. 
As the United States continues to undergo economic restructuring as a result o f the 
increasing globalization o f economic production, U.S. labor unions are struggling to 
remain viable institutions in the face o f declining employment in mature manufacturing 
industries that have traditionally served as a major source o f their membership base 
(Bronfenbrenner 2003:22). Meanwhile, new immigrants increasingly occupy the key 
manufacturing jobs that remain, and in many regions o f the country they have come to 
dominate manufacturing job categories, especially arduous low-paying ones such as
4meatpacking (Catanzarite 2000; Torres 1995; Gomez-Quinones, 1994). And, as labor 
scholar Andres Torres (1995:154) explains, “Labor has had only minimal success in 
expanding into the reconfigured manufacturing sector where immigrants are 
concentrated.”
Restructuring, capital flight, managerial resistance and anti-labor legislation have
depleted labor’s rank since the late 1960’s (Bronfenbrenner 2003; Torres 1995; Farber
1990). At the same time, the labor movement has failed to organize workers, especially
immigrants. As leading labor scholars Ruth Milkman and Kent Wong (2000) explain:
The U.S. is a nation of immigrants, and earlier this century the labor 
movement’s growth was based on extensive recruitments o f foreign-born 
workers and their offspring. In the years since WWII, however, 
immigrants have not always been welcome in the House of Labor....In 
fact, many union leaders took the position that immigrant workers should 
not be allowed to enter the country, fearing that they would lower wages, 
undermine unions, or be used as strikebreakers. (P. 2)
Likewise, labor scholar Kim Moody (1997:166) contends, “Until recently, help has not
always been forthcoming from U.S. unions, whose leaders and members have often
viewed immigrants as either ‘unorganizable’ or simply undesirable.” Moreover, Torres
(1995:154) claims, “Internal practices are slow to accommodate the new workforce. The
range o f problematic attitudes varies from complacency to resistance founded in racism.”
Today, immigrant and native-born Latinos represent the poorest racial/ethnic
group in the United States and continue to fall behind economically (Soler 2003; Torres
1995). Their plight has been exacerbated by unfavorable economic trends, which have
resulted in their concentration in sectors of the economy that are less likely to have union
representation or industries where unions have declined along with wages and working
5conditions (Soler 2003; Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000; Catanzarite 2000; Torres 
1995; Gomez-Quinones 1994). Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000:56) explain that 
immigrants, especially the less skilled, are more likely to occupy jobs whose 
characteristics include low pay, unhealthy or dangerous working conditions, limited 
chances for promotion and minimal job security. Historically, through unionization, 
immigrant workers have successfully challenged such undesirable employment and have 
bargained collectively to improve their wages and working conditions. In light o f the 
mitigating effects unionization has on such terms of employment, it would seem that 
contemporary immigrants, the majority o f whom are Latinos, would be leading 
candidates for unionization.
Although immigrants are less likely than their native-born counterparts to be 
union members, they stand to gain significantly from the benefits unionization offers. 
Over the last century, unionization has been a vehicle for lifting immigrants into 
America’s economic mainstream. Furthermore, union membership has increased income 
equality among workers doing the same job in the same industry and union members are 
at a wage advantage compared to their non-union counterparts. Among all workers, 
union members earn on average 32 percent higher wages, while for Latinos, the union 
difference is 54 percent (American Federation o f Labor -  Congress of Industrial 
Organizations 2000a).
The new realities o f the global economy, including an international division o f 
labor and renewed mass immigration to the United States, especially from Latin America, 
and the associated change in demographics o f the U.S. workforce create both challenges
6and opportunities for the U.S. labor movement. As a number of scholars suggest, 
(Trumpbour and Bernard 2002; Milkman and Wong 2000; Cameron 2000; Delgado 
2000; Sherman and Voss 2000; La Luz and Finn 1998; Flores and Ibarra 1998) the 
greatest challenge of rebuilding the country’s labor movement as we enter the twenty- 
first century may be the ability of unions to reach out to the growing number of 
immigrant workers.
The increased presence of immigrants, particularly Latino immigrants, in the U.S. 
workforce introduces a host o f social, cultural, political and economic considerations that 
are likely to have a profound effect on unionization in ways not unlike the changes 
witnessed at the beginning o f the twentieth century when the United States experienced a 
massive wave of European immigrants. Despite the fact that European immigrants were 
instrumental in establishing the U.S. labor movement throughout the twentieth century, 
unions have paid relatively little attention to organizing Latino immigrants until recently.
The AFL-CIO’s Position On Immigration
Evidence that the U.S. labor movement now acknowledges the importance of 
organizing the country’s newest immigrants is provided in the American Federation of 
Labor — Congress o f Industrial Organizations’ (AFL-CIO) recent reversal of its long held 
position on immigration. In 1999, delegates to its twenty-third Biennial Convention 
formed a “Special Committee on Immigration,” chaired by the Hotel Employees and 
Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) President John Wilhelm and made up 
o f union leaders from every union affiliated with the federation (American Federation o f 
Labor -  Congress o f Industrial Organizations 2000a: 17). This committee was charged
7with the task of studying and recommending changes to the AFL-CIO’s immigration 
policy. Adopted in 1985, the policy endorsed the creation of the current system of 
immigration enforcement, which includes employer sanctions for hiring undocumented 
workers (American Federation of Labor — Congress o f Industrial Organizations 
2000a: 17). In a significant policy shift, in February 2000, the committee called for 
repealing penalties against employers who hire undocumented workers and granting 
amnesty to undocumented immigrants currently in the United States (American 
Federation of Labor -  Congress of Industrial Organizations 2000a: 17). Following the 
committee’s recommendations, on February 16, 2000, the AFL-CIO Executive Council 
unanimously passed a historical resolution calling for the repeal of employer sanctions as 
well as amnesty for the millions o f undocumented immigrants presently working and 
residing in the United States (The National Immigration Forum 2000). This resolution, in 
part, states:
The AFL-CIO proudly stands on the side o f immigrant workers. 
Throughout the history o f this country, immigrants have played an important 
\ role in building our nation and its democratic institutions. New arrivals 
I from every continent have contributed their energy, talent and commitment 
to making the United States richer and stronger. Likewise, the American 
\ union movement has been enriched by the contributions and courage of 
immigrant workers. Newly arriving workers continue to make indispensable 
contributions to the strength and growth of our unions. These efforts have 
created new unions and strengthened and revived others, benefiting all 
I workers, immigrant and native-born alike. It is increasingly clear that if the 
j United States is to have an immigration system that really works, it must be 
J simultaneously orderly, responsible and fair. The policies o f both the AFL- 
/' CIO and our country must reflect those goals.
The AFL-CIO believes the current system of immigration enforcement in 
the United States is broken and needs to be fixed. Our starting points are 
simple:
8•  Undocumented workers and their families make enormous contributions 
to their communities and workplaces and should be provided permanent 
legal status through a new amnesty program.
•  Regulated legal immigration is better than unregulated illegal 
immigration.
•  Immigrant workers should have full workplace rights in order to protect 
their own interests as well as the labor rights o f all American workers.
• Labor and business should work together to design cooperative 
mechanisms that allow law-abiding employers to satisfy legitimate 
needs for new workers in a timely manner without compromising the 
rights and opportunities of workers already here.
•  Criminal penalties should be established to punish employers who 
recruit undocumented workers from abroad for the purpose of exploiting 
workers for economic gain (American Federation of Labor -  Congress 
of Industrial Organizations 2000b:23).
Following the Executive Council’s adoption of this resolution, “the AFL-CIO 
conducted a series o f regional forums on immigrant workers and the realities of their 
lives — at work, at home and in their communities” (American Federation o f Labor -  
Congress of Industrial Organizations 2000b: 1). These forums were held in New York, 
Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles to learn more about the problems facing immigrant 
workers and their families and to find solutions to these problems, as well as to learn 
more about how to build an understanding between the labor movement and the 
community to promote immigrant workers’ rights (American Federation of Labor -  
Congress o f Industrial Organizations 2000a: 17). As a result o f these forums the AFL- 
CIO announced that it would work with its community allies to develop a national 
campaign to achieve the following goals:
•  Promote the vigorous enforcement of work protection laws covering 
safety and health, wages and discrimination;
•  Protect the freedom of all workers to choose to form unions;
•  Build a broad anti-discrimination agenda that will fight discrimination 
against immigrants, women and all minorities;
9• Pass a comprehensive amnesty program;
• Ensure citizenship for members of the late amnesty class and adjust 
the status of those left out of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act;
•  Replace employer sanctions with an enforcement mechanism that 
imposes criminal penalties on employers who recruit undocumented 
workers from abroad in order to exploit them for economic gain, and 
enact whistle-blower protections to prevent retaliation against 
immigrant workers who assert their rights;
• Halt the expansion of -  and reform -  existing guestworker programs;
• Restore safety net benefits to immigrants and promote access to 
government services, including education and health care, and 
increased civic participation;
• Collaborate on a broad-based education campaign for workers and 
communities about immigrant issues; and
• Support immigrant workers through education, training and advocacy 
(American Federation o f Labor — Congress of Industrial Organizations 
2000b:21-22).
Labor relations scholar Vernon Briggs (2000) summarized this historic turnabout in the
AFL-CIO’s position on immigration:
At every juncture prior to the 1980s, the union movement either directly 
instigated or strongly supported every legislative initiative enacted by 
Congress to restrict immigration and to enforce its policy terms. But in the 
late 1980s the leadership o f organized labor began to waffle on the issue.
By the 1990s the labor movement was hesitant to support comprehensive 
reform, even though the nation was in the midst of the largest wave of 
immigration it had ever known and the percentage of the labor force in 
unions was falling. Finally, in Februaiy 2000, the executive council o f the 
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) announced it was changing its historic position: it would now 
support immigration and the special needs o f immigrants. (P. 4)
As the notion of organizing immigrant workers into the ranks of the U.S. labor
movement has become increasingly central to the larger project of revitalizing the
movement, labor scholars such as Ruth Milkman (2000:14) argue that the success o f the
AFL-CIO’s new efforts to organize immigrants will ultimately depend on what happens
10
within its various affiliates, especially at the local level where organizing efforts are 
concentrated. She asserts, “Extending the revolution that has occurred at the top of the 
labor federation into these long-established structures is among the most difficult tasks 
that lie ahead” (Milkman 2000:14).
The Campaign to Organize South Omaha’s 
Latino Immigrant Meatpacking Workers
This case study of an organizing campaign among meatpacking workers, most of 
whom are Latino immigrants, in South Omaha, Nebraska, examines the potential for 
bringing contemporary immigrants into the U.S. labor movement. Specifically, this study 
assesses the possibilities and challenges o f organizing Latino immigrant workers in a 
devalued U.S. manufacturing industry (meatpacking) where they have become 
increasingly concentrated and where unionization has diminished. By examining the 
meatpacking industry, which has undergone substantial industrial restructuring over the 
last few decades and subsequently both deunionization and a recomposition o f its 
workforce from a predominantly native-born Anglo workforce to one which is 
increasingly comprised o f immigrant Latinos, this study explores how the changing 
workforce demographics affect unionization and how unions are responding to these 
changes. Furthermore, focusing on an organizing campaign among primarily Latino 
immigrant workers, which includes efforts by the United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union (UFCW) and Omaha Together One Community (OTOC), which is a community- 
based organization, I explore the complexity of factors that are likely to affect Latino 
immigrant unionization. Moreover, given the fact that this organizing campaign is a 
collaborative effort between the UFCW and OTOC, I am able to assess the different
11
structures and strategies o f these two organizations, as well as the benefits and drawbacks 
of such collaborations.
Questions To Be Addressed
A series of questions guide this study. Are contemporary immigrant workers 
fundamentally different than their native-born counterparts when it comes to 
unionization? What are the factors that facilitate, and those that discourage, unionization 
among contemporary immigrant workers? How does the legal status o f contemporary 
immigrant workers affect unionization? As the demographics o f the U.S. workforce 
change, how are unions responding? Is the labor movement transforming itself to 
accommodate the shift in the country’s workforce demographics? Are unions up to the 
task o f organizing contemporary immigrant workers? What new practices and strategies 
must be envisioned to incorporate contemporary immigrants into the U.S. labor 
movement? Which strategies and tactics have been most effective when organizing 
contemporary immigrant workers, and what are the implications?
The changing demographics o f the U.S. workforce and the ways in which unions 
respond to these changes, particularly their ability to organize immigrant and native-born 
Latino workers, is extremely relevant in the state of Nebraska, where not only has the 
percentage of the Latino population nearly tripled the national average between 1990 and 
2000, but also where the percentage o f unionized workers is well below the national 
average. ^ Nationwide the Latino population increased 58 percent during the 1990s, while 
in the state o f Nebraska it increased 155 percent, from 36,969 in 1990 to 94,425 in 2000 
(U.S. Census Bureau). Furthermore, many estimate the state’s Latino population to be
12
even greater given the number o f undocumented Latino immigrants residing in the state 
that are not adequately accounted for in such government statistics. Meanwhile, as a 
poignant illustration o f the divergent trends informing this study, in 2000, the percentage 
o f unionized workers in the state o f Nebraska was 8.4 percent, which is nearly 5 percent 
lower than the national percentage (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001). Moreover, 
between the years 1999 and 2000 alone, the state’s labor movement declined by nearly a 
thousand members, from 66,000 to 65,000 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001).
The issue of meatpacking unionization is extremely relevant in the state o f 
Nebraska for several additional reasons. First o f all is meatpacking’s importance to the 
state’s economy. Livestock slaughter and processing, collectively referred to as 
“meatpacking,” is the state’s leading manufacturing industry. Second, the industry is 
often cited as the magnet drawing immigration to the state and has recently been singled 
out by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for an enforcement effort, 
dubbed “Operation Vanguard,” which resulted in the “voluntary termination” of over 
3000 o f the state’s meatpacking workers. Third, Nebraska’s Governor recently created 
and implemented the industry’s first ever “Meatpacking Industry Workers Bill of 
Rights,” which designates the first o f eleven rights as “the right to organize.” Finally, the 
industry in South Omaha has recently become the subject o f a collaborative campaign 
between the UFCW and OTOC to organize the area’s estimated 4000 meatpacking 
workers. All o f the above point to South Omaha’s meatpacking industry as offering an 
exemplaiy case to investigate contemporaiy immigrant unionization and to examine this
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crucial juncture in U.S. history when its labor movement is confronted with both 
declining membership and renewed mass immigration.
In order to understand the complexities o f unionization among contemporary 
immigrant workers, I explore not only the individual and group background and 
demographic characteristics o f these workers, but also the collaboration between the 
UFCW and OTOC in an organizing campaign among Latino immigrant meatpacking 
workers. I hypothesize that what is most important in realizing unionization among these 
workers, is not so much their individual and group characteristics, but rather the labor 
movement’s willingness and commitment to organizing the industries in which they are 
concentrated and the organizing strategies implemented. Furthermore, given the decline 
of unionization within the meatpacking industry coupled with the organizational and 
structural limitations o f contemporary meatpacking unions, I hypothesize that 
community-based organizing and labor-community alliances offer the best approach for 
organizing today’s meatpacking workers. This study not only adds to understanding the 
factors that affect unionization among contemporaiy immigrants, but also contributes to 
understanding the complexity of organizing campaigns. And, it will hopefully help 
identify possibilities that might apply to other organizing efforts, especially within 
industries reliant on an immigrant workforce.
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Chapter II 
Literature Review
This research draws primarily from two bodies of literature: 1) factors affecting 
unionization among contemporary immigrant workers; and 2) the restructuring of the 
meatpacking industry and its affect on unionization. Although there is an extensive body 
of literature on immigrant unionization in the United States, for the most part, the focus 
of this scholarship is on European immigrants. Whereas most of the U.S. immigrants 
prior to World War II were Europeans, the current situation differs in that post-war 
immigration has been increasingly composed of individuals from Latin America, the 
Caribbean and Asia. Not only have the national origins of contemporary U.S. immigrants 
shifted from Europe to Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, but also the volume of 
immigration to the United States has substantially increased. “The 2000 Census reveals 
that the percentage of foreign-born in the United States is at its highest since 1930, 
jumping from 4.7 percent in 1970 to 11.1 percent in 2000. Further, European-born first- 
generation immigrants continued their proportional decline in the face of increasing Latin 
American and Asian migration, 78 percent of all foreign-born combined” (Hernandez and 
Glenn 2003:418). Furthermore, the 2000 U.S. Census figures indicate that 51 percent of 
the 28.4 million foreign-born residents are from Latin America, the majority of whom are 
from Mexico (Schepers 2003:14).
Another factor that distinguishes contemporary U.S. immigration from earlier 
periods is the presence of a sizeable number of undocumented immigrants. The 2000 
U.S. Census reports that there are 8.7 million undocumented immigrants residing in the
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United States, 5.4 million of whom are Latino (Schepers 2003:14). However, many 
immigration and labor scholars estimate the undocumented population is even greater 
given the number of undocumented immigrants residing in the country that are not 
adequately accounted for in such government statistics. For instance, labor scholar David 
Bacon estimates that there are between 9 and 11 million undocumented immigrants 
currently residing in the United States (2001b: 1).
In addressing the issue of unionization among contemporary immigrants, 
sociologists Rodger Waldinger and Claudia Der-Martirosian (2000:52) argue that it 
stands at the confluence of two distinct literatures -  one on immigration and the other on 
unionization -  each of which is only peripherally aware o f the other’s existence. They 
maintain, “Labor matters play an important role in the historiography of American 
immigration, but even the historians have not yet generated a unified framework, 
integrating the insights from the study of immigration and the study of unionization” 
(Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:53). Moreover, these two scholars argue that 
although there are a small number of insightful case studies examining unionization 
among immigrant workers, of which the best known is Hector Delgado’s 1993 book, New 
Immigrants, Old Unions: Organizing Undocumented Workers in Los Angeles, the 
contemporary literature is still wanting (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:52-3). 
Likewise, Milkman (2000:3) contends, “There have been few efforts to document and 
analyze the relationship of immigrants to unionism in the contemporary United States.”
The scholarship that treats unionization among contemporary immigrant workers 
in the United States has focused primarily on organizing campaigns among Latino
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immigrants in the Southwest, particularly California, where contemporary immigrants are
more heavily concentrated and where they have been at the forefront of high profile
organizing campaigns throughout the 1990s. Nearly a third of all the Latinos residing in
the United States are concentrated in the state of California. According to the 2000 U.S.
Census Bureau figures, approximately 11 million of the 35.3 million Latinos in the
country reside in California. Moreover, California became the epicenter of immigrant
unionization during the 1990s, where the AFL-CIO scored three of the decade’s largest
union victories amongst Latino immigrant workers. These victories include the largest
organizing campaign in modem labor history, in which 74,000 health care workers joined
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in Los Angeles County. New York
Times reporter Steven Greenhouse explains that in February 1999, a stunning 74,000 Los
Angeles County health care workers, many of them Latino immigrants, voted to unionize
after an eleven-year SEIU campaign, which signified the single largest organizing
success anywhere in the United States since the 1930s (1999:A1).
The second of these victories began in July 1990 when an estimated 1200 workers
at a wheel factory in Los Angles walked off their jobs in a wildcat strike and six months
later, after a successful organizing campaign, voted in favor of union representation by
the International Association of Machinists (Milkman 2002:122). Labor economist,
Carol Zabin (2000) documents:
At the end of July 1990, over eight hundred workers at the American 
Racing Equipment Company (ARE), which manufactures automobile 
wheels, walked off their jobs. After three days the workers, who were 
almost all first-generation Latino immigrants, ended their wildcat strike 
but began long-term organizing to improve their working conditions. Six 
months later they voted in favor of union representation by the
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International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), 
and in September 1991 they won their first contract. The workers are now 
working under their third union contract, which offers them significantly 
higher wages than in their pre-union days as well as employer-financed 
health insurance and union security. (P. 150)
The third of these victories came in November of 1992 when over 3000 drywall workers,
whom install the sheetrock panels that make up the interior walls of modern buildings,
joined the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Union, nearly six months after thousands of
Mexican immigrant workers, from Santa Barbara to San Diego, walked off the job
demanding higher wages, better working conditions and union recognition (Milkman and
Wong 2000:169). According to Milkman (2002:121), this campaign yielded a union
contract that doubled dry wallers’ wages in the region and brought a few thousand
previously non-union Mexican immigrant workers into the carpenters’ union.
Sociologist Hector Delgado, who has also documented these high profile union
victories in California, notes:
Los Angeles has become one of the most active sites of labor activity in 
the country, and Mexican and other Latino immigrants and organizers 
have been at the forefront of many of the city’s labor struggles, including 
the high profile Justice for Janitors campaign and the Drywallers and 
American Racing campaigns....In July 1990, more than eight hundred 
workers, overwhelmingly first-generation Latino immigrants, walked off 
their jobs at the American Racing Equipment Company and remained out 
for three days. Six months later they voted in the International Association 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union (IAM) and in September 
1991 negotiated the first of three contracts....A year later, thousands of 
immigrant construction workers in southern California struck for higher 
pay and union recognition. Among the more militant strikers were drywall 
hangers who shut down residential construction throughout southern 
California (2000a: 3 3-4).
These victories demonstrate the potential for recruiting Latino immigrant workers into
the U.S. labor movement.
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Factors Affecting Unionization Among Contemporary Immigrants
Leading labor scholar, Kim Moody (1997:166) suggests that throughout the
history of the U.S. labor movement, immigrant workers often have been viewed as
“unorganizable” although the evidence demonstrates that not only can many of these
workers be organized, but also they often take the initiative by organizing themselves.
He argues, “Until recently, help has not always been forthcoming from U.S. unions,
whose leaders and members have often viewed immigrants as either ‘unorganizable’ or
simply undesirable” (Moody 1997:166). Likewise, Milkman (2002) explains the
common perception held by many both inside and outside the labor movement regarding
the ‘unorganizability’ of immigrant workers:
The conventional wisdom, widely accepted until very recently, is that 
immigrants are vulnerable, docile persons who are intensely fearful of any 
confrontation with authority, who accept substandard wages and poor 
working conditions because their standard of comparison is drawn from 
their home countries, and who therefore are extremely unlikely to actively 
seek unionization. For the undocumented, the assumption that immigrants 
lack real potential as union recruits is especially widespread. (P. 115)
The “Organizability” o f  Undocumented Workers
The undocumented status of immigrant workers and the legal vulnerability associated 
with that status are often cited as significant impediments to unionization in industries in 
which undocumented workers account for a large percentage of the workforce. Scholars 
such as Vernon Briggs (1984), for example, argued that undocumented workers act as 
deterrents to unionization, since their fear of apprehension and deportation by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) forces them to tolerate low wages and poor 
working conditions. However, “In his benchmark study of a successful Los Angeles
19
organizing drive among undocumented immigrant workers, Hector Delgado demolishes 
many of the arguments about the ‘unorganizability’ of immigrant workers” (Moody 
1997:166).
Delgado is frequently cited in the recent literature on contemporary immigrant 
unionization for his case study of a successful organizing campaign involving immigrant 
workers, most of which were undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central 
America, at a Camagua waterbed factory in Los Angeles in the mid-1980s. His study, 
which examined the effects of workers’ undocumented status on unionization, challenges 
the conventional wisdom regarding the “unorganizability” of undocumented workers. 
Delgado found that “under certain conditions undocumented workers organize to protest 
and improve their working conditions” (1993:133). He identifies these conditions as 
follows:
First, the presumed paralyzing fear of deportation is diluted by the rather 
inconspicuous presence of the INS in Los Angeles and the relative ease of 
returning in the event of apprehension and deportation....Second, the 
distinction between short-term and long-term residents made by organizers 
and some scholars is a critical one in understanding the unionization of 
undocumented workers. Simply stated, permanent settlers, or long-term 
residents, are easier to organize than temporary migrants, or short-term 
residents....Third, the length of time in the interior tends to alter an 
immigrant’s frame of reference. Initially satisfied that they are making 
more money than they made back home, they eventually begin to compare 
their wages, working conditions, material possessions and quality of life to 
others in Los Angeles who are similarly employed. In some instances and 
under certain conditions, such comparisons spur efforts to improve their 
situation. One way to do this, especially if other avenues are closed to 
them, is to unionize....Another factor mitigating the fear of deportation is 
the unique occupational niche filled by immigrant workers in the Los 
Angeles economy. The perception.. .that certain jobs “belong” to them is 
reassuring and contributes significantly to a sense of security expressed by 
Camagua’s workers, and by workers from other firms. Contributing as 
well to the sense of security has been the union’s increasing interest in
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organizing immigrant workers, irrespective of legal status, and the fact 
that undocumented workers have been deemed “employees” under the 
National Labor Relations Act by the courts and, thereby, protected by 
national labor laws. In the Camagua case, the breakdown of paternalistic 
ties between the owner and workers...also helped to ripen the company 
for unionization. Finally, the union’s ability to capitalize on the weakened 
relationship between the owner and his employees, and its determination 
and substantial commitment of resources to organize Camagua, were key 
to the successful unionization of the firm (Delgado 1993:132-3).
Rather than viewing undocumented workers as beyond the pale of unionization,
Delgado 1993:11) suggests that their organizability depends less on their legal status and
more on “labor market forces, the legal environment, organizational capacities and
strategies, forms of labor control, migration and settlement patterns and other such
factors.” In short, he suggests that the elements that promote or retard unionization
among the undocumented are not unlike those that determine the organizability of other
workers who are similarly located in the labor market (Delgado 1993:11). He claims,
“The difficulty in organizing undocumented immigrants is explained not so much by their
legal status as by the factors that make it difficult to organize any worker -  native or
immigrant, documented or undocumented — in most industries and sectors of a declining
national economy” (Delgado 1993:134). Moreover, he states, “The elements that
promote or retard unionization among the undocumented are not unlike those that
determine the organizability of other workers who are similarly located in the labor
market (Delgado 1993:11). Milkman (2000) argues a similar point. She maintains,
“Immigrant workers, undocumented or not, seem ripe for organizing; the major
impediment is not lack of interest in unions on their part, but rather the intensely anti­
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labor environment which makes organizing workers of any type difficult in the late
twentieth century” (Milkman 2000:9).
Based on his research Delgado (1993) suggests that the state plays a very
important role in the unionization of undocumented workers, namely by recognizing
them as “employees” under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and thereby
protecting them under U.S. labor laws. He states, “The recognition of undocumented
workers as “employees,” under the NLRA, has facilitated unionization” (Delgado
1993:16). Moreover, he explains that informing workers that they are protected under
U.S. labor law has “helped facilitate the unionization of documented and undocumented
workers” (Delgado 2000:32). Delgado also suggests that employer resistance to
unionization is an important factor in organizing workers irrespective of their legal status.
He states, “Employer resistance is an important factor, if not the, major obstacle to
unionization of workers,' regardless of citizenship status” (Delgado 1993:12). Another
important factor in the organization of immigrant workers, according to Delgado, is
organized labor’s determination to organize these workers. He claims:
A great deal hinges on organized labor’s willingness, and capacity, to 
invest the necessary resources to organize workers, regardless of their 
citizenship status. Significant shifts in the economy and changes in the 
character of workforces will force organizers to focus much more on 
organizing immigrants, if it [organized labor] hopes to recapture lost 
ground. Earlier claims that women and blacks were unorganizable proved 
not to be supported by the data. Similar claims about undocumented 
immigrants are similarly unsubstantiated (Delgado 1992:140).
Moreover, Delgado (1993:15) claims that organized labor’s determination to
organize immigrant workers is in part, but not solely, a question of resources but
also of innovative organizing strategies.
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Some scholars, however, argue that the organizing climate has changed since
Delgado’s case study. For instance, Milkman (2000:8) suggests that recent efforts to
tighten restrictions on immigration and renewed initiatives to deport the undocumented
may have altered the climate in the years since Delgado did his fieldwork. Similarly,
Edna Bonacich, a sociologist who has conducted research similar to that of Delgado’s
with UNITE’s L o s  Angeles Organizing Department, argues:
As Hector Delgado has shown (1993), lack of legal papers is not a fatal 
bar to organizing. But it certainly makes it more difficult, as workers fear 
that if they expose themselves they may face deportation. And since the 
ILGWA strike reported, on in Delgado’s book, conditions have worsened 
for undocumented immigrants. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) made it illegal for employers to hire the undocumented 
(2000:138).
In addressing the issue of changes in immigration legislation, namely the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which included “employer
sanctions” that, for the first time in history, made it illegal for employers to hire
undocumented workers, Delgado (1992) asserts:
Research conducted prior to IRCA challenges the conventional wisdom 
that undocumented workers cannot be organized because of their fear of 
apprehension and deportation by the INS. Preliminary research subsequent 
to the passage of this legislation in 1986 suggests that essentially the same 
factors that mitigated the fear of the INS and made the undocumented as 
receptive to unionization as other classes of workers similarly located in 
the labor market prior to IRCA are operating in the post-IRCA period.
The future “organizability” of undocumented workers rests considerably 
on unions’ determination to organize them and whether they continue to 
be protected by U.S. labor laws. (P. 131)
But other research demonstrates the lack of consensus among scholars as to the 
effect of legal status on unionization. For example, based on her case study of an 
organizing campaign among Latino immigrant workers at an ARE wheel factory in Los
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Angeles, Zabin (2000:168) argues that legal status does in fact affect workers’
willingness to unionize. She explains:
In 1984 the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 952 tried to 
organize the facility [ARE] (then called Modem Wheel), but lost the 
NLRB election 268 to 452. According to several workers, this attempt 
was sabotaged when the INS raided the plant and deported significant 
numbers of workers shortly before the election. Although many quickly 
recrossed the border and came back to work at ARE, the threat of 
deportation dampened support for the union (Zabin 2000:154).
Likewise, based on their analysis of unionization patterns among U.S. immigrants,
Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000) maintain:
Many new immigrants are recent arrivals, altogether too uncertain of their 
status, standing, and orientation -  will they settle down or return home? -  
to seriously consider unionization. Moreover, a substantial portion of the 
immigrant population -  as many as one out o f every four immigrants 
arriving each year -  has an additional fear factor, associated with a 
condition rarely known earlier in the century, namely, a status prohibiting 
work in the United States. These “illegal” or “undocumented” immigrants 
-  call them what you will -  know all too well that the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service provides employers with an additional union- 
busting tool, yet another reason to desist from organizing activities. (P. 50)
Time Residing in the United States and Length o f  Stay in the Country
Time residing in the United States and length of stay in the country are identified 
in the literature as likely factors affecting unionization among contemporary immigrants. 
A number of scholars, including Milkman (2002; 2000), Delgado (2000; 1993) and 
Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000), suggest that unionism is strongest among the 
growing number of immigrants who have been in the country longer and who plan on 
staying. Delgado (1993), for example, argues that the distinction between short-term and 
long-term residents made by some scholars is a critical one in understanding unionization 
among immigrant workers. He asserts:
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Simply stated, permanent settlers, or long-term residents, are easier to 
organize than temporary migrants, or short-term residents. Significantly, 
the former has been growing ever larger in size since the 1960s....The 
length of time in the interior tends to alter an immigrants’ frame of 
reference. Initially satisfied that they are making more money than they 
made back home, they eventually begin to compare their wages, working 
conditions, material possessions and quality of life to others...who are 
similarly employed. In some instances and under certain conditions, such 
comparisons spur efforts to improve their situation. One way to do this, 
especially if other avenues are closed to them, is to unionize (Delgado 
(1993: 132-3).
Likewise, Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000) argue:
For all immigrants, time is likely to be the most decisive consideration, as 
both interest in the benefits obtained through unionization and the ability 
to obtain union jobs increase with time spent in the United States. In this 
respect, time points to the importance of assimilation: because standards 
change with settlement, the longer immigrants live in the United States the 
more likely their frame of reference will shift from the conditions 
prevailing in the country of origin to those prevailing in their new home. 
However, time does not yield a uniform effect. Workers emanating from 
groups with a history of circular or temporary migration may be more 
likely to assimilate in a delayed fashion. (P. 60)
These scholars clarify that time may not work in quite the same way for all immigrants,
particularly labor migrants who are part of a circular or temporary migration pattern.
They contend, “Workers emanating from groups with a history of circular or temporary
migration will be more likely to retain a dual frame of reference, which in turn reduces
the impetus to organize” (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:59). Therefore, they
theorize that Mexican immigrants, as a quintessential labor migration group and with a
history of circular or temporary migration patterns, will be less receptive to unionization
than other immigrants (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:70).
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Social Networks
Another factor closely related to the settlement patterns of immigrant workers and
suggested in the literature as affecting their receptivity to unionization is their “social
networks”.1 Delgado (2000) explains:
The literature on immigrants is replete with references to the importance 
of social networks in immigration, settlement, and work process. In my 
own research, such networks played a key role in the unionization process.
Family and friendship networks play a key role in unionization both
directly and indirectly. Directly, in that these co-ethnic ties are utilized in
the recruitment and commitment building phases of organization.
Indirectly, because they help workers settle permanently and more 
comfortably in their new environment. (P. 229)
Similar to Delgado, and based on their own studies of immigrant unionization, Milkman
(2002; 2000) and Zabin (2000) suggest that the strong social networks characteristic of
Latino immigrant workers facilitates unionization. Milkman (2000), for instance, claims:
The fact that immigrant workers rely so heavily on ethnic social networks 
for such basic survival needs as housing, jobs, and various other forms of 
social and financial assistance may also make them easier to recruit into 
the labor movement than native-born workers. Southern California is 
famous for its highly atomized social arrangements and weak sense of 
community, but that reputation is based entirely on the “Anglo”
experience. In contrast, L.A.’s working-class immigrants have vibrant 
ethnic networks and communities rooted in extended kinship ties, as well 
as the shared experience of migration from particular communities in their 
countries of origin. The intricate web of social connections among 
immigrants can be a key resource in building labor solidarity, particularly 
if unions can identify and recruit key actors in kin and community 
networks. (P. 17).
Moreover, based on her case study of an organizing campaign among mostly Latino 
immigrant workers at an ARE wheel factory in Los Angeles in the 1990s, Zabin (2000:
1 Sociologist Alejandro Portes (1995:8) defines social networks as “sets of recurrent associations 
between groups o f people linked by occupational, familial, cultural or affective ties.”
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150) found that “the strong social and family ties among immigrants.. .contributed to 
creating the solidarity necessary to initiate and sustain the campaign.”
Union and/or Other Political Experience 
An additional factor indicated in the literature as affecting unionization among 
contemporary immigrants is their union and/or other political experience in their 
sending countries. Some scholars, such as Milkman (2002; 2000) and Wells (2000), 
argue that immigrants are more receptive to unionization than their native-born 
counterparts because they have had previous experience with unionization and 
oppositional politics in their sending countries. Milkman (2000), for example, 
suggests:
One reason for their more pro-union views may be that many of today’s 
immigrant Latinos -  especially those from Central America — have some 
positive experiences of unionism in their home countries. Although this 
transnational influence is less extensive than it was for their early 
twentieth-century European predecessors, it is striking that many of the 
new rank-and-file immigrant union leaders have a history of union 
activism of left-wing political ties in their native lands. While many 
immigrant workers are from rural backgrounds, a substantial number 
arrive in the United States far more acquainted with idioms of unionism 
and class politics than their native-born counterparts. (P. 9)
Miriam Wells (2000), an anthropologist whose research includes a case study of San
Francisco’s hotel industry and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union
(HERE), argues a similar point to that of Milkman, asserting:
Latino immigrants are especially receptive and militant union members.
Not only do they often come from countries with strong and legitimate 
labor movements, but many were union members or leaders there. 
Moreover, many Mexicans and especially Central Americans engaged in 
dangerous authority-challenging struggles in the chain of events that led to 
their emigration. (P. 119)
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Previous research, however, reveals a great deal of variance among Latino 
immigrant workers in regards to their union and/or other political experience in their 
sending countries and the relationship between this experience and their propensity to 
support unionization in the United States. As explained by sociologist Edna Bonacich 
(2000):
Some...Central Americans have had a great deal of experience with 
political struggles in their homelands, as have some Mexicans, especially 
those from Mexico City. On the other hand, many have been exposed to 
corrupt unions or to regimes that assassinate union leaders. These 
experiences, or lack of any experience of political struggle, may handicap 
union organizing. (P. 139)
Moreover, Zabin’s (2000) previously mentioned case study of an organizing campaign
among Latino immigrant workers found that few of these workers had had prior
experience with unions or with political activism in their home countries.
Community-Based Organizing 
A review of the literature on organizing campaigns among contemporary 
immigrant workers also points to the importance of community-based organizing (Fine 
2001; Zabin 2000; Milkman and Wong 2000; Needleman 1998; Chen and Wong 1998). 
This literature suggests that the successful mobilization of immigrant workers relies 
heavily upon the collaboration of both organized labor and community-based 
organizations. Zabin5s (2000) study of a successful organizing campaign among mostly 
Mexican immigrant workers at a wheel factory in Los Angeles and Milkman and Wong’s 
(2000) analysis of a victorious organizing campaign among thousands of Latino 
immigrant drywall workers in southern California suggests that the collaboration between 
the labor movement and community-based organizations was fundamental to the success
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of both of these campaigns. Milkman (2000:21) explains that in both of these cases, 
success was predicated on the combination of bottom-up organizing among immigrant 
workers themselves, partly rooted in immigrant social networks and communities, on the 
one hand, and the labor movement’s willingness to commit extensive financial and legal 
resources to support the effort, on the other. Moreover, based in her case study Zabin 
(2000:167) suggests that in order to facilitate immigrant unionization, “They [unions] can 
hire bilingual organizers and promote participation and leadership development among 
workers. They can build upon the social relationships and solidarity among immigrants 
and work with community organizations that have built ties with the population over 
many years.” She argues, “Though these strategies never assure unionization, the 
immigrant organizing experiences in the early 1990s suggest that they increase the 
chances of success” (Zabin 2000:167).
Ruth Needleman (1998:73), labor studies professor and former organizer with the 
Service Employees International Union, suggests that there are both short-term and long­
term reasons why cooperation and partnership between unions and community-based 
organizations can advance organizing efforts, including that building such relationships:
1) maintains a dual focus at work and in the workers’ community; 2) addresses workers’ 
family and work-based needs, enabling them to stay in the workforce and participate in 
self-organization activities; 3) helps workers overcome fears and language, cultural, or 
legal status barriers; 4) builds lasting networks and support systems to sustain unionism 
across jobs and locations; and 5) lays the foundation for larger organizing campaigns -  by 
occupation and geographical area — down the road. Furthermore, Needleman points out
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the complementary strengths that both unions and community-based organizations have
to offer organizing campaigns:
There are some areas in which unions are extremely successful, in part 
because of their objectives, size, resources, history, and structures. Unions 
have the experience and staff to reach large but dispersed workforces; to 
tackle city, state, and even federal policies or practices that stand as 
barriers to organization; to connect workers to national and even 
international networks of support; and to ensure representation is 
achieved, contracts are signed, and improvements are made in wages and 
working conditions. Given their community roots, emphasis on one-on- 
one contact, and long-term perseverance, community-based organizations 
offer many workers a friendlier, more familiar face, support during 
individual crisis, and training and education over an extended period, at a 
pace well suited to these workers’ overwhelming responsibilities. 
(Needleman 1998:74).
Additional labor scholars and organizers have emphasized the importance
community-based organizations play in the unionization of contemporary immigrants.
For example, labor scholar Andres Torres (1995:154) argues that labor must insert itself
into the life of Latino immigrant communities because, “for Latinos, the community, not
the workplace, is seen as the focal site for organizing activities.” He suggests that local
institutions in the Latino community such as community-based organizations, church
groups, and advocacy networks, all facilitate the unionization of immigrant and native-
born Latino workers (Torres 1995:157). Similarly, May Ying Chen, Vice President of
UNITE, and labor scholar Kent Wong (1998:1867) assert:
It is essential that they [unions] build alliances with community organizations and 
groups.. . .Immigrants’ rights groups.. .and other community-based organizations 
are potential allies of labor. The labor movement needs to spend time, attention, 
and resources to develop and expand these relationships, and to forge common 
agendas. (P. 186)
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Although community-based organizing is gaining considerable credence both
inside the formal labor movement among union leadership, and outside unions among
labor scholars, leading labor scholar Kate Bronfenbrenner (1998:12) argues that it has
been a previously neglected area of research. By examining an organizing campaign
among meatpacking workers in South Omaha, most of whom are Latino immigrants,
which is based on a collaboration between a union -  the United Food and Commercial
Workers Union (UFCW) -  and a community-based organization -  Omaha Together One
Community (OTOC), this case study aims to fill some of this void. In addition,
Bronfenbrenner explains that until recently, very little research has examined the
organizing process itself. She states (1998):
Although there has been considerable macro-level research documenting 
the magnitude of labor’s decline, there has been much less micro-level 
research that looks intensively at the organizing process itself, 
particularly the role played by union strategies and tactics. Furthermore, 
much of the academic research suffers because the samples are small, the 
databases are limited, and the researchers lack an understanding of how 
the union organizing process actually works. Most industrial relations 
research on private sector organizing continues to focus primarily on 
elections and employer variables easily accessible from NLRB data.
From this research we have learned much about the influence of 
environmental factors, the National Labor Relations Board, and workers’ 
attitudes towards unions. Despite the great volume of research, however, 
few studies examine the actual process of union organizing campaigns 
and the importance of union characteristics and strategies in determining 
election outcomes. (P. 8)
Here too, through a case study of an organizing campaign among Latino immigrant
meatpacking workers, this research project looks to fill some of the gaps in research
regarding the actual organizing process.
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Unionization Among Latino Immigrant Workers Outside California
For the most part, research regarding contemporary immigrant unionization has 
focused on California, an area in which Latino immigrant workers have been historically 
concentrated. Meanwhile, little research has focused on unionization among 
contemporary immigrant workers in other geographic locations, such as the Midwest, 
where there has been a rapid increase in the Latino immigrant population. The last 
decade alone has seen a significant growth of the Latino population in the Midwest, 
especially in Nebraska, where the number of Latinos grew 155 percent, from 36,969 in 
1990 to 94,425 in 2000 (Orosco 2001:10). Accompanying the growth of Nebraska’s 
Latino population has been a decline in the state’s percent of unionized workers. As of 
2000, this percentage had fallen to 8.4 percent, which is nearly 5 percent lower than the 
national average (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001).
By focusing on an organizing campaign in the meatpacking industry in Nebraska, 
an industry which is not only dependent on Latino immigrant workers, but also often 
cited as the principal incentive of Latino immigration to the state, this study allows me 
the opportunity to examine the claims put forth in the literature regarding contemporary 
immigrant unionization and to test the degree to which they hold true in different 
geographical areas.
i
In addition, both Nebraska and its meatpacking industry have recently become the 
focus o f national immigration legislation as the INS singled out the state’s meatpacking 
industry for the implementation of Operation Vanguard, an immigration enforcement 
operation. This operation, which reviewed employment documentation, specifically 1-9
32
Forms, for every meatpacking worker in the state, resulted in termination of nearly 3500 
workers. In short, after reviewing some 24,000 meatpacking workers’ records and 
finding approximately 4,500 discrepancies, an estimated 3,500 workers quit their jobs 
rather than face federal immigration officials to verify their employment status (Gouveia 
and Juska 2000:337). Operation Vanguard was not an isolated incident of the INS 
targeting the state’s meatpacking industry. Throughout the last decade, Nebraska’s 
meatpacking industry experienced numerous plant raids by the INS, the latest of which 
took place during the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign and resulted in the deportation 
of over 200 workers, despite an internal policy directing INS agents not to initiate 
immigration enforcement actions during labor organizing campaigns. Consequently, the 
circumstances surrounding this study differ markedly from the situation Delgado 
described in his benchmark case study in which there was a “rather inconspicuous 
presence of the INS” (1993: 33).
The Meatpacking Industry
The second body of literature this study draws from is that of the meatpacking 
industry. This industry represents a prototypical case for analyzing contemporary 
immigrant unionization. It represents a textbook example of post-World War II industrial 
restructuring in the United States, which has resulted in a near elimination of unionization 
and a change in workforce composition from a primarily Anglo native-born workforce to 
one that is overwhelmingly comprised of Latino immigrants.
Although there is a great deal of research on the meatpacking industry, an aspect 
that is missing from this research is contemporary meatpacking unionization. The
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majority of literature on the industry and unionization (Warren 2000; Halpern and 
Horowitz 1999; Fehn 1998; Page 1998; Herod 1998; Horowitz 1997; Halpern 1997; 
Stormquist and Bergman 1997; Pratt 1996; Fink 1997; Deslippe 1993; Barrett 1987; 
Halstead 1986; Fogel 1971; Brody 1964) has focused on the rise and decline of 
unionization within the industry and the historical role both race and gender have played 
in meatpacking unionism. However, relatively few studies have analyzed the relationship 
between the industry’s contemporary workforce, which consists of mostly immigrant and 
native-born Latinos, and unionization.
The most recent meatpacking literature emphasizes the industry’s restructuring 
and how it has affected rural communities (Broadway 2001; Gouveia 2000; Grey 1999; 
Bjerklie 1996; Stull, Broadway and Griffith 1995; Benson 1994; Lamphere, Stepick and 
Grenier 1994). As anthropologist Mark Grey explains, “For the most part, the 
meatpacking literature has documented the impacts of newcomers on rural 
communities...” (1999:16). However, the ethnographic research offered by Grey (1999), 
as well as Deborah Fink (1998), Carol Andreas (1994) and a few others, has yielded 
insights into the nature of work in the modern-day meatpacking industry and the 
experience of contemporary meatpacking workers. Still, what is missing from the current 
meatpacking literature is: 1) how unions are responding to restructuring within the 
industry, especially the changing demographics of the industry’s workforce; and 2) how 
contemporary meatpacking workers are organizing to improve their wages and working 
conditions. As a study of an organizing campaign among contemporary meatpacking 
workers, the majority of whom are Latino immigrants, this project partly fills such a void.
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To understand the dynamics of unionization among contemporary meatpacking 
workers we must consider how modern-day meatpacking is conditioned by historical 
changes within the industry. In many respects, today’s meatpacking industry manifests 
striking similarities to the industry at the turn of the twentieth century, when Upton 
Sinclair’s 1906 novel -  The Jungle — first brought the hazards of the industry to the 
public’s attention. In spite of the fact that meatpacking has undergone substantial 
restructuring during the second half of the twentieth century, newly arrived immigrants, 
poor working conditions and powerful industrial oligopolies still characterize the 
industry. And, just as the immigrants of the past suffered from the brutal working 
conditions of the labor-intensive industry, contemporary meatpacking workers suffer 
from repetitive motion disorders associated with disassembly line production. Although 
meatpacking unions were ultimately able to organize the industry and improve workers’ 
wages and working conditions during the first half of the twentieth century, meatpacking 
unionism was unable to resist the industrial restructuring that characterized the second 
half of the twentieth century.
Economic and Industrial Restructuring 
In many respects the meatpacking industry is an exemplary case of the economic 
and industrial restructuring that has characterized post-World War II America. Over the 
last few decades, U.S. industries have undergone a number of structural changes. For 
instance, technological innovations and the subsequent mechanization of production have 
led to a decline in employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector and a shift in the overall 
U.S. economy to the service sector. These same technological innovations, coupled with
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a favorable international trading and investment regime, have given companies greater 
geographic mobility and thus the ability to search for regions that offer cheaper 
production. This has resulted in capital flight from advanced industrial countries to 
lower-cost, less-developed countries (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999).
Accompanying these structural changes, the U.S. economy has experienced an 
intensification of international competition. Faced with increasing international 
competition, industries began experimenting with strategies to increase their profits by 
reducing labor and other costs. These strategies not only included shifting operations to 
lower-cost locations, but also restructuring and reorganizing operations and labor 
processes to achieve higher productivity and mobilizing new and cheaper pools of labor 
(Held et al. 1999). These strategies are certainly evident in the meatpacking industry, 
which over the last few decades has undergone dramatic restructuring including changes 
in the production process, a wave of plant relocations from urban areas to sparsely 
populated rural communities, a significant reduction of wage scales, deunionization and 
workforce recomposition (Stanley 1994:134). As geographer Michael Broadway 
(1994:30) explains, “Meatpacking is clearly representative of the overall changes that 
have occurred in the wider U.S. economy. Technical innovations and capital mobility 
have enabled new packing companies to locate their plants to rural areas close to feedlots 
in right-to-work states and away from unionized urban areas.” And because many of 
these rural areas lack adequate labor supply, especially for an industry that is physically 
demanding, dangerous, low paying and well-known for its high turnover rate, the 
industry has gone beyond the locales in which its plants are located to actively recruit
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workers, particularly Latino immigrants (Broadway 2001; Grey 1999; Stanley 1994; 
Lamphere et al. 1994).
Restructuring o f  the Meatpacking Industry
Prior to 1860, localized companies provided most of the meat in the United States 
because there was neither the refrigeration nor the transport capacity to allow for the 
perishable product to be shipped significant distances. However, innovations in 
refrigeration and consolidation of the railroad system facilitated the transformation of 
meatpacking to a mostly urban industry (Staggs 1986; Brody 1964). As a result of a 
series of related innovations in production, processing, transportation and marketing, the 
industry emerged during the late nineteenth century near railroad terminals in urban areas 
set within the extensive farming landscape of the Midwest (Herod 1998:266). From the 
late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, cattle were transported by railroad from 
production areas to urban areas where they were slaughtered in multistoried facilities 
located adjacent to the stockyards where the cattle were sold. This method of production 
continued throughout most of the twentieth century, until an Iowa-based meatpacking 
company, Iowa Beef Packers (IBP), pioneered revolutionary changes in the industry.
The “IB P  Revolution. ” In what came to be known as the “IBP revolution,” Iowa 
Beef Packers changed the character of the meatpacking industry through innovations in 
both processing and marketing (Broadway 1995:17-8). The company’s innovations and 
cost-cutting strategies initiated an entire reorganization of the industry, which has 
resulted in modern-day meatpacking (Broadway 2000; Stull, Broadway and Griffith 
1995; Lamphere et al. 1994).
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Unlike its predecessors, IBP constructed plants in rural towns close to the supply 
of cattle. By locating its plants close to the cattle supply, the company was able to reduce 
the transport costs and the costly shrinkage and bruising associated with shipping cattle 
long distances. Locating close to the cattle supply also enabled IBP to reduce its costs by 
purchasing cattle directly from farmers and eliminating the middleman (Broadway 
2000:38). In addition, IBP changed the actual structure of the meatpacking plant facility. 
Unlike the older meatpacking facilities, IBP built single-story facilities, which instead of 
utilizing gravity to move the animals through the plant used a powered chain to transport 
them along a disassembly line. “Under this system, workers are stationed along a line 
and perform the same task as each animal passes by” (Broadway 1999:66). The new 
system proved to be much more efficient than the traditional gravity system used in 
multi-storied plants and therefore resulted in significant gains in productivity (Broadway 
1999: 66). This “disassembly line” mode of production, which was made possible by 
technological innovations and increased mechanization, also allowed for the reduction of 
labor costs by eliminating the need for highly skilled butchers, who could be replaced by 
“unskilled” laborers able to perform repetitive tasks. Subsequently, IBP used this 
“deskilling” as rationale for reducing wages and avoiding the terms of industry-wide 
union contracts that had been established, arguing that less skill was required in their 
newer plants than in the older ones (Broadway 1999:66).
Accompanying this “disassembly line” mode of production has been an increase 
in work-related injuries and illness, the most common being related to repetitive motions. 
As Broadway (1995:20) explains the most common injury among line workers is carpal
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tunnel syndrome, a disorder that occurs when too much pressure is put on the median
nerve that passes through the wrist to the hand. The rapid, repetitive nature of work on
the disassembly line and the management’s regulation of line speed are generally credited
with the syndrome’s high incidence in the industry. Furthermore, Broadway (1995:20)
notes, “Injury and illness rates for meatpacking workers have increased since the 1970s,
and meatpacking proved to be the most hazardous industry in America throughout the
1980s, with an incidence rate for injuries and illness triple that for manufacturing as a
whole.” As of 2000, meatpacking remained the most dangerous industry in the United
States. As Eric Schlosser, an award-winning investigative journalist, reports:
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, meatpacking is the nation’s 
most dangerous occupation. In 1999, more than one-quarter of America’s 
nearly 150,000 meatpacking workers suffered a job-related injury or 
illness. The meatpacking industry not only has the highest injury rate, but 
also has by far the highest rate of serious injury -  more than five times the 
national average, as measured in lost workdays. If you accept the official 
figures, about 40,000 meatpacking workers are injured on the job every 
year. But the actual number is most likely higher given the industry’s 
well-documented history of discouraging injury reports, falsifying injury 
data, and putting injured workers back on the job quickly to minimize the 
reporting of lost workdays (2000b: 40).
Boxed Beef. In addition to relocating and restructuring plants, an additional IBP 
innovation, known as “boxed beef,” further lowered the company’s costs and facilitated 
the reorganization of the meatpacking industry. Horowitz (1997: 250) explains, “IBP 
founder Currier Holman saw an opportunity to dominate the beef trade by attaching 
breaking and boning operations to the slaughterhouses and bypassing both the 
wholesalers and the supermarket warehouse. This innovation quickly became known as
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‘boxed beef because of the manner in which the meat was shipped.” Moreover,
Broadway (1995) describes:
In 1967, IBP constructed a plant in Dakota City, Nebraska to produce a new 
product -  boxed beef. Boxed beef increased the company’s market share and 
lowered its transportation costs. Instead of shipping carcasses to its customers,
IBP removed fat and bone at the plant, thereby retaining valuable waste 
materials, such as entrails for pet food, and shipped vacuum-packaged 
proportions according to retail specifications. Vacuum-packaging appealed to 
customers, since it reduces shrinkage, which is caused by exposure to air, and 
adds to the product’s shelf life. The innovation also allowed meat wholesalers 
and supermarkets to lower their labor costs by eliminating most of their 
skilled butchers and contributed to an increasing demand for the product. IBP 
responded by constructing additional large slaughter-capacity plants close to 
feedlots in the High Plains during the 1970s and 1980s (P. 19)
In short, boxed beef reduced costs in two significant ways. First, meat producers and 
retailers saved money because boxed beef eliminated the skilled meat cutters who had 
previously broken down carcasses into customer cuts. Horowitz (1997:251) explains that 
in effect, boxed beef eliminated the need for a separate “fabrication” stage in between the 
slaughterhouse and retailer, which subsequently eliminated most of the skilled meat 
butchers. He describes, “Boxed beef effectively transferred the work of skilled, union 
butchers from the fabrication warehouse to the packinghouse, where the tasks were 
deskilled and performed by low-wage, nonunion laborers (Horowitz 1997:251). Indeed, 
Horowitz (1997:251) notes, “According to a 1987 survey, boxed beefs primary attraction 
to retailers was its reduced labor requirements.” Second, companies saved transportation 
costs by eliminating the practice of shipping bones and scraps, and in their place shipped 
more meat. Horowitz (1997:251) explains, “Because these meatpacking companies no 
longer paid to ship unusable bones and meat scraps, savings in transportation expenses 
allowed them to undercut prices of firms that shipped beef in carcass form.” Boxed beef
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not only increased IBP’s share of the meatpacking market, but also, with its cost 
advantage, encouraged restructuring throughout the industry.
The structural transformation of meat production and processing was 
accompanied by corporate restructuring, in which older unionized facilities were forced 
to abandon their traditional system of production in order to remain competitive with the 
aggressive new facilities. Basically, because the new facilities were much more 
economical, the older, urban-based, and mostly unionized firms were forced to cut their 
costs in order to remain competitive. Consequently, the innovations introduced by IBP 
resulted in the shutting down of older packinghouses and the reopening of modem, 
technologically advanced facilities in rural, livestock producing areas. This restructuring, 
eventually meant that the plants located in union strongholds were closed and moved to 
non-union rural areas, while the older plants that remained in urban areas either 
demanded wage concessions or closed their older unionized facilities and reopened them 
at lower wage levels. According to Craypo (1994:75) these trends resulted in the closure 
of more than 400 meatpacking plants and the loss of some 40,000 jobs between 1972 and 
1987. Moreover, he explains that the number of workers covered by union contracts 
declined from 70,000 in 1976 to 30,000 in 1983 (Craypo 1994:75).
As a consequence of the rapid decline of unionized plants, local meatpacking 
unions were reduced in size or completely eliminated. The unions that managed to hang 
on lacked the resources, both financial and in terms of actual manpower, needed to 
organize the new plants. Thus, they focused on mere survival, which resulted in union 
mergers and concession bargaining.
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The Formation o f  the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW)
In 1979, in an attempt to gain back some strength that was lost with the 
restructuring of the industry, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen 
Union merged with the Retail Clerks International Union to form the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW). This merger combined approximately 700,000 retail 
clerks and 500,000 meatpacking workers into a single union of 1.2 million members 
(Skaggs 1986:204). As a result, the UFCW became one of the largest unions affiliated 
with the American Federation of Labor -  Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL- 
CIO). Today, the UFCW represents approximately 1.4 million workers in many different 
industries, but concentrated in retail food, meatpacking, poultry, and other food 
processing industries (United Food and Commercial Workers 2001a).
The majority of unionized meatpacking workers in the United States are 
represented by the UFCW. However, there are also a number of meatpacking workers 
represented by other unions such as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). 
For instance, economist Charles Craypo (1994:76) notes, “In 1992 the Teamsters (IBT) 
had beefpacking contracts with IPB at Pasco, Washington (a relatively small plant) and 
Amarillo, Texas; with ConAgra at Garden City, Kansas; and with Excel at Fort Morgan, 
Colorado. It also had contracts in porkpacking.”
While the merger of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union and Retail Clerks 
Union provided clear advantages for both unions; for example, the advantages associated 
with gains in resources and absolute numbers, many argue that this merger came with a
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cost to the meatpacking membership (Fink 1998; Page 1998; Halpem 1997; Horowitz
1997; Andreas 1994). Fink (1998), for example, argues:
The logic of the merger was that if workers were to face larger and more 
determined anti-union companies, they needed a larger base of power and 
deeper pockets. The other side of such a merger was that meatpacking 
workers became one corner of a larger organization, and they could not 
necessarily count on their agenda becoming a priority of the entire union.
(P. 60)
Moreover, labor historian Roger Horowitz (1997), in documenting meatpacking
unionists’ sentiments regarding the merger, notes:
Omaha unionist Max Graham, while working for the UFCW, used the 
analogy of “a shot of whiskey” to compare the organizations. “When we 
was the UPWA [United Packinghouse Workers of America], we was little 
but powerful. Then we joined the Amalgamated and we got like a mixed 
drink. Now it looks to me like we’re a shot in a quart of Squirt.” (P. 264)
At the time of the merger, meatpacking workers represented less than ten percent of the
newly established UFCW’s membership (Horowitz 1997:265). Consequently, the Retail
Clerks dominated the organization (Horowitz 1997:265). They dominated the UFCW not
only because they made up the majority of the newly formed union’s membership, but
also because their membership base was increasing while the Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen, on the other hand, were experiencing difficulties in expanding their
membership. Andreas (1994:72) explains, “While membership in the Meat Cutters union
had been declining, membership in the Retail Clerks union had increased, because service
jobs were beginning to replace manufacturing jobs in the 1970s.” Furthermore, Page
(1998), asserts:
Meatpacking had always been somewhat of a secondary concern for the 
Amalgamated and when the UFCW was created, packinghouse workers 
became an even smaller fish in a rapidly expanding organizational pond
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dominated by retail workers. Given the traditional bargaining practices in 
the retail field and the fact that packinghouse workers account for only a 
small fraction of the UFCW’s total membership, the union’s leadership 
has not always taken an aggressive stance in the meatpacking industry. In 
fact, in 1987 the UFCW leadership chose to abandon its yearlong 
organizing drive at IBP plants -  over the objections of its packinghouse 
division chief -  as part of a backdoor “sweetheart” agreement with IBP 
that kept some plants unorganized while allowing the union into other 
plants, although under terms quite favorable to the company. (P. 288)
Concession Bargaining. As Page (1998) indicates, the restructuring of the
meatpacking industry and the resulting decline in union membership and strength, not
only resulted in union mergers, but also led to concession bargaining between unions and
the industry. Horowitz (1997) explains:
Concessions accelerated almost as soon as the UFCW formed. In 1980 
and 1981 at least two dozen companies asked for concessions while 
contracts were in effect. Many threatened to close their plants if the union 
did not comply. Despite opposition from the packinghouse division, at 
least a half-dozen firms secured concessions by making agreements with 
local unions. In these instances, the contracts were approved by UFCW 
President William Wynn over the objections of Anderson [Director of the 
UFCW’s Packinghouse Division] (P. 266)
Moreover, Horowitz (1997:266) details, “In December 1981, with one year left under the
national contracts, threats of plant closings persuaded the UFCW and the packinghouse
division to grant concessions at five major packing companies with thirty thousand
workers.”
Throughout the 1980s, the meatpacking industry effectively forced concessions 
from the UFCW. Although dozens of local strikes erupted against the industry’s 
concessionary pressures, they were universally defeated (Horowitz 1997:268). By 1990, 
Horowitz (1997:276) reports, “Union concessions brought meatpacking wages 20 percent
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below the average for manufacturing. Real wages (adjusted for inflation) plummeted 30 
percent between 1979 and 1990.”
The decline of organized labor in meatpacking has meant that unions no longer 
exercise pressure on the overall level of wages and working conditions in the industry. 
Inside the plants, this decline has been accompanied by a return to the system that 
characterized meatpacking at the turn of the twentieth century, which was so vividly 
captured and described by Upton Sinclair in his groundbreaking expose of the industry, 
The Jungle. Similar to the turn of the last century, today, the flow of casual labor in and 
out of meatpacking plants draws on workers who have the most limited employment 
options. Whereas at the turn of the last century, these workers were mostly newly arrived 
European immigrants, today’s meatpacking workforce is comprised mostly of immigrants 
from Latin America.
Recomposition o f  the Meatpacking Workforce
Coinciding with the restructuring of the meatpacking industry and the decline in 
meatpacking unionization has been a rapid recomposition of the industry’s workforce. 
Over the last few decades, this workforce has undergone dramatic changes, in which the 
composition of the workforce has shifted toward nearly complete reliance on Latino 
immigrants. Although workforce composition within the industry varies considerably 
from plant to plant, industry wide, the number of Latino immigrants has increased 
dramatically, especially in the Midwest where they typically make up half or more of the 
workforce (Gouveia and Saenz 2000; Broadway 2000; Craypo 1994; Stanley 1994).
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While conventional explanations of the deterioration of unionization, as well as
wages and working conditions, in the meatpacking industry generally assert that the
changing workforce demographics are to be blamed, Stanley (1992:113) agues that while
the employment of immigrants in the industry has coincided with this deterioration, it has
been more the result of this deterioration, rather than its cause. Moreover, she claims,
“While the deterioration of wages and working conditions in the industry was not caused
by the influx of immigrant and refugee workers, their presence made it easier for
meatpacking firms to slash wages, speed-up production, and weaken or eliminate labor
unions” (Stanley 1992:115). She explains the relationship between industrial
restructuring, workforce recomposition, and deunionization in meatpacking as follows:
A key effect of the industry’s restructuring has been the decline of union 
strength. The relocation of packing plants allowed firms to escape or 
avoid union contracts, and organizing efforts in the new plants have 
proven difficult because of high employee turnover. The presence of large 
numbers of foreign-born workers has also hindered organizing attempts.
Most entered the industry as union strength was declining and in areas 
where unions were non-existent. The unions are often viewed as 
ineffective since they have not been able to protect workers from wage- 
give-backs and line speed-ups. In an effort to recruit foreign-born 
members, the unions now employ bilingual organizers. While there have 
been a few successful organizing drives in recent years, these have been 
largely confined to new plants in old packing towns with strong union 
traditions. Key segments of the industry, including many of the largest 
plants, remain unorganized. (1992:114).
In short, the changing workforce demographics in meatpacking have been an 
integral part of the process of industrial restructuring. Demand for immigrant labor, to a 
great extent, was created by the industry as companies pursued restructuring strategies, 
which made meatpacking employment less attractive to native-born workers. Formerly 
characterized as a relatively high-wage manufacturing industry, today, meatpacking
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wages have fallen well below the national average for manufacturing. Page (1998:288) 
reports, “In 1971, wages in meatpacking were 117 percent of the average for all 
manufacturing; today, they are less than 80 percent of that average.” Likewise, Bacon 
(1999:20) reports the average meatpacking wages are now between $9 and $10 an hour, 
the same level, adjusted for inflation, that they were at twenty years ago and $4 lower 
than today’s average manufacturing wage. Associated with the declining wages and 
dangerous working conditions that characterize today’s meatpacking industry, labor 
turnover at most plants is estimated to be as high as 100 percent annually (Grey 1999; 
Schlosser 1998; Hackenberg, Griffith, Stull and Gouveia 1993; Stanley 1992). This 
turnover has necessitated a constant flow of new labor supplies, which largely has been 
filled by Latino immigrants.
For the most part, jobs in the meatpacking industry are unattractive to native-born 
workers who have more options and are therefore more likely to refuse such jobs because 
of their low wages and hazardous working conditions. Grey (1997:22) explains, “For 
most Anglo production workers, packing jobs are jobs of last resort.. .The difficult and 
repetitive nature of the work and the recent history of low wages created the reputation of 
packing jobs that does not inspire Anglo labor.” Given the physically demanding nature 
of meatpacking work, the hazardous working conditions, and the low pay, it is not 
surprising that employment in the industry has become increasingly less attractive to 
native-born Anglo workers who may have more employment options. Conversely, 
immigrant Latino workers, often with less employment opportunities, are likely to be 
attracted to meatpacking jobs because neither English proficiency nor previous work
47
experience are required, and because, by national standards, these are relatively well- 
paying jobs (Stanley 1994, 1992). Also adding to the equation is the fact that 
meatpacking employers, driven by small profit margins and the desire to keep labor costs 
as low as possible, have become increasingly dependent on the low-cost labor that 
immigrant Latino workers provide and therefore have actively recruited among this 
population.
Recruitment o f  Immigrant Workers. As low wages and difficult working
conditions reduced the meatpacking industry’s attractiveness to an Anglo workforce,
employers began recruiting immigrant workers into the industry (Stromquist and
Bergman 1997:9). A number of scholars, including Gouveia and Saenz (2000), Grey
(1999), Stromquist and Bergman (1997), Cooper and Grey (1997) and Stanley (1994)
have documented how immigrant workers have been recruited, both directly and
indirectly, into the meatpacking industry. These scholars have documented how
meatpacking employers recruited immigrant workers directly by employing a staff of
recruiters who travel to areas of high unemployment both within and outside of the
United States border to secure workers. For example, based on her research examining
the process of immigrant incorporation into the meatpacking industry in the Midwest,
Kathleen Stanley (1994) explains:
Some of the largest companies employ a staff of labor recruiters who 
target areas with high unemployment. The recruiters travel to these areas, 
conduct interviews, and offer jobs to those willing to migrate. Workers 
who move more than one hundred miles receive 16 cents per mile in 
compensation and advances of up to $200 to help them get settled. In 1990 
informants indicated that most new recruits were arriving in the Midwest 
from southern Texas and northern Mexico. (P. 139)
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Similarly, based on his 1997 case study of immigrant meatpacking workers at a Hog
Pride Pork plant in Storm Lake, Iowa, Grey (1999) asserts:
Newcomers to Storm Lake with whom I became familiar were Mexican 
Mennonites. About seventy had migrated to Stork Lake from Mexico and 
Texas in order for the male household heads to take jobs at IBP....The 
men were directly recruited by IBP and its agents at their settlements in 
Chihuahua Province. With job offers in hand, and the assistance of IBP’s 
agent (whom the workers also paid), they easily obtained green cards to 
enter the United States legally. (P. 248)
Recruitment of workers into the industry also takes place through workers’ social 
networks. Informal local, national, and international social networks based on kinship 
and friendship ties among Latino workers are used to inform Latino immigrants about 
meatpacking jobs, which subsequently facilitates further migration (Grey 1999; Stanley 
1994; Gouveia and Stull 1995). Meatpacking employers frequently utilize these kinship 
and friendship ties to recruit workers into their plants by offering bonuses to workers who 
recruit additional workers. As Stanley (1994:139) describes, “Workers at some plants
receive bonuses for recruiting family members and friends. A typical bonus is $150 if the
In addition, immigrant workers have been recruited into the meatpacking industry
through local and state employment agencies, as well as through federally supported job
placement programs. Stanley (1994) explains the ways in which federal programs have
been utilized to recruit workers into the meatpacking industry:
The structure of federally supported job-placement programs has had an 
important impact on the recomposition of the labor force in the industry. 
Programs designed to promote self-sufficiency among refugees and to 
move seasonal agricultural workers into permanent employment have 
encouraged these individuals to take meatpacking jobs.... Because in the 
Midwest meatpacking jobs are plentiful and open to non-English-speaking
new recruit makes it past the probationary period, which is usually 90 or 120 days.”
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workers, the service providers must often encourage their clients to apply 
for these jobs even when they themselves have reservations, which many 
do, about the working conditions in the plants. Other federal programs 
also encourage meatpackers to hire certain categories of workers. 
According to one state employment official in Kansas, the meatpacking 
firms make “extensive” use of two employment programs that result in 
significant subsidies to the industry. Under the Job Training Partnership 
Act, federal funds will pay for half the basic wages of disadvantaged 
workers during the initial training period. In rural areas, this program is 
frequently used to help move seasonal agricultural workers into full-time 
employment in meatpacking. Another important program is the Targeted 
Jobs Tax Credit program designed to help disadvantaged workers escape 
chronic unemployment. Under this program employers can claim tax 
credits equal to 40 percent of the first $6,000 of qualified wages paid to 
the applicant during the first year on the job. (P. 140)
Workforce Recomposition and Unionization. Regarding the changing
demographics of the meatpacking industry’s workforce and what it has meant for
unionization, very few scholars have taken up the issue and those who have deliver
mixed conclusions. Scholars such as Grey (1999, 1997) and Horowitz (1997 argue that
the changing workforce demographics, more specifically the recruitment of immigrant
workers, has impeded unionization. Horowitz (1997), for instance, claims:
The flow of casual labor in and out of packinghouses draws on workers 
who have the most limited options. Packinghouse workers travel in a 
cyclical pattern from plant to plant in the Midwest, seeking new 
employment after layoffs or trying to find slightly better wages and 
conditions. Packinghouse companies aggressively recruit Mexicans and 
Southwestern Asians and are able to use federal job training programs to
subsidize the transportation and training costs This fundamental
recomposition of the meatpacking labor force has impeded unionization.
(P. 277)
Similarly, based on his research at a Hog Pride Pork plant in Storm Lake, Iowa, Grey 
(1999:21) maintains, “Although several Latinos were active union members and some 
were even shop stewards, the Latino propensity to treat Hog Pride jobs as temporary
50
threatened the historical sense of what union members were suppose to do. Indeed, large-
scale turnover and Latino migration in particular undermined the power of union leaders
by preventing union activism.”
Several other scholars, such as Herod (1998), Fink (1998) and Andreas (1994),
however, argue that it is organized labor and unions themselves that have been slow to
respond and adapt to changes within the meatpacking industry and therefore share
responsibility for the decline in union membership and strength in the industry. For
example, based on her case study of a unionized meatpacking plant in Perry, Iowa, Debra
Fink (1998:151) pointed out that Anglo meatpacking union leaders may have accepted
Latino members, but they were unwilling to give up white privilege to achieve a broader
and more cohesive union voice. She maintains:
The union was not limited to white workers, and not all white workers 
were members, but its local leadership and the majority o f its members 
were white. It was attempting to include Latino and black workers....Yet 
the union was ambivalent with respect to the prospect of giving up white 
privilege in exchange for a broad and more united collective voice (Fink 
1998:151).
Likewise, based on her research at a Monfort meatpacking plant in Greeley, Colorado,
sociologist Carol Andreas (1994:147) explains that even though the UFCW has been
attempting to organize immigrant meatpacking workers, many of these workers may feel
that the union, which initially supported the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
that provides sanctions against the hiring of undocumented workers, “is not their best
defense against company abuse.” Moreover, she notes:
Most union policy-makers are older white males, far removed from the 
plant floor. Few union officials speak Spanish. If today’s meatpackers are 
to be organized from within their own workplaces, they may have to be so
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-  at least initially — with little assistance or encouragement from the union 
(Andreas 1994:108).
Although the prevailing explanation for unionization’s decline in the meatpacking
industry suggests that the changing demographics of the industry’s workforce hinders
unionization, recent events illustrate that across the United States Latino immigrants are
at the forefront of revitalizing meatpacking unionism. For example, in June 2000 at a
“Dakota Premium Foods meatpacking plant in South St. Paul, Minnesota, workers, mostly
Latino immigrants, stopped production for nearly eight hours during a sit-down strike.
This strike instigated a union organizing campaign that resulted in the workers voting in
the plant’s first union, UFCW Local 789 (Rivera 2001:3). As journalist Marco Antonio
Rivera (2000) reported:
Workers at Dakota Premium, the majority of whom were bom in Mexico 
and Central America, shut down production on June 1 st, 2000, for seven- 
and-a-half hours to protest working conditions and production line speed 
in particular. The sit down strike initiated an organizing drive that 
culminated in a union victory seven weeks later when the meat packers 
voted 112 to 71 to join the UFCW. (P. 3)
In addition, on February 26, 2001, hundreds of Latino immigrant meatpacking workers
staged a wildcat strike against northeastern Colorado’s largest employer, Excel
Corporation, demanding better wages and working conditions (Aguilar 2001). Journalist
Roger Calero explained the strike as follows:
Nearly 400 meat packers at Excel Corp.’s plant in Fort Morgan, Colorado 
staged a wildcat strike February 26 to protest working conditions and 
demand a three-year contract with higher wages and benefits. The walkout 
began one day after the union members, most of whom are Mexican and 
Central American immigrants, rejected a six-year contract in a 917-59 
vote...the strike ended with the unionists drafting a list of 14 demands to 
be included in the contract negotiations. (P. 7)
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Also in 2001, immigrant meatpacking workers at Long Prairie Packing located in Long 
Prairie, Minnesota, stopped production in the boning department and demanded that the 
bosses slow down the speed of the production line (Fruit and Malapanis 2001:7). Most 
recently, unsatisfied with their union representation at a Swift and Company meatpacking 
plant in Greeley, Colorado, Latino immigrant workers spearheaded an effort challenging 
and ultimately forcing the resignation of their union’s (UFCW Local 990) entrenched 
leadership (Swanson 2002).
Through a case study of an organizing campaign among Latino immigrant 
workers in South Omaha’s meatpacking industry, not only am I able to examine the 
extent to which the fundamental changes that have occurred within the meatpacking 
industry over the last few decades, specifically the transformation of the workforce from 
a predominately Anglo native-born workforce to an increasingly Latino immigrant 
workforce, affects contemporary meatpacking unionism, but also assess the degree to 
which these changes have fostered changes within meatpacking unions themselves. For 
example, this study elaborates how union structures, cultures, strategies, and tactics have 
or have not been modified as a result of industrial restructuring and the need to 
accommodate the changing demographics of the meatpacking workforce. Furthermore, 
given that the meatpacking industry in many ways exemplifies the structural changes that 
have occurred in the overall U.S. economy, specifically declining unionization and 
changing workforce demographics, it offers a textbook case for exploring key factors 
affecting contemporary immigrant unionization. This study adds to our understanding of 
the factors likely to affect labor organization among contemporary immigrants.
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This study builds on research in several areas, including: 1) contemporary 
immigrant unionization; 2) community-based organizing and community-labor alliances; 
and 3) meatpacking unionism. Little research has explored unionization among 
contemporary immigrant workers, especially workers in the Midwest. Furthermore, 
although much literature exists on the meatpacking industry and its unions, little of this 
research has focused on contemporary unionization among the industry’s predominately 
Latino workforce. From the vantage point of the UFCW/OTOC campaign to organize 
South Omaha’s meatpacking workers, the majority of whom are Latino immigrants, this 
study provides a needed addition to the research and literature.
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Chapter III 
Methods
This research is based on a case study in which I utilize a combination of 
qualitative methods, including participant observation, semi-structured and in-depth 
interviews, as well as a review of institutional histories and documents from a variety of 
organizations such as the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), the 
AFL-CIO’s Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA), the Industrial 
Areas Foundation (IAF) and its affiliate Omaha Together One Community (OTOC). In 
addition, I utilize public records and media sources as supplemental evidence and to 
crosscheck field observations and interviews.
This research is based largely on a case study of the UFCW/OTOC organizing 
campaign among South Omaha’s estimated 4000 meatpacking workers. This campaign 
officially began and was publicly announced in June 2000. As explained in a UFCW 
press release:
More than four thousand people, the majority of whom are new 
immigrants, work in Omaha’s meat packing industry. Latino workers are 
fighting to improve working conditions and gain basic respect on the job.
The United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) 
and Omaha Together/One Community (OTOC) will announce a joint 
organizing campaign with new immigrant workers at a press conference 
on Tuesday, June 20, 2000, at 1:30 p.m. The new organizing campaign is 
committed to mobilizing workers to stand up for their legal rights on the 
job with the backing of the largest meat packing workers’ union in the 
country, the UFCW. (United Food and Commercial Workers 2000a)
The UFCW, which represents over 1.4 million workers, is one of the largest private
sector unions in the United States. This union, formed in 1979 with the merger of the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union and the Retail Clerks International Union, is affiliated
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with American Federation of Labor -  Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). 
For the most part, the UFCW has union jurisdiction over the meatpacking industry in the 
United States, representing an estimated 250,000 meatpacking and food processing 
workers (United Food and Commercial Workers 2003). In Omaha, the union is 
represented by UFCW Local 271, which is under the direction of the UFCW Northcentral 
Region 6.
OTOC, which is a community-based organization, is the other organization 
participating in the campaign among South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. Founded in 
1992, OTOC represents over forty member organizations, most of which are religious 
congregations. Its parent organization is the Southwest Network of the Industrial Areas 
Foundation (IAF). The IAF is a national network of community-based organizations, 
which represents the largest and oldest institution for community-based organizing in the 
United States (Dahle 1999:294).
Phases of Data Collection
This research is informed by several phases of data collection. The first of these 
phases took place during the summer of 1998 when I participated in the national AFL- 
CIO’s Union Summer Program. As a Union Summer intern I spent four weeks in Fox 
Valley, Wisconsin, working with several local unions, including the UFCW, on various 
organizing campaigns. This experience informs my research in that, as an intern, I had 
the opportunity to experience organizing campaigns from their inception. As a 
participant in these campaigns I was able to observe many aspects of the AFL-CIO and 
its affiliated unions’ structure, culture, organizing strategies and tactics. These
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campaigns utilized what are commonly referred to as “traditional” union organizing 
strategies, which include handbilling, housecalling, authorization card signing, and 
worker committee meetings. Directly participating in these strategies has allowed me to 
evaluate their effectiveness. These are some of the same strategies the UFCW utilized in 
its organizing campaign among meatpacking workers in South Omaha. Parallel to my 
experience, the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign analyzed here was initiated once 
Omaha was declared the site for the AFL-CIO’s 2000 Union Summer program.
The second phase of this research occurred while I was working as a Graduate 
Research Assistant on a project that focused on the incorporation of Latino immigrants 
into two rural communities in Nebraska that have meatpacking plants as their primary 
employers. Data collection for this project consisted of interviews with various 
community members, including meatpacking workers, meatpacking industry 
representatives, union representatives, community and political leaders, business owners, 
law enforcement and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials. My 
particular data collection consisted primarily of interviews with representatives of the 
UFCW Local 22. All of the members of Local 22’s full-time staff, including the 
President, Secretary-Treasurer, and Business Agents were interviewed. In addition, 
interviews were conducted with the following: 1) meatpacking union stewards; 2) former 
and current meatpacking workers; 3) the manager of a sanitation company, which 
subcontracts the third shift or “sanitation crew” at several of the meatpacking plants 
throughout rural Nebraska; and 4) INS officials. In addition to these interviews, I
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collected and analyzed secondary data such as public records and historical documents 
regarding the meatpacking industry in these two rural Nebraska communities.
Through this research I was able to gain a better understanding of the 
meatpacking industry, its workforce and unions, prior to conducting research and 
interviews associated specifically with the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign in South 
Omaha. Because UFCW Local 22 has had union jurisdiction of the meatpacking industry 
throughout the state of Nebraska, it was primarily through this research project that I first 
gained an understanding of the structure of meatpacking unions in Nebraska. This 
research allowed me to gather background information on the union and its membership, 
which infonns my current case study. Furthermore, gaining both workers5 and 
organizers’ perspectives prior to interviewing individuals involved in the UFCW/OTOC 
organizing campaign helped structure and inform my interviews and data collection.
The third phase of this research includes my participation in the Nebraska 
Lieutenant Governor’s Task Force on Immigration Enforcement in the Workplace. This 
task force was a year-long effort to research and analyze the effects of recent immigration 
legislation and enforcement, specifically an enforcement effort dubbed “Operation 
Vanguard,” on various institutions in Nebraska, including the state’s economy, livestock 
and meatpacking industries, social services and agencies, workers, immigrants and 
communities. The task force was composed of representatives from the aforementioned 
institutions as well as representatives from advocacy organizations, religious 
communities, labor unions and academia. In addition, representatives from the INS as 
well as Nebraska’s congressional offices served as ex-officio members of the task force.
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I, too, participated in the task force as an ex-officio member. This allowed me to learn 
more about the ways in which employers construct their arguments regarding the number 
and kinds of workers they need and the type of immigration policies most beneficial to 
them. My participation in the task force also allowed me to establish contact with a 
variety of actors in the meatpacking industry, and through these contacts I was able to 
tour a meatpacking plant and interview industry representatives.
In addition, as part of the task force, I assisted Dr. Lourdes Gouveia in the 
construction and implementation of a survey of meatpacking industry human resource 
directors and union representatives at more than forty meatpacking plants identified by 
the INS as targets of its enforcement operation, Operation Vanguard. The primary focus 
of this survey was to ascertain the effects of INS enforcement operations, particularly 
Operation Vanguard, on wages and working conditions in the meatpacking industry.
Also of importance was how INS enforcement efforts within the meatpacking industry 
affect unionization. Most importantly, my participation in task force meetings, along 
with conversations with union representatives who participated in the task force, allowed 
me to explore the relationship between immigration and unionization, particularly how 
immigration legislation and enforcement efforts affect unionization. By assisting in the 
survey of union representatives, I had the opportunity to investigate the results of INS 
operations on both meatpacking workers and unions.
Finally, my participation in the task force allowed me to evaluate the extent to 
which unions, local meatpacking unions in particular, are taking up the issue of 
immigration and are involved in issues affecting immigrant workers. The involvement of
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unions, or lack thereof, in such “task forces” demonstrates to some extent their 
commitment to addressing issues relevant to immigrant workers and their communities. 
The participation of unions in the Lt. Governor’s task force exemplifies how immigrant 
concerns alter the traditional representational roles and responsibilities of unions, and 
furthermore, how unions attempt, or neglect, to address the issues concerning immigrant 
workers. Union representatives participating in this task force were not outspoken in 
their opposition to INS enforcement operations. In fact, they had very little to say about 
Operation Vanguard. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the national ALF-CIO had not 
yet reserved its position on immigration and therefore its affiliates were still operating
under the federation’s historic exclusionary position, which supported restrictive
•  •  •  0immigration policies such as employer sanctions.
The final and central phase of this research began in November 1999, when I first 
attended an OTOC “Temporary Workers Committee” meeting held at Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Parish Hall in South Omaha. This meeting was my introduction to 
community-based organizing and the organization of workers outside the official U.S. 
labor movement (the AFL-CIO). Following this meeting, I began observing additional 
OTOC meetings and “actions,” in which I was invited to participate. Within months of
2 In 1999 the AFL-CIO formed a Special Committee on Immigration, which was charged with 
the task o f studying and recommending changes to the AFL-CIO’s immigration policy, 
particularly its position on employer sanctions. In February 2000, this committee recommended 
changing the policy that endorsed the creation o f employer sanctions. In a significant policy 
shift, the committee called for repealing penalties against employers who hire undocumented 
workers and granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants currently in the United States. 
Following the committee’s recommendations, on February 16, 2000 the AFL-CIO Executive 
Committee unanimously passed an historical resolution calling for the repeal o f employer 
sanctions and supporting the organization of immigrant workers (The National Immigration 
Forum 2000).
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my initial participation, OTOC and the UFCW formed an alliance to organize South 
Omaha’s estimated 4000 meatpacking workers. Observations of this unique labor- 
community alliance allowed me to witness and analyze an unprecedented organizing 
campaign, which is now being touted by the national AFL-CIO and a number of its 
affiliates as a promising model for organizing immigrants. Tracking the UFCW/OTOC 
organizing campaign from its inception has allowed me to critically explore and evaluate 
the effectiveness of such alliances. It has also allowed me to compare the two 
organizations and the differing structures, resources, and strategies that each brings to the 
campaign, and assess their particular effectiveness in organizing immigrant meatpacking 
workers. Finally, in this case study, I explore meatpacking workers’ perceptions of the 
two organizations, their collaborative campaign and their differing leadership, strategies 
and tactics, as well as workers’ receptivity to unionization in general.
Sample
My internship with the AFL-CIO and UFCW, participation in Nebraska’s Lt. 
Governor’s task force, and research with Dr. Lourdes Gouveia involving meatpacking 
communities allowed me to identify key contacts that have been essential as both 
interviewees and for identifying and enrolling additional participants in this study. These 
key contacts include both UFCW and OTOC representatives and organizers. It was 
through them that I initially gained access to meatpacking workers in South Omaha.
I interviewed a total of 31 individuals for this study. This sample size (N=31) 
allowed for both in-depth interviews and still a variety of experiences, as found in the 
following: 1) a cross-section of 23 workers from several different South Omaha
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•  • • • Tmeatpacking plants; 2) four community-based organizers; and 3) five union officials. 
These individuals were chosen using non-probability sampling techniques, including both 
purposive and referral sampling. They were carefully selected to represent relevant 
dimensions and important sources of variation in the population (Singleton, Jr. and Straits 
1999:158). Once I gained access to key contacts, I continued with referral sampling, in 
which the key contacts were asked to supply the names and contact information of 
members of the target population (Singleton, Jr. and Straits 1999:162). Another referral 
sampling technique utilized was snowball sampling, wherein at the conclusion of each 
interview I asked the interviewees if they could provide the names and contact 
information for other individuals whom might be interested in participating in the study. 
Inclusion criteria in the sample included any one of the following: 1) current or former 
union organizer and/or representative at the local, regional and/or national level; 2) 
current or former community-based organizer and/or representative; and 3) current or 
former meatpacking worker in South Omaha. Interviews took anywhere from ninety 
minutes to six hours, with an average of three hours and on some occasions required 
several settings. The length of the interviews was based on the extent to which 
interviewees chose to expand on their answers.
3 During the course of this study, one of the meatpacking workers I interviewed became an 
organizer and was therefore interviewed in both capacities. For this reason, the aforementioned 
number o f individuals does not correspond to the sample size of N =31.
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Instruments and Data Collection
Meatpacking Worker Interviews
Semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis 
with meatpacking workers unless there was a need for a translator, in which case, I 
utilized an individual trusted by both the interviewee and myself. Rather than contacting 
workers directly, I chose to use key contacts, who have earned the trust o f the workers 
and whose trust I also earned (i.e., UFCW and OTOC organizers), as a means to 
prospective participants. Key contacts distributed letters of invitation to workers and 
once these workers indicated that they were interested in participating in the study, the 
key contact arranged a date, time and place for the interview, that is, unless the worker 
preferred to contact me directly, in which case the key contact was not needed to 
schedule the interview. The interviews took place at locations preferred by the workers. 
Most interviews were conducted in the workers’ homes. Some interviews, however, took 
place at the following: 1) Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church located in South 
Omaha; 2) the UFCW/OTOC sub-office also located in South Omaha; and 3) public 
establishments, such as restaurants, where the workers felt comfortable.
I interviewed 23 workers from six different South Omaha meatpacking plants, 
including ConAgra5s Northern States, Armour Swift-Eckrich (ASE), Nebraska Beef, 
Greater Omaha, Quality Pork International (QPI), and Millard Processing Services 
(MPS). Prior to the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, MPS was the only one of these 
six plants unionized. The majority of the meatpacking workers I interviewed (8 out of 
23) were working for Northern States at the time of their interview. However, an
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additional 5 of the 23 workers had previously worked for Northern States, but at the time 
of their interview were working at different South Omaha meatpacking plants. In other 
words, 13 of the 23 workers interviewed had experience working at the Northern States 
plant. In addition to the 8 individuals working at this plant at the time of their interviews, 
6 individuals were working at ASE; 6 individuals were working at Nebraska Beef; and 
the final 3 individuals were working at Greater Omaha, QPI and MPS. The majority 
(N=21) of the meatpacking workers I interviewed were Latino immigrants, the bulk of 
whom (N=15) were Mexican. Interviewees also included two meatpacking workers from 
El Salvador, one from Guatemala and one from Honduras. Only one of the Latinos I 
interviewed was native-born. This individual is a second-generation Mexican-American. 
My sample also includes one Caucasian worker. Nearly 75 percent of the workers 
interviewed (N=17) have been residing in the U. S. for over a decade. The age of the 
interviewees ranges from 24 to 64, with a mean age of 40. In regard to gender, the 
interviewees are relatively evenly split, with 13 males and 9 females in the sample.
The purpose of these interviews was to explore the extent to which the 
background and demographic characteristics of meatpacking workers, specifically Latino 
immigrant workers, affects their propensity to support unionization. An additional 
objective of these interviews was to examine, from the workers’ perspectives, the process 
of unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign.
Community Organizer Interviews
“Community organizers” are defined here as OTOC organizers. These 
individuals were, for the most part, identified through pre-established personal contacts
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and subsequently asked to participate in the study. In addition, individuals identified in 
the media were invited to participate. Four OTOC organizers, all of whom are actively 
involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, were interviewed. These interviews 
took place at the following locations: 1) the UFCW/OTOC sub-office in South Omaha; 2) 
Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church; 3) organizers’ homes; and 4) public 
establishments of the organizer’s choosing. These interviews were semi-structured. The 
structured component included questions regarding the individual’s role in the 
UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. The structured component also included questions 
concerning the individual’s relationship to the Latino community in South Omaha. The 
unstructured component or “guided” questions were tailored to each interviewee 
according to his or her particular expertise and/or position in the organizing campaign.
Union Official Interviews 
Union officials include current and/or former organizers and/or representatives of 
the UFCW Local, Regional and/or International Union and the AFL-CIO, including the 
federation’s Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA). The majority of 
these interviewees were identified through pre-established personal contacts. These 
interviews were also semi-structured. The locations in which they were conducted were 
chosen by the interviewees and included both local union offices and public 
establishments. Interviews with union officials in Washington, D.C. were conducted via 
telephone. In total, five union officials were interviewed. O f the five, three were UFCW 
organizers and two were AFL-CIO representatives, including a representative from 
LCLAA.
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Examination o f  Public Records
Precise figures on union membership and activities are difficult to obtain. It has 
been my experience that unions are resistant to release information regarding their 
membership and organizing campaigns. Given that the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, which is an AFL-CIO affiliated union, also represents meatpacking workers, I 
made several attempts to invite representatives of their organization to participate in this 
study and to gather information regarding their meatpacking membership. Although I 
was able to establish that the Teamsters Warehouse Division represents meatpacking 
workers, when I finally was able to contact a union representative from this division they 
said that they could not be of assistance and referred me to the Teamsters Resource 
Division. To no avail, I left several messages with representatives of the Resource 
Division at the Teamsters Press Office in Washington, D.C. Also unsuccessfully, I made 
several attempts to contact representatives of the UFCW Minority Coalition in order to 
invite them to participate in this study, including sending letters of invitation and emails 
and making phone calls. In addition, the United Latinos of the UFCW declined my 
invitation to participate. Due to the aforementioned organizations’ failure to respond to, 
and in some cases outright refusal of, my requests for information and/or invitation to 
participate in this study, I depended on second-hand information and statistics obtained 
from: 1) the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; 2) the U.S. Department of Labor; and 3) the 
National Labor Relations Board.
According to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act o f 1959, 
union reports must be filed with the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards
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Administration (ESA) and Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS). These 
reports include the following information: 1) Union Constitutions and Bylaws; 2) Form 
LM-1 Reports, which disclose union membership fees and dues per fiscal year; 3) Union 
Annual Financial Reports that disclose financial activities such as assets, liabilities, 
receipts, disbursements, loans, investments, and payments to officers and employees; and 
4) Union Trusteeship Reports, which disclose information regarding trusteeship. I used 
these reports to obtain information regarding union membership and to serve as a cross- 
reference for information provided by interviewees and in the press and media.
In addition, I utilized information provided by Research, Education, Advocacy, 
and People (REAP), which is an independent, nonprofit reform group that emerged from 
the UFCW. REAP was founded in 1990 by former UFCW Packinghouse Director Lewie 
Anderson and has since grown to represent over two thousand members in an estimated 
twenty UFCW locals (Craypo 1994:76). Essentially, REAP serves as a UFCW watchdog 
by providing research, analysis and assistance to rank-and-file union members and 
officers. As explained by sociologist Carol Andreas (1994:78), “The organization 
denounces the high salaries of union officials, the infrequency of meetings among 
officials and delegates, and the oligarchic nature of the union’s leadership structures. It 
also serves as a watchdog on union giveaways to corporations.”
Finally, both the UFCW and OTOC were assessed in regards to their membership 
and leadership, as well as their hierarchical structure. For instance, UFCW and OTOC 
leadership were categorized according to ethnicity, in order to assess the ethnic diversity 
and integration, or lack there of, within each of the organizations. Specifically, I examine
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the ethnic composition of each of these organizations in order to evaluate the extent to 
which immigrant and native-born Latinos have or have not been incorporated and in what 
capacity.
Participant Observation
Interview data were complemented with participant observation in public and 
private meetings, which I was invited to attend. For the most part, these meetings took 
place at Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church and the UFCW/OTOC sub-office, both 
located in South Omaha. I also attended press conferences held by the UFCW, OTOC 
and the INS that were open to the public. In addition, I observed UFCW and OTOC 
“actions” in which I was invited to participate. By participating in these activities, I was 
able to observe the level and type of participation among meatpacking workers, union 
officials and community organizers, as well as among members of the Latino and 
religious communities. My participation in these activities also allowed me to observe 
the level and type of interaction between and among workers and organizers; for 
example, the level of communication, accessibility and receptivity between and among 
these individuals.
Data Analysis
The aforementioned methods of data collection were directed toward the 
development of theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967, 1965) refer to theory that is generated 
from the data as “grounded theory.” Moreover, Miles and Hubermann (1994) explain 
that grounded theory advocates a loosely structured research design that allows 
theoretical ideas to emerge from the field in the course of the study. In this study, data
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analysis consisted of systematically looking for patterns documented in field observations 
and interviews.
There are two primary levels of analysis: 1) the level o f meatpacking workers as 
individuals and/or groups subject to, and participating in, organizing campaigns; and 2) 
the level of the organizing campaign itself. First, the data is analyzed at the level of 
individual meatpacking workers and their propensity to support unionization based on a 
number of background and demographic characteristics that have been identified in the 
literature as affecting contemporary immigrant unionization, which include: 1) their legal 
status; 2) the length of time they have been residing in the United States and whether they 
view their stay in the country as temporary or permanent; 3) their prior union and/or other 
political experience; 4) their social networks, which include kinship, friendship, cultural 
and/or community ties; and 5) their nationality.
Second, the data is analyzed at an organizational level, which includes a 
juxtaposition of union and community-based organizing, as well as an analysis of the 
collaboration between a union (the UFCW) and a community-based organization 
(OTOC) in an organizing campaign. The UFCW and OTOC are analyzed independently 
and in alliance in order to assess their respective effectiveness in terms of organizing 
contemporary meatpacking workers, the majority of which are Latino immigrants. I 
analyze each organization’s history, structure, culture, strategies and tactics. I also 
consider their organizational resources and commitments (financial, physical and 
emotional), as well as objectives. Furthermore, I assess whether or not these two 
organizations have: 1) bilingual and/or Spanish-speaking staff, organizers and
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representatives; 2) integrated immigrant and native-born Latinos into organizing and 
leadership positions and incorporated their specific needs and concerns into the 
organization’s agenda; and 3) roots in and links to the Latino community and its 
institutions. Organizational strategies and tactics which I explore include: 1) workplace 
versus community organizing; 2) plant-by-plant versus industry-wide organizing; 3) 
leafleting or what is commonly referred to as handbilling; 4) visiting workers in their 
homes, which is also referred to as housecalling and/or one-on-ones; 5) contact with and 
recruitment of workers; 6) meetings; 7) actions; and 8) training and education.
Additional factors that will be analyzed include employer resistance to unionization (i.e., 
anti-union tactics utilized by employers during organizing campaigns) and the role of the 
state, particularly labor and immigration legislation and enforcement efforts.
Limitations and Implications 
Given that this research is a case study, it bears the “weaknesses” typically 
associated with case study research, which includes a lack of generalizability. By 
focusing on a single organizing campaign, I am unable to determine how much of what 
occurred was specific to the conditions prevailing in this particular campaign. However, 
case study research allows for the capturing of a rich reality of the organizing process, 
particularly the complex interaction among workers, their employers, their community 
and organized labor. Moreover, this micro-level research looks intensively at the 
organizing process itself, particularly the role played by immigrant workers, their 
communities and labor-community alliances to capture vivid analysis of the factors 
affecting unionization. Case studies play an important role in clarifying and expanding
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our knowledge and understanding of organizing strategies and campaigns. Although this 
is a case study of a single organizing campaign, the campaign consists of organizing 
efforts at several different meatpacking plants and the implications are much broader than 
the meatpacking industry to include other industries employing a significant number of 
Latino immigrants.
The implications and contributions of this study are both theoretical and practical. 
Theoretically, it allows us to rethink and challenge certain assumptions commonly held 
about the “unorganizability” of immigrant workers. It informs our understanding of the 
micro-process of labor organization, particularly among Latino immigrants. Additionally, 
it adds to the more recent efforts to document and analyze the relationship between 
contemporary immigrants and unionization.
Practically, this research may be helpful in describing factors that influence 
unionization among contemporary immigrant workers, specifically Latino immigrant 
meatpacking workers, and therefore help determine which strategies and approaches are 
most likely to facilitate labor organization. It is my hope that this research sheds light on 
current efforts to organize workers in the meatpacking industry and other industries with 
a predominantly Latino immigrant workforce. By exploring the complexity of factors 
that affect organizing an immigrant workforce, this study may help chart a new course for 
unionism within the meatpacking industry and the U.S. labor movement in general. 
Further research regarding immigrant unionization is needed in additional settings such 
as other industries and sectors of the economy with a predominantly immigrant 
workforce as well as a diversity of geographic locations.
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Finally, this research contributes to immigration and labor policy by illustrating 
the contradictions in these two bodies of legislation. For example, the National Labor 
Relations Act defines all workers, including the undocumented, as “workers” and 
therefore entitles them to protection under U.S. labor law, while immigration legislation, 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in particular, makes the employment of 
undocumented workers illegal and therefore subjects these workers to labor exploitation 
and ultimately deportation.
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Chapter IV
Latino Immigrant Meatpacking Workers and Unionization
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the complex ways in which the 
individual and group characteristics of Latino immigrant meatpacking workers affect 
unionization. Through an in-depth case study of the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign 
among an estimated 4000 meatpacking workers in South Omaha, this chapter explores 
the factors that have been identified in the literature as affecting immigrant unionization. 
Thus, I examine how the following factors affect immigrant workers’ propensity to 
unionize: 1) their legal status; 2) the length of time they have resided in the United States 
and their intended length of stay in the country; 3) their social networks, which included 
their kinship, friendship and cultural ties; 4) their prior union experience; and 5) 
demographic characteristics such as their nationality, gender and age.
South Omaha’s Meatpacking Industry 
South Omaha’s meatpacking industry dates back to the 1870s (Pratt 1981:13). In 
1876 John A. Smiley organized the Union Stock Yards Company (Larsen and Cottrell 
1997:72). Shortly after which, Omaha capitalist William A. Paxton, along with several 
Omaha businessmen and Alexander Swan, a powerful Wyoming “Cattle King,” 
established the South Omaha Land Company, which built packing houses in South 
Omaha and persuaded Geo. H. Hammond & Co. to open a slaughterhouse in the area 
(Larsen and Cottrell 1997:74). The cornerstones of the meatpacking industry, such as 
Swift & Company and Cudahy Packing Company, soon followed. According to Larsen 
and Cottrell (1997):
73
They all had their killing areas, fertilizer departments, bone yards, “arctic” 
rooms, and gut departments. Worth millions of dollars, they employed 
men who yearly slaughtered and dressed millions of animals. The only 
other larger packing centers in the United States were Kansas City and 
Chicago. (P. 77)
By the mid-1950s South Omaha surpassed these cities to become the largest 
livestock center in the world, a position it maintained until the early 1970s (Burbach 
1999:19). At this time there were nearly twenty meatpacking companies in South 
Omaha, including the industry leaders, Cudahy, Armour, Wilson, and Swift (Burbach 
1999:19). These firms were accompanied by a number of smaller companies, including 
Higgins Packing Company, Hoffman Brothers, Mayerowich & Vail, Roth & Sons and 
South Omaha Dressed Beef Company (Larsen and Cottrell 1997:142).
There are currently over a dozen meatpacking and processing plants in the South 
Omaha area, including Armour-Swift-Eckrich, Inc., ConAgra Beef Company (Northern 
States), Greater Omaha Packing Company, J.F. O’Neill Packing, John Roth & Sons, 
Mann’s International Meat Specialties, Inc., Millard Processing Services, Inc., Nebraska 
Beef, Omaha Steaks International, Quality Pork International, Rabe’s Quality Meats, Inc. 
and Skylark Meats, Inc. Altogether, these companies employ an estimated 4000 workers, 
80 to 90 percent of whom are Latino immigrants.
Latino Immigrant Workers’ Background and Demographic Characteristics 
Legal Status: Unionization and the “Undocumented”
The term “undocumented” refers to immigrants who are present in the United 
States without the permission of the U.S. government. Undocumented immigrants enter 
the United States either illegally, without being inspected by the immigration authorities,
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or by using false documents, or legally, with a temporary visa and then remain in the 
country beyond its expiration date. It is estimated that there are between 9 and 11 million 
undocumented immigrants currently residing in the United States (Bacon 200 lb: 1).
According to a February 1998 U.S. GAO report, the INS estimates that as many 
as 25 percent of the workers in Nebraska’s meatpacking industry are undocumented (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1998:15). However, both labor and community organizers 
estimate that an even greater percentage of the industry’s workforce in South Omaha is 
undocumented. Their estimates range up to 40 percent, with this percentage varying 
based on plant characteristics, such as size, management and ownership. As explained by 
a community organizer ( J a i  some plants in South Omaha, like Nebraska Beef, top-level 
managers are from Mexico and are therefore able to use their ethnic connections to 
recruit workers, most of which are undocumented, directly from Mexico. At these plants 
almost half of the workers are undocumented” (Interview February 3, 2000)?]Lending 
support to this organizer’s claim is the fact that in December 2000 three managers at 
Nebraska Beef were arrested and charged with smuggling undocumented workers from 
Mexico to work at the South Omaha meatpacking plant. According to a Lincoln Journal 
Star article, Nebraska Beef officials including the company’s vice president of human 
resources, a personnel manager and a recruiter, were arrested and accused of participating 
in a conspiracy to transport undocumented workers from Mexico to the South Omaha 
meatpacking plant for employment (Beck 2000).4
4 In 2002, federal prosecutors dropped their case against Nebraska Beef officials who 
were accused of conspiring to hire undocumented workers after a federal judge dropped 
the charges when the INS deported the immigrant witnesses (Australia Visa 2003).
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All of the immigrant meatpacking workers interviewed for this study indicated 
that were residing and working in the United States legally. However, 90 percent of them 
stated that at one point in time they were working in the country illegally, as 
undocumented immigrants. These workers revealed that they initially had migrated to 
the United States and gained employment in the country illegally. Most of them made 
the transition from undocumented to documented status by gaining amnesty under the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Basically, IRCA provided 
amnesty to undocumented immigrants who could demonstrate that they had lived in the 
United States continuously since 1982 or that they had resided in the United States and 
performed seasonal agricultural services in the country for at least 90 days during a 
twelve-month period ending May 1, 1986. The second of the two amnesty measures is 
referred to as the “special agricultural worker” (SAW) provision. It is estimated that 
nearly 3 million undocumented immigrants were granted amnesty under IRCA (Baker 
1997:6).
The following workers’ comments illustrate how they utilized the SAW provision 
to make the transition from undocumented to documented status:
• In 1983, I migrated, illegally, from Tijuana to California, where I found a 
job as a farmworker. My wife stayed behind because she was pregnant with 
our son. After she had him, they [his wife and son] migrated, illegally, to 
California to meet me. We [he and his wife] both worked as farmworkers 
for about three years. And because we worked as farmworkers, we got our 
“papers” through “amnesty.” Our boss just had to write a letter telling the 
INS that we had been working for him for a few years (Interview July 2,
2001).
• In 1988 I crossed the border into El Paso illegally. Then, I took a bus from 
El Paso to Kansas City, where my in-laws picked me up and brought me to 
Nebraska. My brother-in-law owns a farm here in Nebraska and he was
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able to get me amnesty by saying that I worked on his farm since before 
1986 (Interview June 26, 2001).
Other meatpacking workers revealed that they became legal U.S. residents by 
alternative means, particularly through marriage to U.S. citizens:
• In 1983, when I was seventeen years old, I moved to Bakersfield, 
California with some friends from my hometown in Mexico. In 
Bakersfield, I worked as a farmworker picking oranges, grapes, tomatoes 
and other fruit. Then, when some friends of mine said that they were 
moving to Omaha, I decided to go with them. When we got to Omaha, we 
found work at a hide plant in South Omaha. I worked there for about 6 
months. I quit because the chemicals I worked with burnt my arms. 
Because I was undocumented I tried to gain amnesty, but didn’t qualify. 
After I married a U.S. citizen, I became documented and then I was able to 
get a job at a meatpacking plant, Comhusker Packing Plant [which was 
located in South Omaha] (Interview June 8, 2001).
• I came to the United States in 1992, when I was 16 years old. I paid a 
coyote to smuggle me across the U.S.-Mexico border, where my brother 
was waiting for me. He brought me to Omaha, where he was working at a 
meatpacking plant. Because I was undocumented, I couldn’t get a job at 
the plant so I found a job as a dishwasher at a Chinese restaurant. I worked 
in different Chinese restaurants for about three years, until I got my papers. 
They [Chinese restaurants] don’t ask for papers. I got my papers after I 
married a Mexican-American. Then I went to work at MPS [Millard 
Processing Services, a meatpacking plant in South Omaha] (Interview 
April 6, 2001).5
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) undocumented workers are 
recognized as “employees,” and therefore protected under U.S. labor law. In short, the 
NLRA serves as the primary legislation governing relations among employers, 
employees, and unions in the private sector of the U.S economy. The act guarantees 
employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers. To 
administer the legislation, Congress established an independent federal agency, the
5 Coyotes, also known as polleros, help undocumented migrants enter the United States illegally 
in exchange for a fee (Zahniser 2000:273).
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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Under the NLRA undocumented workers are
provided the right to join unions, and furthermore, protected against employer
interference with that right. Delgado (1992) explains that in 1984 the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that undocumented workers were “employees” under the NLRA:
In 1984 the Supreme Court handed down an important decision on 
undocumented workers and the NLRA. In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB , the 
Supreme Court ruled that undocumented workers were protected by the 
NLRA, noting that there was no federal law prohibiting employers from 
employing undocumented immigrants. (P. 137)
However, just two years later, such a federal law was passed. This legislation provides 
for “employer sanctions.” Employer sanctions are a cornerstone of the aforementioned 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). The assumption behind these 
sanctions is that they would close a loophole in immigration law by forbidding
I
employers, for the first time in U.S. history, from hiring undocumented immigrants and
allow the INS to penalize employers who knowingly do so. Michael Fix (1991) explains:
These sanctions were intended to right an asymmetry in American law: 
while it had been a violation of federal law for undocumented aliens to 
enter and work in the United States, their employers committed no illegal 
act by hiring them. Following IRCA’s enactment, employers became 
liable for knowingly hiring undocumented aliens and for failing to conduct 
mandated verification and record-keeping procedures. (P. 2)
In enacting employer sanctions, IRCA replaced the law often referred to as “the 
Texas Proviso,” which for many years had exempted employers from legal culpability for 
employing undocumented immigrants. IRCA required employers to hire only workers 
who can establish their right to work in the United States and keep records regarding the 
immigration status of these workers or risk substantial civil and criminal penalties. 
Basically, the employer sanctions provision of IRCA prohibits three types of activity: (1)
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knowingly hiring undocumented immigrants; (2) the continued employment of known 
undocumented immigrants; and (3) hiring any worker without verifying his or her 
identity and authorization to work in the United States (Fix and Hill 1990:33). The law 
requires that all employers verify the authorization to work of employees hired after 
November 6, 1986, and maintain records (1-9 Forms) indicating that the employee’s 
eligibility was verified. In addition, the law requires that applicants for employment 
attest to the fact that they are authorized to work by signing these forms. It also requires 
that employers sign them, pledging under penalty of perjury that they have examined 
specified documents to determine the applicants’ identity and work eligibility. Moreover, 
IRCA sets out a graduated set of penalties for knowingly hiring undocumented workers 
of $250 to $2000 per worker for the first violation; $2000 to $5000 per worker for the 
second violation; and $3000 to $10,000 for the third and subsequent violations (Fix and 
Hill 1990:34).
In effect, IRCA’s employer sanctions provision makes it illegal for immigrants
without the appropriate legal documentation to work in the United States, creating a
fundamental contradiction between immigration legislation and labor legislation. Labor
and immigrant scholars and advocates contend that this contradiction provides employers
with a means to keep workers unorganized. For instance, the National Immigration
Forum (2002) explains:
When undocumented workers begin to stand up for improved working 
conditions, their employer calls the INS to remove the undocumented 
workers. When this happens, the employer is rid of workers who insist on 
better pay and/or working conditions, and is free to hire replacement 
workers. The employer escapes penalty, and the INS has unwittingly 
assisted the employer in evading the law.
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Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that employers routinely use the threat of calling in
the INS to verify the 1-9 Forms in workers’ files when they start organizing and/or
protesting their wages and working conditions, as a way of intimidating them and
undermining unionization. When asked about the obstacles they face in organizing
undocumented workers, labor and community organizers interviewed for this study
universally claimed that employers routinely intimidate their employees by threatening to
call the INS. Several organizers claimed that during their campaign in South Omaha,
meatpacking employers held captive-audience meetings with their employees in which
they discussed the INS coming to the plant. For instance, a labor organizer stated,
“Because the second shift is usually comprised of a larger number of undocumented
workers, managers from this shift held captive-audience meetings with their workers and
told them that if  enough of them supported the union the company would call in the INS”
(Interview January 18, 2001). Labor and community organizers also explained that
undocumented workers were singled out and intimidated by their managers and
supervisors. For example, a former meatpacking worker who is currently working as an
organizer explained:
At some meatpacking plants, the managers and supervisors know which 
workers are documented and which ones are not and threaten them 
accordingly. While Anglo managers and supervisors are usually aware of 
the fact that some of their workers are undocumented, they usually do not 
know who is documented and who is not. But at plants like Nebraska Beef 
and Greater Omaha where the managers are Latino and recruit their 
workers directly from Mexico, they are aware of which workers are 
undocumented and they put more pressure on these workers (Interview, 
February 2, 2002).
Similarly, a meatpacking worker stated:
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Managers at my plant have been pulling workers aside one-by-one and 
asking them whether they support the union. One of the workers on my 
line said that when she told them that she supported the union they warned 
her that the INS would review her papers if there was a union election 
(Interview May 10, 2001).
Organizers also mentioned less direct ways in which employers used the legal
status of their employees and the INS to thwart unionization. For example, a community
organizer pointed out how a leaflet stapled to Nebraska Beef employees’ paychecks
indirectly implied that the INS would be involved in the union election. A section of the
leaflet reads as follows:
Q: What is an “election” that the Union and the Company are talking about?
A: Federal law provides that if thirty percent (30%) employees at a work 
location who have similar interests, sign enough cards to represent thirty 
percent (30%) of the work force, then The National Labor Relations Board 
(a government agency like the International Revenue Service and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service) will conduct a secret ballot 
election to determine whether or not a majority of those employees wish to 
have the Union be their bargaining agent and representation.
In anticipation of these employer tactics and to help mitigate the effects of workers’ legal
status, labor and community organizers explained that they informed workers that
regardless of their legal status they are considered “employees” under the NLRA and
therefore protected under U.S. labor law and against unfair labor practices by their
employers. For instance a community organizer explained:
When we [OTOC] started organizing a ‘Temporary Workers’ Committee’ 
among South Omaha meatpacking workers, we held meetings with workers 
in which Department o f Labor representatives and labor lawyers were 
invited to provide workers with information about their rights as employees 
and to explain to them that they are protected under U.S. labor law 
regardless of their legal status (Interview June 25, 2001).
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The legal vulnerability of undocumented workers is often cited as a 
significant barrier to unionization in industries such as meatpacking where they 
make up a substantial number of the workforce. It is generally assumed, in fact, 
some labor scholars and organizers argue, that because of their vulnerability to 
deportation, undocumented workers have a negative impact on unionization. 
Delgado (1992:131) explains, “They [undocumented workers] are said to act as 
deterrents to unionization, since their fear of apprehension and deportation by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) purportedly forces them to tolerate 
very low wages, abusive treatment by supervisors, and poor working conditions.” 
Likewise, Milkman (2002: 115) explains that conventional wisdom assumes that 
undocumented immigrants are “vulnerable, docile individuals who are intensely 
fearful of any confrontation with authority, who accept substandard wages and 
poor working conditions because their standard of comparison is drawn from their 
sending countries, and who therefore are extremely unlikely to actively seek 
unionization.” Challenging this view Milkman (2002:116) argues, “Despite the 
large numbers of undocumented immigrants among foreign-born workers, there is 
survey evidence, albeit fragmentary, suggesting that foreign-born workers’ — 
especially Latinos’ — attitudes are actually more favorable toward unions than are 
those of native-born workers.”
Delgado also challenges the conventional wisdom on the presumed negative 
impact of undocumented workers on unionization. Based on his research among 
Mexican and Central American undocumented workers in Los Angeles, he explains,
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“The data indicate that undocumented workers are indeed ‘organizable’ and the degree to 
which they can or cannot organize seems to depend little on their citizenship status, and 
more on labor market factors, organizing strategies, state control, and the settlement 
process of immigrants” (Delgado 1992:131-2). Moreover, based on his research,
Delgado (1993:134) suggests that undocumented workers fear of deportation did not 
make them more difficult to organize than their documented counterparts employed in the 
same industry. He explains that the fear of apprehension and deportation by the INS 
among undocumented workers was mitigated by the rather inconspicuous presence of the 
INS in Los Angeles and the relative ease of returning to the United States in the event of 
apprehension and deportation (Delgado 1992:133).
However, among Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in Nebraska, and in 
South Omaha in particular, the INS’s presence is by no means inconspicuous. INS 
attention to Nebraska’s meatpacking industry creates a situation markedly different from 
that described by Delgado. Since the establishment of employer sanctions, this agency 
has targeted the state’s meatpacking industry and its undocumented workforce with 
repeated efforts to enforce the law. The most blatant example of this is “Operation 
Vanguard.”
Operation Vanguard. In 1998, in an effort to enforce employer sanctions, the 
INS implemented “Operation Vanguard.” This was a state and industry-wide operation, 
which focused on undocumented immigrants working in Nebraska’s meatpacking 
industry. According to the INS, Nebraska was chosen for this operation because of its 
high concentration of meatpacking plants, which it claimed had “traditionally attracted
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large numbers of unauthorized workers” (U.S Department of Justice 1999). Basically, 
under its general powers to enforce employer sanctions, in December 1998, the agency 
mailed “Notices of Inspection and Administrative Subpoenas” to approximately 115 
meatpacking plants throughout Nebraska and western Iowa requesting copies of 
employment eligibility paperwork and employment history records for all employees, 
including 1-9 Forms, Social Security numbers, and Alien Registration numbers. By late 
December, it had gathered documents pertaining to approximately 24,000 meatpacking 
employees. The following month a “clearinghouse” was established in Omaha at the INS 
District Office, consisting of nearly a dozen INS personnel. These personnel typed 
employee information into a database, which was then checked against INS and Social 
Security Administration databases, looking for discrepancies. In all, the agency 
identified “40 plants that had workers with discrepancies between their work papers and 
the databases” (Immigrants’ Rights Update 1999:2). In these plants, it reported that more 
than 4,500 workers had such discrepancies (Immigrants’ Rights Update 1999:2). 
Subsequently, in April 1999 the INS held a “seminar” with representatives from these 40 
plants to provide them with their respective “discrepancies list.” These lists consisted of 
those employees for whom the INS was unable to verify employment eligibility and with 
whom it intended to interview. At this seminar the agency also distributed notices for 
each one of the employees on the “discrepancy lists” to be delivered by the employer. 
These notices explained that the INS would come to the meatpacking plant to interview 
the employee. The notices also stated that if an employee failed to complete an interview
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or provide additional information to the employer and the INS, “the employer may
terminate their employment” (Maurstad 2000b: 3). Gouveia and Juska (2002) explain:
‘Big Three’ (IBP, now Tyson, Cargill and ConAgra) executives, and small 
plant owners alike, were herded into a hotel room filled with media and 
community representatives. They were handed boxes containing the 
letters summoning employees identified for ‘discrepancies’ among various 
forms of identification. A total of 4,500, out of 24,000 Nebraska and Iowa 
meatpacking workers were identified as having such ‘discrepancies’ (i.e., 
were suspected of working illegally). Some companies had up to 68 
percent of their employees called in for INS interviews. (P. 337)
Nearly 70 percent, or an estimated 3500 workers, called in for interviews with the INS
quit their jobs rather than face the agency. In the end, the INS arrested only 34 workers
for being undocumented (Bacon 1999c:4).
The INS promoted this strategy as an effective means of enforcing employer
sanctions and reducing undocumented immigration. The assumption behind this strategy
as a deterrent to undocumented immigration is as follows: once undocumented workers
receive notification from their employers regarding the INS inquiry, they will either quit
their jobs and leave the area or submit to an interview and be deported, thus engendering a
“ripple” effect which will persuade other undocumented workers to avoid employment in
certain sectors, such as meatpacking, where undocumented workers are concentrated
(Mumgaard 2000). The INS intended to keep undocumented workers from returning to
the meatpacking plants by maintaining a presence in the industry through follow-up
inspections every 90 days. The agency also planned to implement Operation Vanguard in
Iowa and other Midwestern states and in other industries. However, the operation was
suspended during the summer of 1999, when the Social Security Administration (SSA)
stopped permitting the INS to check employee records against its database, citing privacy
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concerns. The SSA stated that its purpose was to track workers’ earnings to determine 
their eligibility for Social Security benefits, not to aid the INS in the enforcement of 
immigration laws (Gonzalez 2000:2).
When asked about the effects of Operation Vanguard on unionization, a few of 
the union representatives interviewed for this study were unfamiliar with the operation, 
which, to some extent, suggests that they were not aware of some of the basic concerns of 
the Latino immigrant meatpacking workers they sought to represent. However, those 
union representatives familiar with the operation claimed that it has had a detrimental 
effect on unionization. For instance, they explained that among the unionized 
meatpacking plants in Nebraska, the operation depleted their membership as union 
members simply quit their jobs rather than deal with the INS. For example, one of them 
asserted:
There are lots of families with three or four and sometimes more members 
working in the industry, sometimes at the same packing plant. Even if only 
one of the family members was undocumented and decided to quit before 
the INS came to interview them, the entire family quit with them. Lots of 
workers and their families just quit work and picked-up and left, rather than 
facing the INS (Interview August 8, 2000).
Similarly, another claimed, “Even the documented workers decided to quit their jobs
instead of being questioned by the INS. Even though their documents were probably
fine, they were afraid of being deported by the INS” (Interview June 20, 2000). A third
stated, “Anytime you have workers who have signed union authorization cards and want
to form a union and the INS comes around, the union campaign is going to fall apart.
Workers don’t want to chance being deported” (Interview January 18, 2001). A fourth
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union representative explained another way in which the operation affected unionization. 
He explained:
Some of the plant supervisors called the workers at home and told them not 
to come into work because the INS would be there. Meanwhile, we [the 
local UFCW] didn’t know what was going on, so we weren’t able to warn 
or help the workers like their supervisors did. Not only were they pissed at 
us, but this also helped the supervisors gain their trust. The whole operation 
undermined the union (Interview February 28, 2000).
Although it was not a formal, NLRB sanctioned, organizing campaign, OTOC
began organizing workers among the meatpacking plants in South Omaha before the
implementation of Operation Vanguard. During my interviews with OTOC organizers,
they explained how the operation undermined their efforts to organize the non-union
meatpacking plants in South Omaha. According to one OTOC organizer, prior to the
operation OTOC had been organizing and building a base of leaders and workers
throughout the meatpacking plants located in South Omaha. Once the operation began,
however, most of these leaders and workers quit their jobs, which effectively eliminated
the organizational base OTOC had helped established. This organizer explained:
Through our work within the Latino community, with the church and the 
soccer league, we had established a “temporary workers’ committee.” This 
committee was made up of twenty or more leaders from various 
meatpacking plants in South Omaha. After Vanguard we were left with 
only a couple of leaders and without a workers’ committee. We basically 
had to start all over again (Interview January 9, 2001).
This account corresponds to that offered by labor scholar and journalist, David Bacon,
who explains, “In Omaha, where a community organization, Omaha Together One
Community had made beginning steps towards organizing non-union plants, Operation
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Vanguard wiped out its rank-and-file organizing community” (Bacon 1999a: 19).
Moreover, he notes:
Since last fall Sergio Sosa, a Guatemalan organizer with Omaha Together 
One Community, has been meeting with packinghouse workers, 
investigating plant conditions while looking for cultural threads to unify an 
anxious work force....Sosa’s work led to the formation of a committee of 
twenty-two in-plant leaders who met regularly and were building a base.
After Operation Vanguard’s debut, only two of those leaders were left. As 
Sosa puts it, “The companies already buy people off when they begin to 
organize, threaten workers with immigration raids, fire people and even 
bring in workers from the border in a crisis. Operation Vanguard gave the 
companies a big gift on top of all this -  almost all our leaders had to find 
jobs elsewhere” (Bacon 1999a: 19).
Plant Raids. Operation Vanguard was not an isolated incident of the INS 
targeting Nebraska’s meatpacking industry. Since the creation of employer sanctions, the 
industry has also been the focus of a series of plant raids. For example, in 1995, as part 
of an 18-state INS operation dubbed “Operation Jobs,” the agency raided meatpacking 
plants throughout Nebraska apprehending hundreds of workers. Beef America, a 
unionized meatpacking plant, which then was located in South Omaha, was one of the 
plants raided as part of this operation, which resulted in the apprehension of 
approximately 84 workers who were suspected of working in the United States illegally 
(“INS Gets Tough” 1995:8). Additionally, as explained in the aforementioned 1998 
GAO report:
In operations to identify illegal aliens at seven Nebraska and Iowa 
meatpacking plants in 1996 and 1997, the INS found 909, or about 23 
percent, of the workers in these plants had questionable identification 
documents, which indicated that they might be illegal aliens. During these 
operations, the INS apprehended 513 illegal aliens, or about 13 percent of 
the workforces. The INS District Director for Nebraska and Iowa said that 
more illegal aliens would have been apprehended if they had reported for
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work when the INS was at the plant and was ready to interview them (U.S.
General Accounting Office 1998:15).
In South Omaha meatpacking plants, specifically in 1997, the INS raided Quality 
Pork International, Greater Omaha Packing and VMI. These raids resulted in the 
apprehension and deportation of an estimated 350 meatpacking workers, 45 of whom 
were working at VMI, a liver-processing plant (Ruggles 1997:13). Another 150 workers 
were apprehended at Greater Omaha Packing, while the rest were working at Quality 
Pork International (Taylor 2000a:4). Although none of these raids occurred during 
unionizing campaigns, labor and community organizers alike argue that the repeated 
plant raids and presence of the INS in Nebraska’s meatpacking industry creates a chilling 
effect among the mostly Latino immigrant workforce, which in turn makes their job of 
organizing more difficult.
^ T h e  most recent South Omaha raid, which took place during the organizing 
campaign, occurred December 5, 2000 at the Nebraska Beef plant. Two hundred and 
twelve workers were apprehended and deported after an estimated 100 federal agents 
raided the plant. Most of these workers were from Mexico; however, there were also a 
few from El Salvador and Guatemala. According to government officials, the raid was 
the result of a fourteen-month investigation dubbed “Operation Putman.” As a result of 
this investigation, the U.S. government charged Nebraska Beef and three company 
officials with conspiring to ship busloads of undocumented Mexican workers to Nebraska 
every few weeks to work in the meatpacking plant. However, approximately sixteen 
months later, in April 2002, a federal judge dropped the charges when the INS deported 
the immigrant witnesses (Australia Visa 2003). (
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Rather than sanctioning the employer, according to organizers and workers alike,
this raid succeeded in undermining a yearlong effort to unionize the plant. As previously
mentioned, it took place during the UFCW/OTOC campaign despite the fact that the INS
has an internal policy against initiating immigration enforcement actions during labor
organizing campaigns. Under the INS operations instructions (287.3a), agents are
prohibited from engaging in any enforcement activities when aware of union organizing
efforts. According to union officials, when the UFCW announced its organizing drive in
June 2000, International Union officials in Washington, D.C. informed the INS that labor
disputes existed at a number of South Omaha meatpacking plants, which included
Nebraska Beef. However, the INS defended the raid arguing that its investigation began
prior to the union organizing campaign (Taylor 2000b). Regardless, community and
union organizers, as well as workers, argue that by deporting a significant number of
Nebraska Beef workers who supported unionization, the raid sabotaged the
UFCW/OTOC campaign.
Just two days after the raid, while immigrant advocates gathered at a press
conference in South Omaha to condemn the INS operation, workers at the Nebraska Beef
plant stopped production protesting their working conditions. As a result of this work
stoppage, seven meatpacking workers were fired. One of them explained:
After the raid we were doing the same amount of work with a couple 
hundred fewer workers. The managers didn’t slow down the line speed 
and the meat was piling up. We were working as fast and as hard as we 
could, but we couldn’t keep up. So, about half of us [an estimated 400 
workers] just stopped working. We walked off the line and to the cafeteria.
Our supervisors and managers followed us into the cafeteria, where we 
asked them to slow down the line speed and give us a raise. After they 
agreed to give us a 50-cent an hour raise, most of the workers returned to
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the line. A few of us, however, stayed behind in the cafeteria, and were 
fired for doing so. The managers said we were fired for “inciting a riot.”
After getting fired, we went over to Our Lady of Guadalupe Church to talk 
to OTOC and the union about what happened (Interview April 3, 2001).
UFCW and OTOC organizers responded to the situation at Nebraska Beef by not
only meeting with the fired workers and providing legal representation for them, but also
by intensifying their organizing campaign at the plant. Immediately following the firings,
UFCW and OTOC organizers held a meeting with an estimated 50 Nebraska Beef
workers at the union hall located just a few blocks from the plant. At the meeting they
vowed to step up their organizing efforts at the plant and as a result the workers in
attendance signed authorization cards and agreed to actively participate in theses efforts
(Interview January 18, 2001). UFCW representative Carl Ariston stated, “The 50 people
that we met with said they would meet us at the plant after they got off work [Friday],
and that they were going to help to sign up all the rest of their co-workers” (Taylor
2000d:l). Similarly, an OTOC organizer explained:
Following the raid and the firings, Nebraska Beef workers were very 
agitated. They began organizing themselves. Then they came to OTOC 
and the UFCW looking for support and signifying that they wanted to 
unionize their plant. So, we [OTOC and the UFCW] decided to focus our 
immediate attention and efforts on Nebraska Beef. It became our highest 
priority. Organizers and workers gathered outside of the plant gates daily 
in between shifts to handbill and talk to workers. The discontent among 
workers at the plant allowed us to intensify our effort and gain the required 
authorization cards to petition for a union election (Interview February 23,
2001).
Moreover, in defense of the fired workers, the UFCW filed unfair labor practice 
charges against Nebraska Beef, alleging that the workers were fired for engaging in a 
protected activity and sought to get them reinstated with back pay. Approximately four
91
months later, in April 2001, the NLRB ruled in favor of the seven fired workers and sent 
Nebraska Beef a settlement offer that called for them to be reinstated and given back pay 
(Walton 2000:4A). When the company failed to respond, the Board issued a complaint 
against them and scheduled a hearing on October 10, 2001. According to a UFCW 
representative, a few days before the scheduled hearing, Nebraska Beef reached a 
settlement with the workers and the union (Interview May 11, 2002).
Interviews with meatpacking workers as well as UFCW and OTOC organizers 
revealed the complex and contradictory ways in which workers’ legal status and 
immigration enforcement operations affect unionization. The most direct way in which 
INS operations hinder organizing is when they result in the deportation of undocumented 
workers who support and/or are involved in unionization. The INS raid at Nebraska Beef 
represents such a case. Organizers claim that the raid resulted in the deportation of a 
large number of workers who not only supported unionization, but also were actively 
involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. As stated by a UFCW organizer, 
“The INS sabotaged our organizing campaign when it raided Nebraska Beef and deported 
a significant number of workers who supported the UFCW” (Interview January 18,
2001). Moreover, an OTOC organizer explained, “Over the last six months we have 
developed a sizeable committee of workers and leaders at Nebraska Beef. As a result of 
the raid at the plant over half of these committee members and all but two of our leaders 
were deported” (Interview January 9, 2001).
UFCW and OTOC organizers claimed that their organizing campaign was also 
adversely affected when managers blamed the INS raid on the union. For instance, a
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UFCW organizer stated, “When workers went to management seeking an explanation for
the raid, they were told that the UFCW was to blame” (Interview January 18, 2001).
Moreover, an OTOC organizer explained:
The Nebraska Beef raid happened less than two weeks before a scheduled 
union election at the Cudahy plant in South Omaha. In order to undermine 
the union, Cudahy managers told workers at their plant that the union was 
responsible for the raid at Nebraska Beef and that Cudahy would be next if 
the union won the election” (Interview March 11, 2001).
Similarly, a Latina immigrant worker at the Armour Swift-Eckrich (formerly Cudahy)
plant in South Omaha claimed:
After the raid at Nebraska Beef everyone at Cudahy was worried that the 
INS was going to raid us too. My supervisor told me that the reason the 
INS raided Nebraska Beef was because of the union. Well, at Cudahy we 
were trying to get the union too, so we figured our plant would be next 
(Interview March 31, 2001).
The INS raid at Nebraska Beef also affected the UFC W/OTOC organizing 
campaign in that it created a sense of camaraderie between workers and managers at the 
plant when managers helped workers escape apprehension by the INS. A Nebraska Beef 
worker explained:
During the raid managers helped workers escape. For example, when 
workers found out the INS was coming they ran to the shipping 
department where they got on a truck which drove them out-of-town where 
they were later picked up and driven back to Omaha by their managers. 
Managers also called workers at home and told them not to come to work 
because the INS was at the plant (Interview June 8,2001).
While the previous discussion reveals how the INS raid at Nebraska Beef
hindered unionization, according to a few organizers it also had the contradictory effect
of facilitating their unionization efforts. The organizers mentioned two ways they
utilized the situation at Nebraska Beef to build support for unionization: 1) to channel the
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discontent among workers at the plant into organizing and building support for the
UFCW/OTOC campaign; and 2) to demonstrate their commitment to the meatpacking
workers. A UFCW organizer explained, “There was increased discontent among workers
at Nebraska Beef, which created a basis upon which we were able to build support for our
campaign at that plant” (Interview January 23, 2001). Another union organizer stated:
Workers at Nebraska Beef were frustrated with the insufficient number of 
workers on the line and their increased workloads following the raid and 
responded to these conditions by organizing and protesting. Several 
workers were fired in the process. After they were fired they came to us 
[the UFCW] for help and we filed charges on their behalf. This 
demonstrated our commitment to them. It demonstrated that even though 
they are not union members we are committed to fighting for them 
(Interview January 18, 2001).
Likewise, a third union organizer claimed, “Because of the UFCW’s presence and
support after the raid, workers at the plant realized that we were committed to them”
(Interview February 26, 2001).
Meatpacking workers also commented on how the raid at Nebraska Beef changed
their affinity to the UFCW and their participation in the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign. For instance, a Nebraska Beef meatpacking worker stated:
I supported the organizing campaign by signing an authorization card back 
in October when the UFCW was handing them out to workers outside the 
plant. But I wasn’t involved in the campaign until after the raid. A couple 
of days after the raid I was fired for complaining about the speed of the line 
and not having enough workers on the line. The union filed charges 
against the company to help me get my job back. Since then I have been 
going to union meetings and helping build support for the campaign by 
getting other workers to come to the meetings and sign cards (Interview 
April 3, 2001).
Because of their vulnerability to deportation, one might expect undocumented 
workers to be more apprehensive about the risks involved in unionizing, particularly
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when confrontations with the INS are likely. Yet, this study suggests this may be less of
an obstacle to unionization than one might expect. Although a few UFCW organizers
listed the legal status of the workforce as an obstacle they face when trying to unionize
the meatpacking industry, the community organizers interviewed for this study
universally claimed that undocumented workers are just as likely to support unionization
as their documented counterparts. For instance, a community organizer stated:
During my one-on-ones with meatpacking workers, they usually revealed 
their legal status. And during these one-on-ones, undocumented workers 
were just as likely as documented workers to complain about their working 
conditions and assert their support for organizing. In fact, a number of 
them [undocumented workers] were involved in OTOC’s Temporary 
Workers’ Committee, and when OTOC and the UFCW joined forces they 
continued to be involved. I would say they [undocumented workers] are 
just as likely as documented workers to support unionization (Interview 
June 25, 2001).
In this case study, there is reason to believe that community organizers offer a more
adequate assessment of the propensity of undocumented meatpacking workers to
unionize, given that these organizers, some of whom migrated to the United States
themselves and worked in the country illegally, have been better able to establish
relationships with these workers based on their shared experiences.
When asked whether the undocumented workers at their plants support the
UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, the meatpacking workers interviewed for this study
also claimed that their undocumented co-workers were just as likely to support
unionization as their documented counterparts. For instance, a worker who had worked as
an undocumented immigrant explained:
Undocumented workers support the union and are not intimidated by the 
INS. Look, we have one foot here and one foot there, what difference does
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the INS make? We’re already at risk by being in this country. We aren’t 
risking much more by supporting the union. Why not at least try to 
improve our working conditions? (Interview December 19, 2000).
Similar to Delgado’s (1993) findings, in this study, immigrant workers indicated that the
undocumented workers at their plants are more concerned with being fired for supporting
the union than being apprehended by the INS. For example, a Latina immigrant
meatpacking worker stated:
Workers are mostly afraid of not being able to secure another job if they 
lose the one they have. See, they have a job now and are secure in that job.
But because they don’t have papers they are afraid that if they are fired 
they won’t be able to secure another job. Who is going to hire them 
without papers? They are afraid that other companies won’t hire them 
without papers (Interview May 10,2001).
Several organizers agreed that the fear of job loss is more of an obstacle when organizing
undocumented workers than fear of apprehension and deportation by the INS. However,
in regard to the notion that undocumented workers fear involvement in unionization more
than their documented counterparts, one immigrant stated:
I think some undocumented workers avoid involvement in the organizing 
campaign but still support the union. For example, a few undocumented 
workers that I know didn’t talk about the union or sign authorization cards 
or attend union meetings. They remained silent until it was time to vote in 
the union election and then they voted ‘yes’ for the union (Interview March 
30, 2001).
According to the meatpacking workers and organizers I interviewed, regardless of their 
legal status, the majority of workers in South Omaha’s plants support unionization and 
the current UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Overall, this study challenges the 
common assumption that undocumented workers are “unorganizable.”
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Given the previous accounts of INS efforts to enforce the employer sanctions 
provision of IRC A, it is apparent that the situation among meatpacking workers in South 
Omaha differs markedly from the one described in Delgado’s study of a waterbed factory 
in Los Angeles where there is a “rather inconspicuous presence of the INS” (1993:133). 
The situation among meatpacking workers in South Omaha reveals a more complex 
relationship between worker’s legal status and unionization. Although this study 
supports Delgado’s (1993) claim that undocumented workers are by no means impossible 
to organize, it also suggests the variety of ways in which immigrant worker’s legal status 
and immigration policies and procedures affect unionization. The legal status of 
meatpacking workers in South Omaha has not generally deterred them from supporting 
unionization and/or participating in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign by signing 
authorization cards, attending union meetings and voting in support of union 
representation, but it has posed an obstacle to unionization given the INS’s focus on 
Nebraska’s meatpacking industry for the enforcement of immigration legislation.
Length o f  Time Residing in the U.S. and Intended Length o f  Stay in the Country 
A number of scholars (Milkman 2002, 2000; Delgado 2000, 1992; Waldinger and 
Der-Martirosian 2000) maintain that time residing in the United States and length of stay 
in the country are important factors affecting unionization among contemporary 
immigrant workers. Specifically, they contend that unionization is strongest among those 
immigrant workers who have been in the United States longer and who plan on remaining 
in the country. Basically, these scholars argue that the longer immigrants live in the 
United Stated and intend to remain in the country, the more likely their frame of
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reference is to shift from the conditions prevailing in their native country to those of the 
United States, which in turn is assumed to increase their willingness to unionize. In fact, 
Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000:60) maintain that time is likely to be the most 
decisive factor influencing the unionization of immigrants as interest in the possible 
benefits obtained through unionization increase with the time spent in the United States. 
(2000:60). However, these authors also clarify that time may not work in quite the same 
way for all immigrants, particularly labor migrants who are part of a circular or 
temporary migration pattern. They argue, “Workers emanating from groups with a 
history of circular or temporary migration will be more likely to retain a dual frame of 
reference, which in turn reduces the impetus to organize” (Waldinger and Der- 
Martirosian 2000:59). Therefore, these authors theorize that Mexican immigrants, as a 
quintessential labor migration group and with a history of temporary and/or circular 
migration patterns, will be less receptive to unionization than other immigrants 
(Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:70).
In this study only two of the 21 Latino immigrant meatpacking workers 
interviewed have been residing in the United States for less than a decade. These two 
workers indicated that they have been in the country for two years and eight years, 
respectively. In other words, approximately 90 percent of the immigrant workers 
interviewed indicated that they have been residing in the United States for over a decade, 
with the majority of them (52 percent) having lived in the country for fifteen or more 
years. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Latino immigrant meatpacking 
workers interviewed had been residing in the United States for over a decade
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demonstrates their tendency towards “permanent settlement” in the country. In fact, 
nearly all of these workers claimed that they do not see themselves as “temporary 
migrants,” but rather as “permanent settlers.” When asked about their plans for 
remaining in the United States, the overwhelming majority expressed a desire to remain 
in the country and in the Omaha area in particular. Furthermore, 81 percent, or 17 of the 
21 Latino immigrant workers interviewed, are Mexican; and rather than being “temporary 
migrants,” 15 of these 17 indicated that they have already settled, or are planning to 
settle, permanently in the United States. Most of them have their families residing with 
them in South Omaha and many have children who were bom U.S. citizens.
The results of this study suggest that Latino immigrant meatpacking workers’ 
tenure in the United States may be longer than presumed. Moreover, they suggest these 
workers’ inclination towards permanent settlement in the country, even those workers of 
Mexican descent. The two workers in this study who did in fact express their desire to 
return to Mexico in the near future also indicated that they not only support unionization, 
but also were actively involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. By “actively 
involved” I am referring to the fact that they participated in an array of organizing 
activities, such as getting their co-workers to sign union authorization cards, handbilling 
their c-workers outside meatpacking plants, assisting organizers on housecalls and 
attending union and/or community meetings. In short, the two workers who claimed that 
they are in fact “target earners,” also indicated their desire for unionization and 
proclaimed their support for the current UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Therefore, 
these two workers counter Waldinger and Der-Martirosian’s (2000) contention that
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Mexican immigrants have a negative effect on unionization. For example, an individual 
who was working at a South Omaha meatpacking plant explained how he quit the plant 
over a year ago and returned to Mexico to start his own business with the seed money he 
had earned working at the plant. When that business endeavor failed, he returned to his 
former meatpacking employer in South Omaha. He is currently working at the plant to 
earn money to start another business in Mexico. When asked why he is participating in 
this organizing campaign given his temporary status at the plant and in the United States, 
he responded:
There are basically two reasons why I want to help the union. One is that I 
might end up back at the plant someday. For example, if the new business 
I am planning fails or if I need to earn money for my family, I might have 
to return to the plant. And when I do, I want things to be different. Second 
is that I have friends who are working at the plant and I want things to be 
different for them and for the person who comes in behind me, to fill my 
position. I support the union because I want things to be better for them 
(Interview May 24, 2001).
Among the four other Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in this study who
are not of Mexican descent, but rather from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, only
one revealed that his stay in the United States is temporary. And although he has traveled
back and forth between the United States and Honduras for the past decade and plans on
returning to his native country permanently in approximately two years, (after he has
earned enough money to help finance the college education of his four children), he too
supports unionization and the current UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. He explained
his support as follows:
We need a union because we don’t need to be treated the way we are 
currently being treated at the plant. We aren’t treated like human beings.
Our managers and supervisors don’t respect us. Something needs to be
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done about the way they treat us. Something needs to be done about our 
working conditions, especially the speed of the line. If we get a union 
maybe our managers and supervisors will start respecting us and maybe our 
working conditions will improve (Interview February 26, 2001).
When pressed about the risks involved in unionization and his temporary status in the
meatpacking industry and the United States, this worker continued:
What do I have to lose? If I get fired, I’ll be able to find another 
meatpacking job, probably within a couple of days. And if I have trouble 
finding a job, I’ll just go back to Honduras for a while. I’m really not 
risking much. I’m in a better position than most of the Anglos at the plant, 
who have been working there for years. They are the ones that have the 
most to lose (Interview February 26, 2001).
Interviews with these workers reveal the extent to which they view their stay in the
United States as “temporary” and that it has had little effect on their willingness to
support unionization or become involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign.
Although a few of the UFCW organizers I interviewed support Waldinger and
Der-Martirosian’s (2000) argument that circular or back-and-forth migration between the
United States and the workers’ sending country makes unionizing more difficult, both the
OTOC organizers and workers I interviewed disagree. Moreover, an OTOC organizer
suggested that the issue of back-and-forth migration could be alleviated to some extent by
negotiating policies that address the issue in union contracts. For example, this organizer
suggested:
In order to confront the issue of back-and-forth migration among 
meatpacking workers who have extended families and responsibilities in 
their home countries, policies regarding the issue should be incorporated 
into union contracts. Such polices would be useful so that immigrant 
workers don’t lose their pay, benefits, and seniority when they take leave, 
or in some cases quit, to return home for an extended period of time. Such 
policies would also benefit unions in at least two ways. First, unions 
wouldn’t lose their members when they are fired for taking extended leave.
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And second, by having such policies in their contracts, unions would be 
more appealing to immigrant workers (Interview June 25, 2001).
Some unions, in fact, have incorporated such immigrant-specific language into their
contracts. For example, Local 2 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
(HERE), in Los Angeles, has negotiated an “extended leave policy” into their union
contract. Wells (2000:125) explains, “This policy, which was first incorporated into the
contract language in 1980, came directly out o f a large group of grievances filed by
workers who were denied leave or who had been terminated when they failed to return
‘on time’ after visits to their native country to tend to relatives.”
The results of this study do not support Waldinger and Der-Martirosian’s claim
that recent arrivals are “altogether too uncertain of their status, standing and orientation to
seriously consider unionization” (2000:50). Based on the responses of workers who are
relatively recent arrivals, this study suggests that they too support unionization and are
willing to participate in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. For example, one of the
recent arrivals stated:
It doesn’t take us workers long to figure out that we need a union. When I 
worked as a housekeeper in Vegas I learned the difference a union makes.
Not only were union housekeepers paid more money, but the union also 
helped its members find jobs. When I moved to Omaha and started 
working at Nebraska Beef, one of the first things I told the other workers at 
the plant is that we needed a union (Interview February 26, 2001).
Although the majority of immigrant workers interviewed for this study have been
residing in the United States for over a decade, nearly all of the them mentioned having
family and/or friends who are recent arrivals working in South Omaha’s meatpacking
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plants.6 These workers responses also suggest that recent arrivals often support
unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. For example, when asked if
the recent arrivals at his plant support unionization, a worker stated:
My brother, who moved here from Mexico just a couple of months ago, 
supports the union and has been helping to organize workers at the plant. 
Right after he moved here, he started coming with me to union meetings.
At first he just came with me for something to do, but now he is really 
serious about the union and getting workers at the plant to support it. He 
has only worked there for a short while, but already he knows that we need 
a union (Interview April 3, 2001).
Furthermore, when asked if the recent arrivals at their meatpacking plants support the
UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, workers’ responses suggest that they enter into
established social networks in both their workplaces and communities. Consequently,
these individuals are likely to support what those in their social networks support.
Therefore, if those in their social network support unionization, they are likely to follow
their lead. For instance, the most recent arrival interviewed, a Latina, who arrived in
South Omaha nearly two years ago to join her husband as a meatpacking worker,
explained her support for the organizing campaign as follows:
My husband has been helping the union organize workers at the plant 
[Nebraska Beef]. I don’t know too much about unions, but I support my 
husband and what he is doing. I also support the union because my friends and 
church support it (Interview March 16, 2001).
In sum, this research suggests that even those meatpacking workers who are relatively
recent arrivals to the United States and/or view their migration to the country as
6 “Recent arrivals” are defined here as individuals who have migrated to the United States within 
the last couple o f years (after 1999).
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temporary, support unionization and are often willing to participate in the UFCW/OTOC 
organizing campaign.
Social Networks: Latino Immigrants * Strong Kinship, Friendship and Cultural Ties
As mentioned previously, a factor that is commonly associated with the settlement
patterns of immigrant workers and is suggested as influencing their receptivity to
unionization is the strength of their social networks. Based on their case studies of
immigrant unionization, Milkman (2002, 2000), Delgado (2000, 1993) and Zabin (2000),
among others, argue that the social networks characteristic of Latino immigrant workers
facilitates unionization. For instance, Milkman (2002) explains:
The fact that immigrant workers rely so heavily on ethnic social networks 
for such basic survival needs as housing, jobs; and various other forms of 
social and financial assistance may also make them easier to recruit into 
the labor movement than native-born workers. Southern California is 
famous for its highly atomized social arrangements and weak sense of 
community, but that reputation is based entirely on the “Anglo” 
experience. In contrast, L.A.’s working-class immigrants have vibrant 
ethnic networks and communities rooted in extended kinship ties, as well 
as the shared experience of migration from particular communities in their 
countries of origin. The intricate web of social connections among 
immigrants can be a key resource in building labor solidarity, particularly 
if unions can identify and recruit key actors in kin and community 
networks. (P. 117)
Similarly, Delgado (2000) explains that in his own research, immigrant social networks 
played a key role in labor organizing. He explains, for example, that these networks were 
used to recruit workers into the organizing process (Delgado 2000:229). Moreover,
Zabin (2000:150) found that the strong social networks among immigrant workers 
contributed to creating the solidarity necessary to initiate and sustain organizing
campaigns.
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In addition, a number of scholars have documented how meatpacking employers 
utilize immigrant social networks to recruit new employees, a process which is 
commonly referred to as “network recruiting” (Grey 1999; Stull, Broadway and Griffith 
1995; Stanley 1992). They have shown how this process benefits meatpacking 
employers. For example, Grey (1999:21) argues that employers benefit from this form of 
recruiting as it facilitates further labor migration, which provides a steady supply of new 
workers into their meatpacking plants and reduces their cost of recruitment. Moreover, 
Stanley (1992: 112) explains, “Workers at some plants receive bonuses for recruiting 
family members and friends. A typical bonus is $150 if the new recruit makes it past the 
probationary period of usually 90 to 120 days.”
The results of this study support these findings and reveal that network recruiting 
has provided a stream of immigrant workers into the meatpacking plants in South Omaha. 
This study also provides additional evidence for previous research which suggests that it 
is common for new and potential immigrant workers to seek information regarding 
employment opportunities from friends and/or family members in their social networks 
(Milkman 2000; Grey 1999; Stull, Broadway and Griffith 1995; Stanley 1994). Nearly 
every immigrant meatpacking worker interviewed found work in South Omaha’s 
meatpacking plants through their social networks. In fact, 20 out of the 21 of them had 
friends and/or family already working in the meatpacking industry when they arrived in 
South Omaha. Thirteen of the 21 workers explained that they chose this type of 
employment because they had family members working in meatpacking plants (six 
indicated brothers; four mentioned cousins; the additional three mentioned a sister, a
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father-in-law; and a brother-in-law respectively). Of the seven workers who indicated 
that they chose meatpacking employment because they had friends working in the 
industry, five mentioned friends from their hometowns in Mexico, one mentioned a 
friend from Texas and the other mentioned a friend in Omaha. The only immigrant 
worker interviewed who did not rely on his friendship or family ties to gain meatpacking 
employment explained, “When I moved here from Mexico I didn’t know anyone. I came 
here because I saw an advertisement in The Heraldo for meatpacking jobs in Nebraska 
that paid $8 an hour and offered a 15-day hotel stay” (Interview May 24, 2001).
When asked why they chose meatpacking employment, by far the most common 
response was because they had family working in the industry. The following responses 
were typical:
• My brother told me that he could get me a job at the plant where he was
working [Nebraska Beef]. So, I moved to Omaha and he did (Interview
February 1, 2001).
• My brother was working for Northern States and making good money 
while I was back in Mexico. When he said that there were plenty of 
meatpacking plants and jobs in Omaha, I decided to come check it out. By 
the time I got here, he had a job waiting for me at the plant [ConAgra’s 
Northern States] (Interview April 3, 2001).
• I chose ConAgra because of my sister. She works at the plant and told me
that if I moved here, she would help me get a job there (Interview May 30,
2001).
• My wife and I were living in Texas and working for a furniture 
manufacturing company when we received a call from our relatives telling 
us that there were meatpacking jobs available in Omaha and that we could 
make more money here than in Texas (Interview July 2, 2001).
UFCW and OTOC organizers alike explained that it is not uncommon for
immigrant meatpacking workers to have between three and six immediate family
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members and seven to ten extended family members working at meatpacking plants in 
South Omaha. Interviews with the meatpacking workers themselves verified these 
estimates. It was common during interviews with meatpacking workers for them to
n
convey that several members of their family are also meatpacking workers. For 
instance, one worker explained that he and his wife have been working together at 
Nebraska Beef for three years and that their oldest son, who recently turned eighteen, also 
works at the plant (Interview June 26, 2001). Another worker stated, “Between my 
family and my wife’s family, there are at least ten of us working in meatpacking” 
(Interview May 28, 2001). Additional comments included:
• My wife and her father are both working at Nebraska Beef. One of my 
brothers works at the Skylark packing plant and the other works at Omaha 
Steaks. I also have a sister here in Omaha who is working at the QPI 
packing plant (Interview February 2, 2001).
• My husband and I are both working on the kill-floor at ConAgra’s 
Northern States plant. I have a brother who is also working at the plant, 
but he is in fabrication. I have another brother working at QPI and a sister 
at Cudahy. Her husband also works at the plant [Cudahy] (Interview 
March 30,2001).
According to UFCW and OTOC organizers, these family as well as friendship ties 
were essential in their organizing campaign among South Omaha meatpacking workers. 
They explained how these ties were used to get information, leaflets, handbills and union
1
I concluded each o f my interviews with meatpacking workers by asking them if  they could 
provide the names and contact information for any other workers who might be interested in 
participating in this study. Almost half o f the workers interviewed provided the names o f two or 
more family members who were employed in South Omaha plants. One o f them stated, “Well, if  
you want to come back, I can arrange for you to talk with my brother and his wife, they are both 
working at Greater Omaha” (Interview July 2, 2001). Another said, “My husband and both o f his 
brothers are meatpacking workers if  you are interested in interviewing them” (Interview June 2, 
2001).
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authorization cards circulated and signed throughout the meatpacking plants and the
Latino community in South Omaha. In fact, these social networks were fundamental in
reaching meatpacking workers and recruiting them into their organizing campaign.
Organizers described how they utilized them to establish in-plant workers’ committees
and to build commitment among workers at different meatpacking plants in South
Omaha. For instance, a UFCW organizer stated, “At every level of this campaign, from
handbilling to housecalling workers, to getting authorization cards signed and meetings
organized, the workers’ family and friendship ties have been essential” (Interview
February 8, 2001). Another UFCW organizer explained, “Meatpacking workers
approached their friends and families and persuaded them sign authorization cards and to
participate in union meetings and activities” (Interview January 18, 2001). Similarly, an
OTOC organizer explained:
We have used workers’ social networks both inside and outside of the 
meatpacking plants to mobilize workers and gain support for our 
unionization. Family ties have been particularly important in organizing 
house meetings. For example, after my one-on-one with a Latina worker, 
she agreed to organize a house meeting with several of her relatives. She 
has relatives working at three different meatpacking plants in South 
Omaha. Therefore, with just this one-on-one, I was able to enlist seven or 
eight additional meatpacking workers into our organizing campaign 
(Interview February 11, 2001).
Moreover, according to another OTOC organizer:
Meatpacking workers in South Omaha are already highly organized based 
on their immigrant social networks. We just need to find leadership within 
these social networks and explain to these leaders the benefits of being 
union and they will go back and talk to the rest of their friends and 
families. They will organize themselves (Interview March 17, 2001).
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OTOC organizers also explained that meatpacking workers belong to social networks
which are based on their common places of origin, such as the workers’ hometowns, and
that they were able to utilize these networks to organize the workers. For instance, one
organizer explained:
Within each meatpacking plant there are clusters o f workers that come 
from the same rural areas, towns, cities, and states. Many times they know 
one another because they are from the same hometowns in Mexico. Once 
you find leaders within these clusters, the leaders are usually able and 
willing to organize the rest of the cluster. These clusters of workers will 
basically organize themselves. For example, after I met with a 
meatpacking worker who was recruited along with fourteen other men 
from Chihuahua, Mexico, to work at Nebraska Beef, he went back and 
persuaded the fourteen men to get involved in the union campaign. All 
fifteen men signed authorization cards and pledged their support for the 
union. They also arranged for me to meet with their friends from 
Chihuahua who are working at meatpacking plants other than Nebraska 
Beef in South Omaha (Interview February 17, 2001).
In addition, interviews with OTOC organizers and workers revealed that the 
Omaha Latino Soccer League functions as part of the immigrant meatpacking workers’ 
social network and therefore played an important role in the process of unionization. 
According to an OTOC organizer, nearly 50 percent of the league’s players are 
meatpacking workers. Thus, he explained, “The league offers us a vehicle for organizing 
workers and building support for the organizing campaign” (Interview November 8,
2000). Moreover, he explained, “The fact that many of the meatpacking workers in 
South Omaha are involved with the Latino Soccer League has provided us the 
opportunity to connect and build relationships with a large number of workers at several 
South Omaha meatpacking plants” (Interview November 8, 2000). Another OTOC 
organizer stated:
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While doing ‘one-on-ones5 and ‘house-meetings5 with the Latino 
community in South Omaha, I realized that a lot of the meatpacking 
workers are organized into soccer teams based on their regions of origin.
For example, they are organized into teams based on which states in 
Mexico they are from. Some team names include Durango, Zacatecas and 
Jalisco. Once organizers are able to identify team leaders and gain their 
support, it is much easier to gain the support of the rest of their team 
members. These leaders and their team members have helped us recruit 
other meatpacking workers throughout the league and the community into 
our campaign in South Omaha (Interview February 1, 2001).
Furthermore, because the Latino Soccer League held its weekly meetings at the
UFCW/OTOC sub-office in South Omaha, members of the league, many of which are
meatpacking workers, became more familiar with the UFCW and OTOC and their joint
organizing campaign. The league's use of the sub-office also provided the opportunity
for organizers and workers to connect with one another. Also establishing familiarity
with, and perhaps legitimacy for, the UFCW/OTOC5s organizing campaign was the fact
that these two organizations sponsored a team in the Latino Soccer League.
The results of this study also suggest that the geographic concentration of Latino
immigrant meatpacking workers in South Omaha facilitates labor organization. First of
all, it helps maintain and solidify their social networks, which in turn makes it easier to
organize the workers. Moreover, it makes it easier to organize Latino workers than their
Anglo counterparts who tend to be dispersed throughout Omaha. Nineteen of the 23
workers interviewed for this study live in South Omaha, and no more than four of the 23
claimed to be the only meatpacking worker living at their residence. In other words, 83
percent of the workers in this study indicated that they are sharing their residence with at
least one other meatpacking worker. Given that the unionization process requires visiting
workers in their homes, the fact that they are geographically concentrated has made the
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task of these visits, or what the UFCW refers to as “housecalling,” much easier and less
time consuming. More importantly, according to organizers, the geographic
concentration of meatpacking workers in South Omaha has facilitated their efforts to
locate and recruit additional workers. As explained by a UFCW organizer:
During a typical organizing campaign, we will map out the plant and then 
identify workers on each line, in each department, etc. Once we’ve 
identified these workers, we try and find out where they are living in order 
to do housecalls. This process can be very difficult. However, that has not 
been the case with meatpacking workers in South Omaha. It has been 
rather easy obtaining the names and addresses of workers for this 
campaign. Because most of the meatpacking workers live in the same 
neighborhoods, if you ask them to list other workers on their lines, in their 
departments, or working at their plants, not only can they tell you the 
names of additional workers, but they can also tell you where they are 
living. For the most part, they are concentrated in South Omaha 
neighborhoods (Interview January 18, 2001).
Another UFCW organizer stated:
The union does housecalls based on workers’ zip codes. Basically, we map 
out where workers are living and then divide up the task of housecalling 
based on their zip codes. The fact that most meatpacking workers are 
concentrated in South Omaha makes our job a lot easier (Interview 
February 26, 2001).
A third explained:
The fact that many of these workers live in the same neighborhoods and 
even the same houses has made housecalling less difficult. For example, I 
had the address of a guy working at Nebraska Beef. When I arrived at his 
apartment I found-four other meatpacking workers living there and several 
additional workers living in the same apartment complex. By the time I 
concluded my housecall, I had authorization cards signed by seven workers 
from three different plants. These workers also gave me the addresses of a 
handful more of meatpacking workers living in the neighborhood 
(Interview January 25, 2001).
An OTOC organizer, likewise, explained that when he went to do a “one-on-one” with a
worker at an apartment complex that one of the meatpacking employers in South Omaha
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uses to house newly recruited immigrant workers, this visit resulted in eleven signed 
authorization cards (Interview January 21, 2001). In short, both union and community 
organizers maintain that because of the geographic concentration of meatpacking workers 
in South Omaha, they were able to reach a majority of them relatively easily.
The fact that most of the Latino immigrant meatpacking workers are concentrated 
in South Omaha also means that many of them attend the same Catholic Church. In this 
study, 70 percent, or 16 of the 23 workers interviewed, are members of and/or attend 
religious services on a regular basis at Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church. The 
results of this study reveal the vital role this church played in the UFCW/OTOC 
organizing campaign. First, the church functions as a mechanism through which Latino 
immigrant social networks are built and maintained, which in turn facilitates the process 
of unionization. And second, by actively participating in the UFCW/OTOC organizing 
campaign, priests, nuns and other clergy members of the Catholic Church provided 
support and legitimacy for the campaign. Not only were these individuals outspoken 
regarding their support for unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, but 
also they participated in the campaign by: 1) writing letters and making phone calls to 
workers, employers and public officials; 2) visiting workers in their homes and/or 
assisting organizers with their housecalls and one-on-ones; 3) holding meetings with 
workers and their families, as well as other community members; and 4) dedicating 
masses, homilies and other religious services to the workers and their effort to unionize 
South Omaha’s meatpacking plants. For instance, in a letter addressed to meatpacking
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workers at ASE, Father Damian Zuerlein and Sister Janet Horstman of Our Lady of
Guadalupe Parish state:
A few days from now, on Friday December 15th, you will have an 
opportunity to vote and be represented by the United Food and Commercial 
Workers Union....OTOC and Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish support you 
and your co-workers in this election... .We have been helping workers to 
organize in some Omaha packing plants because you deserve better wages, 
better working conditions and a voice in the workplace; the only way this 
can happen is through union contracts.
A similar letter addressed to Nebraska Beef workers from Father John Buckson and
Sister Janet Horstman of Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish, dated June 12, 2001, reads in
part:
As you probably know, workers at Nebraska Beef have been organizing for 
many months to form a union and be represented by the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW). We want you to know that OTOC and Our 
Lady of Guadalupe Parish support you and your co-workers. We stand
with you and are ready to act to protect your right to organize No doubt
officials at your plant will offer you much advice and information about 
unions, perhaps make promises or even threats that the plant may close if 
workers vote for the union. These same tactics were used at ConAgra Beef 
and Cudahy a few months ago. We urge you to get accurate information; 
think through what you are hearing and do what is in your best interest and 
the interest of your family. Again, OTOC and Our Lady of Guadalupe 
Parish support you and your co-workers as you organize.
Workers from Nebraska Beef, Armour-Swift-Eckrich (ASE), and other South Omaha
plants expressed how letters such as these, as well as the phone calls they received from
clergy members, gave them the confidence and courage they needed to support and
participate in the organizing campaign. For instance, an ASE worker explained:
As it came closer and closer to the day of the union election, our managers 
started putting more and more pressure on us. They were trying to 
intimidate us and make us uneasy about the election and the union. 
Workers at the plant were mostly afraid of losing their jobs if they voted 
for the union. But once we received letters and phone calls from the
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Church and knew that the Church and community were supporting us, we 
had the support and courage we needed to stand up to our managers and to 
vote for the union (Interview April 3, 2001).
Another worker at this plant stated:
The day before the election I received a phone call from someone from the 
Church [Our Lady of Guadalupe]. They called to tell me that the Church 
was supporting me and my co-workers in the election and that they were 
praying for us. That is the first time in my 25 years as a meatpacking 
worker that I had ever heard of anything like that happening...the Church 
getting involved in a union election. Knowing the Church was behind us 
and supported our efforts really made a difference. It boosted my morale 
and gave me confidence that we were going to win the election. I believe it 
made quite a difference for a lot of workers (Interview February 25, 2001).
In addition, a Nebraska Beef worker claimed, “As soon as I found out there was going to
be a union election at the plant I decided I was going to vote “yes” for the union. But my
decision to vote for the union was reinforced when I received a letter from the Church
assuring me that I had their support” (Interview March 31st, 2001). Additionally, a
worker at the Northern States plant stated, “The Church built my confidence in the union.
Knowing that priests and nuns were involved helped me trust the union and influenced
my decision to get involved too” (Interview May 4, 2001).
The Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish has also provided a sanctuary for workers and
organizers to meet and discuss their organizing campaign. As explained by an OTOC
organizer:
We used to hold our meetings with meatpacking workers on Sundays 
following mass, but once we leased an office in South Omaha, we started 
having our meetings there. Once we changed locations, attendance at these 
meetings began to drop for basically two reasons: 1) because it was more 
convenient for workers to meet right after mass on Sundays than to come to 
meetings at the UFCW/OTOC office during the evenings of the work­
week; and 2) because workers didn’t feel comfortable meeting at the 
UFCW/OTOC office. They believed they were under surveillance entering
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and leaving the office by their employers, managers, and other company 
supporters. For example, workers at one of the plants suspected their 
employer of having the owner of the building across the street from the 
office take down their names and license plates when they came to 
meetings. Several workers suggested that we move our meetings back to 
the Church (Interview May 4, 2001).
Workers also suggested that holding UFCW/OTOC meetings at the church provided
them a sense of security. Furthermore, an OTOC organizer explained that by having
their meetings at Our Lady of Guadalupe, organizers were given the opportunity to make
contact and interact with workers that attend the church but are not necessarily
acquainted with the UFCW or the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. In short, the
church has provided the UFCW and OTOC access to numerous South Omaha
meatpacking workers and served as a channel of communication between the organizers
and workers.
The findings of this study are in line with those of Milkman (2002, 2000), 
Delgado (2000, 1993) and Zabin (2000), which suggest that Latino immigrant social 
networks facilitate unionization. They show that most of the meatpacking workers in 
South Omaha belong to social networks that are based on their family, friendship and 
cultural ties. Many of these workers not only have a number of family members and 
friends working in South Omaha meatpacking plants, but they also live in the same 
neighborhoods, attend the same church and play in the same soccer league. According to 
organizers and workers alike, all of these factors played a critical role in building support 
for the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Moreover, the findings of this study 
demonstrate that the same social networks meatpacking employers use to recruit new 
workers can be utilized for organizing purposes as well.
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Union Experience
Immigrant workers’ experience with unions in their sending countries is indicated
in the literature as a factor conditioning their preference for unionization once working in
the United States. Scholars such as Milkman (2000, 2002) and Wells (2000) suggest that
immigrant workers are especially receptive to unionization because of their likelihood of
having had previous experience with unionization and oppositional politics in their
sending countries. Milkman (2002), for example, explains:
Although there is no systematic evidence on this point, it is striking that 
many of the new rank-and-file immigrant union leaders have a history of 
union activism and/or left-wing political ties in their native lands. And 
although many immigrant workers are from rural backgrounds, a 
substantial number arrive in the United States far better acquainted with the 
idioms of unionism and class politics than their native-born counterparts. 
Among the workers involved in the L.A. Justice for Janitors (JfJ) campaign 
in 1990, for example, organizers reported “a high level of class 
consciousness,” as well as a willingness to take the risks involved in 
organizing, that was shaped by experiences back home. (P. 117)
Likewise, based on her research among immigrant hotel workers in San Francisco, Wells
(2000) asserts:
Latino immigrants are especially receptive and militant union members.
Not only do they often come from countries with strong and legitimate 
labor movements, but many were union members of leaders there. 
Moreover, many Mexicans and especially Central Americans engaged in 
dangerous authority-challenging struggles in the chain of events that led to 
their emigration. (P. 119)
Bonacich (2000), however, argues that the union and/or political experience of immigrant
workers in their sending countries not only varies significantly, but also may have a
negative effect on their unionization in the United States. She states:
Some of the Central Americans have had a great deal of experience with 
political struggles in their homelands as have some of the Mexicans,
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especially those from Mexico City. On the other hand, many have been 
exposed to corrupt unions or to regimes that assassinate union leaders.
These experiences, or lack of any experience of political struggle, may 
handicap union organizing. (P. 139)
Moreover, Zabin’s (2000) analysis o f an organizing campaign among mostly Latino
immigrant workers at a wheel factory in California found that few of the workers had
experience with unions in their sending countries.
Interviews among Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in South Omaha
revealed results similar to Zabin’s (2000). Although the immigrant meatpacking workers
in this study vary in their previous union experience, the overwhelming majority of them
indicated having had no prior union experience either in their sending countries or the
United States. In fact, 17 of the 21 immigrant meatpacking workers I interviewed
claimed that this campaign was their first union experience. Only three o f the 21
immigrant workers mentioned having had prior union experience in their sending
countries and these three were all of Mexican descent. Moreover, they universally
claimed to have had positive union experiences in Mexico, which contradicts some of the
claims made by labor organizers regarding the prior union experience of immigrant
workers and how it affected the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. For example,
during my interviews with UFCW organizers, a few of them asserted that because
immigrant workers from Mexico associate U.S. labor unions with corrupt Mexican
unions or “sindicatos,” they are less likely to support unionization. However, when asked
about labor unions in their sending country, not a single Mexican immigrant worker
mentioned corruption. In fact, one of the three Mexican immigrant workers with prior
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union experience referred to the relative strength of the Mexican labor movement in
comparison to U.S. labor unions and labor laws. He stated:
There is something I do not understand about unions in this country [the 
U.S.], when a union is on strike, not all the workers honor the strike. In 
this country workers cross the picket line and go back to work. They 
wouldn’t get away with that in Mexico. Also, in this country, when 
workers go on strike the company can hire new workers to take their place. 
If workers are striking a plant in Mexico, no one is working and their jobs 
can’t be given away. That is the law (Interview May 5, 2001).
Moreover, all three of the Mexican immigrant workers with prior union experience
accredited their support for the current organizing campaign in South Omaha to their
positive experience with unions in Mexico. For example, one of them stated:
In Mexico, if I had a problem with my supervisor I would just go see 
someone in the union and they would take care of the problem. We need 
something like that here, in the meatpacking plants. The supervisors treat 
us workers terrible. We need a union to deal with them. That is what I am 
expecting from the union, what I got in Mexico. If I didn’t have that 
experience with unions in Mexico, I don’t know if I would support the 
meatpacking union (Interview May 4, 2001).
Another worker with five years union experience at a refrigerator factory in Mexico
explained:
My experience with the union I belonged to in Mexico was a good one. It 
was a good union. I was working at MABE Refrigerators and we went on 
strike for better wages. All of the workers stayed on strike and out of the 
factory until we won a wage increase. During the strike, we had workers 
blocking each entrance to the plant and we rotated our picket lines so that 
no one could get in the plant. No one even thought of crossing the line. 
The strike lasted about two months. It was hard not getting paid for those 
two months, but we won. Not only did we get the wages we were asking 
for, but we also got paid back wages for the two months we were out on 
strike. It was a good union experience and I expect the same from this one 
(Interview Wednesday, May 30, 2001).
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O f the four workers with prior union experience, as previously mentioned, three of them 
gained union experience in Mexico and the other individual was a member of the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) while she worked as a housekeeper at a hospital 
and hotel in Las Vegas. She also claimed to have had a positive union experience.
Although they were not union members, five of the 21 immigrant meatpacking 
workers in this study have previously worked in unionized meatpacking plants, three of 
whom worked for Millard Processing Services (MPS), which is located in South Omaha 
and represented by UFCW Local 271. The other two individuals worked for Farmland 
in Denison, Iowa, which is represented by UFCW Local 440 and H&H Packing, which 
is located in Fort Worth, Texas. When asked why they did not belong to the unions at 
these meatpacking plants, the workers responded as follows:
• I wanted to become a union member, but when I asked the union 
steward at the plant how to, I was told that I missed the time frame to 
become a member (Interview May 30, 2001).
• I only worked at the plant for a month. And in that time, no one told 
me anything about the union or asked me if I wanted to join (Interview 
June 26,2001).
• Shortly after I started working at the plant I became a “lead man” and if 
I want to be promoted to supervisor, I can’t be a union member 
(Interview June 8, 2001).
• Because there are a lot of problems with the union at MPS. For 
example, the union steward at the plant doesn’t speak Spanish and I 
don’t speak English, so I can’t communicate with her. I can’t 
communicate with anyone at the local office either because no one 
there speaks Spanish. The UFCW has three different union 
representatives who visit the plant on Wednesdays from 3:00-4:00 pm.
So, if a Spanish-speaking worker needs to speak with someone from 
the union their only opportunity is one hour on Wednesdays. These 
three UFCW representatives are not from the local office; they’re out of 
the international office. And, there is no union steward at the plant
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during the second shift. There is only someone during the first shift.
So, for nearly 500 workers and $19 per month in union dues, there is 
one union steward and she doesn’t speak Spanish (Interview February 
25, 2001).
The last of these five workers did not even realize that the plant she works at, which is
MPS, was a unionized plant until it was revealed to her during the process of being
interviewed. When I explained to her that MPS is in fact unionized, her response was:
There is no union at MPS. I work there. I know there is no union there.
I’ve never seen nor heard anything about the union and I’ve worked there 
for eight months. Besides, I don’t know any workers at MPS who belong 
to the union (Interview May 10,2001).
Additional Demographic Characteristics 
Ethnicity/Nationality. As mentioned previously, Latino immigrants comprise an 
estimated 80 to 90 percent of the meatpacking workforce in South Omaha. According to 
organizers and workers alike, the majority of these workers are first generation (foreign- 
born) Mexican immigrants. Of the 23 meatpacking workers interviewed for this study,
21 are first generation, Latino immigrants. Seventeen of them, or just over 80 percent, 
are in fact Mexican, which suggests that the meatpacking workforce in South Omaha is 
rather homogeneous with regard to ethnicity and nationality. However, there are several 
other nationalities represented among South Omaha’s meatpacking workforce, including 
individuals from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Columbia and other Latin American 
countries, as well as from Vietnam, the Philippines, and a growing number from Sudan.
Several of the union organizers interviewed suggested that intra-ethnic tensions 
exist within the meatpacking plants and that these tensions hinder worker solidarity and, 
consequently, unionization. However, interviews with meatpacking workers did not
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reveal in-plant tension based on ethnicity and/or nationality. Instead they reveal the ways
in which ethnic relations and networks based on nationality encourage unionization. For
instance, an OTOC organizer explained:
From their South Omaha neighborhoods to their soccer teams, these 
workers are already highly organized based on their regions and countries 
of origin. Once we are able to find leaders in their neighborhoods or on 
their soccer teams, these leaders do the rest. If we find leaders who support 
unionization, we pretty much have the support of the rest of their friends, 
neighbors, and teammates. For example, while I was doing a one-on-one 
with a meatpacking worker from Guatemala, he told me that nearly 
everyone in his neighborhood is Guatemalan and working in meatpacking.
After I expressed my desire to meet with these workers, he arranged a 
meeting with twenty or so men who were working in several different 
meatpacking plants in South Omaha. Just like that, he organized a meeting 
with twenty meatpacking workers (Interview June 3, 2001).
Overall, my interviews with meatpacking workers from several different countries of
origin including Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala did not reveal
differences in the appeal of unionization based on ethnicity and/or nationality.
Gender. Latina immigrants make up a considerable proportion of South Omaha’s
meatpacking workforce. Their percentage of the workforce varies from plant to plant and
by department within plants. According to both union and community organizers they
typically comprise between 25 to 40 percent of the workforce at any given plant and
dominate departments such as “packing” and “fabrication,” which are considered less
physically-demanding departments. Organizers also estimate that Latina immigrants
make up at least 75 percent of the workforce at some secondary meat processing plants in
South Omaha.
Eight of the nine female meatpacking workers interviewed for this study are 
Latina immigrants, all of whom claimed to support the UFCW/OTOC organizing
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campaign in South Omaha. Although these women support the campaign, their responses
suggest that their participation is adversely affected by their patriarchal family structure
and its resulting gendered roles and responsibilities. When asked to describe their
involvement in the campaign, several Latina meatpacking workers indicated their
willingness to participate, but were unable to do so because of their domestic roles and
responsibilities. For example, one of them explained, “I do not attend the union meetings
because they are mostly .in the evenings and that is when I am taking care of my children
and housework. I am away from my children all day, while I am at work, so I need to be
with them in the evenings” (Interview March 32, 2001). Likewise, another claimed:
I tried to make it to as many of the OTOC’s Temporary Workers’ 
Committee meetings as I could, but I missed a few because I had to take 
care of my kids. For example, the evening that Governor Johanns came to 
South Omaha to meet with workers in the basement of Our Lady of 
Guadalupe, I couldn’t find a babysitter. I really wanted to be at that 
meeting, so I decided to just take my kids with me. When I got to the 
church and went downstairs to the basement, I realized that practically all 
the workers at the meeting were men and that there weren’t any kids there.
I couldn’t take my kids down there, so I left the church and tried to get a 
hold of someone to take care of them. I couldn’t find anyone, so I missed 
the meeting (Interview June 11, 2001).
A third Latina, whose husband is also a South Omaha meatpacking worker, explained, “I
would like to go to the meetings with my husband, but someone needs to take care o f our
children” (Interview May 30, 2001).
Organizers also agreed that female meatpacking workers’ participation in the
organizing campaign, particularly union meetings and activities, was limited due to their
domestic roles and responsibilities. For instance, an OTOC organizer stated:
It is hard to get women involved in the campaign, mostly because of their 
culture. Many of their husbands do not want them involved and even if
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they let them get involved, the women have so many family responsibilities 
that it is hard for them to find time to participate (Interview June 18, 2001).
UFCW organizers, likewise, stated:
• Female meatpacking workers don’t get involved in the campaign because 
of their family and household obligations (Interview June 11, 2001).
• It is difficult to get female workers involved in the campaign. They are 
less likely to show up for our meetings than male workers, which is 
probably because they are the ones taking care of their households 
(Interview May 18, 2001).
• It’s “a familia,” or more accurately, “a machismo issue.” Machismo within 
their families effects Latinas’ participation in unionization. Latinos do not 
want their wives to participate in the union or this campaign because they 
think their place is at home, as a wife and a mother (Interview February 13,
2001).
In addition, a few of the Latina meatpacking workers indicated that their husbands do
not support unionization and therefore discourage them from getting involved with the
union and the current organizing campaign. Interestingly, these women revealed that
they do not necessarily follow their husbands’ advice regarding unionization. Here, one
Latina worker said:
My husband tells me not to get involved with the union or the organizing 
campaign, but he doesn’t work at a packing plant. He doesn’t know what it 
is like to work where I work or whether or not I need a union. Because of 
him, I don’t go to union meetings or talk about the union, but when it 
comes time to vote, I’m voting “union yes” (Interview July 2, 2001).
Another stated, “My husband doesn’t like the union, so he tells me I shouldn’t take part
in what they are doing. So, I didn’t tell him that I signed a union [authorization] card. I
don’t talk to him about what the union or workers at my plant are doing” (Interview April
3,2001).
123
On the other hand, husbands of several of these Latina workers support
unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Six of the eight Latina
workers in this study have husbands who are also working at meatpacking plants in South
Omaha. All but one of these women claimed that their husbands support unionization,
which has in turn influenced their decision to support the campaign. For instance, when
asked what influenced their decision to support the campaign, a frequent response was, “I
support the union because my husband supports the union.” In fact, their husbands’
influence over their decision to support the UFCW/OTOC campaign was apparent in
their responses. For example, one of them stated:
I support the union because my husband tells me I should. The 
meatpacking plant that he is working at now doesn’t have a union, but the 
one he used to work at, American Beef, had a union. He was a member, so 
he knows about unions. He has experience working with them and at a 
unionized plant. So, when he told me I should support the union, I did! 
(Interview April 16, 2001).
Likewise, another Latina worker explained:
I don’t really know much about unions. I’ve never been a union member, 
but my husband has. And he told me that if the union is organizing my 
plant, I should support them. So, I guess there are two main reasons I 
support the union. The first is because of my husband and the second is 
because of my injury (Interview March 31, 2001).
A final theme revealed during interviews with Latina meatpacking workers is the 
role the church has played in influencing their decision to support the UFCW/OTOC 
organizing campaign. Seventy-five percent of the Latina meatpacking workers 
interviewed claimed to be active members of Our Lady of Guadalupe parish. Several of 
these women explained that their support for the campaign is directly related to the 
church. For instance, one of them stated, “I was not sure what to think about the union,
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but when I received a letter from Father Damien and Sister Janet pledging their support
for the union, I was 100 percent convinced that it was something I needed to support too”
(Interview March 30, 2001). Similarly, another claimed:
At first I was uncertain about the union and whether or not to get involved.
But one day, after mass at Our Lady of Guadalupe, there was a bus outside 
the church and it was taking people downtown for a union rally at 
ConAgra. I decided to get on the bus and go to the rally. After the rally, I 
decided to support the union. Since the church was backing the union, I 
knew it was the right thing to do (Interview, May 10, 2001).
A third Latina worker explained, “Some members of my church [Our Lady of Guadalupe]
started having union meetings after mass on Sundays. I went to a couple of meetings and
decided that I needed to support the union” (Interview March 28, 2001). Overall,
interviews with female meatpacking workers, specifically Latina immigrant workers,
suggest that although their patriarchal family structure may hinder their participation in
the unionization process, they still overwhelmingly support unionization.
Age. The age of South Omaha’s meatpacking workforce ranges from at least the
legal working age of 18 to the retirement age of 65. Workers and organizers alike
indicated that there are some individuals working in the plants that are actually younger
than the legal working age of 18. The meatpacking workers interviewed for this study,
ranging in age from 24 to 64, are illustrative of this range. In fact, several of the workers
in this study indicated that their families have three generations presently working in
South Omaha plants. However, union organizers estimate that most local meatpacking
workers are between the ages of 30 and 45. The mean age of workers in this study,
which is 40, confirms this estimate.
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Three out of the five UFCW organizers interviewed suggested that younger
meatpacking workers are less likely than their older counterparts to support unionization.
In line with this suggestion, when asked the question: “Who are the least likely workers
at your meatpacking plant to support unionization,” several workers claimed that the
younger workers at their plants are not interested in unionization. When further
questioned as to why this might be the case, the typical response was that the younger
workers are not interested in the benefits unions have to offer. For example, an
individual with 23 years experience as a meatpacking worker claimed, “When you are
young, you don’t care about things like health insurance and pension and retirement
plans, all you care about is getting a pay check every Friday” (Interview February 22,
2001). However, interviews with younger meatpacking workers (those workers under the
age of 35) sometimes contradicted these responses. For example, a twenty-four year-old
Latina immigrant stated:
The older workers, who have been working at the plant for several years, 
are the ones that don’t support the union. They don’t support it because 
they have the most to lose. They have the most invested in the company, 
and therefore the most to lose. They don’t want to risk their jobs on the 
union. We younger workers don’t have as much to lose. We can easily get 
a job at another plant, with another company (Interview February 26,
2001).
Likewise, a twenty-four year-old who has been working in meatpacking plants in South
Omaha for over four years stated:
We younger workers are more likely to support the union for several 
reasons, most importantly, because we have the least to lose if we get fired 
for our support or lose our jobs because the company decides to close the 
plant because of the union. The older the worker, the more likely they are 
to have a family that they have to support, so the less likely they are to 
support the union or participate in this campaign because they cannot
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afford to lose their jobs. The older workers need their jobs more than we 
do because they have families to support. Plus, they have less free time 
than we do to go to meetings and other union activities (Interview April 6, 
2001).
Whereas several of the younger workers indicated that one reason they support 
unionization is because they have little to lose, the older workers in this study (those 
workers over the age of 50) indicated that one of the primary reasons they support the 
campaign is their desire for the security and retirement benefits a union contract 
presumably offers them. A few of the older workers also mentioned that they were 
working in the industry when it was unionized and that they remember the difference it 
made regarding their wages and working conditions. For example, a native-born 
Mexican American, who has worked over 46 years in the meatpacking industry, 
explained:
I remember when we were union. I remember how much better the pay 
and working conditions were. When I walked off the job during a union 
strike in the eighties I was making $11.45 per hour. Now, after working an 
additional nineteen years in the industry, I am making $11.35 per hour. 
That’s ten cents less an hour than I was making in 1982! The pay, benefits, 
and working conditions went out the door right along with the union. I 
remember the benefits we had when we were union and I want to see them 
brought back to the industry (Interview February 22, 2001).
On the whole, this research did not reveal a difference in the immigrant meatpacking
workers’ inclination to support unionization based on age. From ages 24 to 64, all of the
workers interviewed for this study indicated that they supported and had participated, or
were willing to participate, in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign.
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Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to critically examine and ultimately challenge the 
widely held assumption that contemporary meatpacking workers are “unorganizable.”
By exploring immigrant workers’ propensity to support unionization based on a number 
of their background and demographic characteristics, this study suggests that regardless 
of: 1) legal status; 2) length of time residing in the United States and intended length of 
stay in the country; 3) prior union experience; 4) ethnicity and/or nationality; 5) gender; 
and 6) age, Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in South Omaha often support 
unionization.
First of all, the results of this study refute the notion that undocumented workers 
are “unorganizable.” Regardless of their legal status, the majority of workers in South 
Omaha’s meatpacking plants support unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing 
campaign. However, because Nebraska’s meatpacking industry has been the focus of 
numerous INS efforts to enforce immigration legislation, particularly employer sanctions, 
the legal status of the industry’s workforce has posed challenges to union organizing. 
Second, the results of this study suggest that even those meatpacking workers who are 
relatively recent arrivals to the United States and/or view their migration to the country as 
temporary support unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Third, the 
overwhelming majority of Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in this study have not 
had prior union experience. However, this lack of experience has not affected their 
willingness to support unionization and participate in the campaign. Fourth, the results of 
this study did not reveal differences in Latino immigrant meatpacking workers’
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receptiveness to unionization based on their nationality, gender, or age. Interviews with 
female meatpacking workers, specifically Latina immigrants, suggest that although their 
patriarchal family structure may hinder their participation in the organizing campaign, 
they still overwhelmingly support unionization. Additionally, this research did not reveal 
a difference in meatpacking workers’ tendency to unionize based on age. Although the 
younger generation of workers implied that their older counterparts were less likely to 
support unionization and the older workers implied just the opposite, suggesting that it 
was their younger counterparts that were less incline to support the union, the findings o f 
this study suggests that from ages twenty-four to sixty-four, contemporary meatpacking 
workers support unionization.
Finally, the results of this study suggest that Latino immigrant meatpacking 
workers in South Omaha belong to extensive social networks, which are based on 
kinship, friendship and cultural ties. Meatpacking employers utilize these ties to recruit 
new workers into their plants. The findings of this study reveal that organizers can also 
tap into these social networks to facilitate unionization. Nearly every meatpacking 
worker interviewed for this study found work in South Omaha’s plants based on his or 
her social networks. In fact, this study suggests that the success of the UFCW/OTOC 
organizing campaign has, to some extent, depended on the ability of labor and 
community organizers to tap into meatpacking workers’ social networks to mobilize 
workers and build support for their campaign.
Whereas this chapter has focused on how the background and demographic 
characteristics of Latino immigrant meatpacking workers affects unionization, the next
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chapter describes and evaluates the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign among South 
Omaha’s predominantly Latino immigrant meatpacking workforce.
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Chapter V
The UFCW/OTOC Organizing Campaign Among South Omaha’s 
Meatpacking Workers
In the summer of 2000 two organizations, the United Food and Commercial 
Workers Union (UFCW) and Omaha Together One Community (OTOC), converged in 
an effort to organize South Omaha’s predominantly Latino immigrant meatpacking 
workforce. These two organizations have different organizational histories, structures, 
cultures and strategies. This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of these two 
organizations, alone and in alliance, in terms of organizing contemporary meatpacking 
workers. I begin by briefly describing each organization and then turn to a description of 
OTOC’s efforts throughout the 1990s to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. 
Next, I present data from the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, which began in the 
summer of 2000. This data examines workers’ receptivity to the two organizations and 
their alliance in order to draw conclusions later about the extent to which organizational 
approaches emerge as the most critical factors in determining unionization among 
contemporary meatpacking workers. As in the previous chapter, I allow the voices of 
workers and organizers to describe and evaluate the effectiveness of each organization 
and their collaborative organizing campaign in South Omaha.
The United Food and Commercial Workers 
The UFCW is one of sixty-eight unions affiliated with American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). It was formed in 1979 with 
the merger of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union and the Retail Clerks International
Union. Today, it is one of the largest private sector unions in the United States, 
representing approximately 1.4 million workers in many different industries, including an 
estimated 250,000 meatpacking workers (United Food and Commercial Workers 2003). 
The union consists of approximately five hundred local unions, which are organized into 
eight regions across the United States (United Food and Commercial Workers 2003). 
Each of these regions is headed by a “regional director” who oversees a staff that 
provides assistance to the local unions within its geographic territory. In Omaha, the 
UFCW is represented by Local 271, which is under the direction of the UFCW 
Northcentral Region 6, based in Illinois. UFCW Local 271 is the second largest union in 
Omaha, according to the Omaha Federation of Labor (Deering 2000:13). As of January 
2000, the local had 2,078 members (not all of whom are meatpacking workers) and 
represented only three of more than a dozen meatpacking plants located in South Omaha 
(U.S. Department of Labor 2000b). The three meatpacking plants were Millard 
Processing Services (MPS), Omaha Steaks International, and Aksarben Foods, Inc.
In the years preceding the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign in South Omaha, 
UFCW Local 271 experienced a decline in membership and therefore was placed into 
trusteeship by the International, according to a UFCW representative (Interview January 
18, 2001). A U.S. Department of Labor LM-15 Form confirms that the local was placed 
into trusteeship on July 29, 1997 (U.S. Department of Labor 1999). It states the reasons 
for establishing the trusteeship as (1) “to assure the performance of collective bargaining 
agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative” and (2) “to ensure that the
132
local union achieves and maintains financial stability” (U.S. Department of Labor 1999).
It also provides the following, more detailed, explanation:
The Trustee continues to work on ensuring that the percentage of members 
in the local union’s bargaining units is maintained at an acceptable level, 
and achieving that objective has been made more difficult by unanticipated 
problems. The Trustee’s progress in reducing the local union’s past-due per 
capita tax obligations to the International Union and in ensuring the local 
union’s financial stability continues to be challenged by the loss last 
summer of one of the local union’s largest bargaining units when the plant 
was permanently closed and by the loss earlier this year of three bargaining 
units in Iowa to recently chartered UFCW Local No. 440. As a 
consequence, work continues to ensure that the local union may meet its 
financial obligations and to ensure future financial stability and the ability 
and necessity of the local union servicing its membership and keeping its 
bargaining units strong (U.S. Department of Labor 1999).
In January 2000 the trusteeship was terminated by the International Union and the
following officers were elected: Richard Saalfeld (President), Donna McDonald
(Secretary-Treasurer), William Smith (Vice President), Linda Lee (Vice President), Rick
Skillett (Vice President), Frank Rodriguez (Vice President), Dennis Knapp (Vice
President), Marshall Martin (Vice President) and Shirley Spencer (Vice President) (U.S.
Department of Labor 2000a). However, just prior to the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign in South Omaha, Local 271’s President, Richard Saalfeld, retired and was
replaced by Secretary-Treasurer, Donna McDonald.
Omaha Together One Community (OTOC)
Omaha Together, One Community (OTOC) is a community-based organization 
founded in 1992 and currently representing over 40 member organizations, most of which 
are religious congregations. OTOC is affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation 
(IAF), a national network of community-based organizations, which represents the largest
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and oldest institution for community-based organizing in the United States (Dahle 
1999:294). The IAF was founded in Chicago in 1940 by community organizer Saul 
Alinsky. The Foundation’s mission is to train people to organize themselves to take 
responsibility for solving the problems in their local communities. Mary Beth Rogers, 
organizer o f the Foundation for Democracy Dialogues, explains, “IAF organizations 
concentrate on the development of skill and insight that allows people to act for 
themselves, to transform themselves from passive participants who are content to have 
things done for them into actors who initiate change in their inner as well as outer lives” 
(1990:50). This approach was formulated by Saul Alinsky and continues to be carried on 
by the national IAF and its affiliated organizations. Central to this approach is what IAF 
affiliates and members commonly refer to as “The Iron Rule,” which is “never do for 
people what they can do for themselves” (Rogers 1990:50).
IAF affiliates are locally constituted and while they are linked into regional 
and national networks, their emphasis remains on local organizing. They mobilize 
around concerns that arise again and again in community dialogues. William Greider, 
a prominent political journalist and author of Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal 
o f  American Democracy, explains that the IAF “does not start out with ‘policy issues’ 
or a political purpose. It starts with conversations in peoples’ homes. It does not 
spring itself on to a city or town, but begins by establishing relations with enduring 
institutions that people rely on -  churches and synagogues and civic associations, 
from Catholic bishops to black Baptist ministers’^  1992:225).
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In 1969 the IAF established a training center, the Saul Alinsky Training
Institute, which provides leadership training for community organizers. And, over the
years the IAF has trained ordinary people to organize amongst themselves to become
a powerful political voice and to solve problems in their communities. Sociologists
Joe Feagin and Heman Vera (2001) explain:
Over the decades, the IAF has trained many organizers, and it currently 
serves many groups and families in numerous states and overseas as well. 
Today, the IAF is the center of a national network of broad based, 
multiethnic, interfaith organizations in primarily poor and moderate 
income communities. Typically, these organizations are broad coalitions, 
which include an array of local churches, synagogues, mosques, unions, 
schools, and environmental, health, and civic organizations. These 
coalitions get local organizations to listen to, and learn from, each other — 
and then work to develop coordinated strategies to get local decision 
makers to sit down with them to make meaningful changes in community 
conditions and services. IAF groups work to establish and renew local 
democracy by empowering citizens through participation and political 
action. (P. 142)
As of 2000, the IAF was staffed by a team of 110 professionally trained organizers, who 
contract with community organizations to recruit and train community members on how 
to effectively address pressing issues facing their communities (Ramsey 2000). It 
comprised 62 affiliated organizations across the United States with an estimated 
combined membership exceeding one million individuals (Industrial Areas Foundation 
2001).
Religious Congregations Bring the IA F  to Omaha
The IAF came to Omaha in the early 1990s in the form of a “Temporary 
Organizing Committee.” This Committee grew out of discussions among Omaha 
clergymen, dating to the mid-1980s, about how to involve and empower people in their
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local communities. In October of 1991, a group of pastors from 21 Omaha congregations 
formed a sponsoring committee and the following year it entered into a contract with the 
IAF and hired a professional organizer, Tom Holler, from San Antonio, Texas with 13 
years experience with the IAF (Flannery 1993:15). As described in the following Omaha 
World Herald article signed by the co-chairmen of the Omaha Temporary Organizing 
Committee:
The Omaha Temporary Organizing Committee had its roots in discussions 
started in 1986. Pastors from various parts of the city recognized that the 
present system could not resolve the serious problems that confronted our 
communities: violence, underemployment, unemployment, youth
problems, discrimination, deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods, and 
the rising cost of health care, among others. We discovered that these 
problems were related to the increased isolation and disconnectedness that 
exists in our communities. This fragmentation leaves people increasingly 
less capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out. We quickly 
realized that we could not expect others to solve problems for us. In our 
search for answers, we learned of the success of congregations in other 
areas of the country that were engaged in community organizing. We 
contacted organizing training centers. In October of 1991, we formed a 
sponsoring committee. The following year we entered into a contract with 
the Industrial Areas Foundation and hired an organizer (“Omaha 
Temporary Organizing Committee: ‘The Goal is Just To Solve People’s 
Problems” 1993:15B).
It changed its name to “Omaha Together One Community” (OTOC) in 1995. Since then,
OTOC has continued to grow, and now consists of over 40 member organizations.
The organizational structure of OTOC has an “executive team” which includes
the following: 1) a secretary; 2) a treasurer; 3) a member of the clergy caucus; and 4)
several elected co-chairs. It also has a “steering committee” and “delegate congress,”
which are comprised of members from each of its member organizations. In addition,
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there is an “education arm,” the “Institute for Public Life,” which trains leaders in 
research and organizing.
The organizing strategies utilized by OTOC and its organizing staff are those 
espoused by the national IAF. In the broadest sense, these strategies include: 1) “one-on- 
ones,” 2) “house meetings,” 3) “research actions,” and 4) “actions.” At the core of 
OTOC’s approach to community-based organizing are “one-on-ones” and “house 
meetings” in which organizers meet with individuals and groups of individuals in the 
community to identify their common interests and concerns, as well as search for leaders. 
As explained by Rogers (1990:51), “one-on-ones” are a “technique used to recruit new 
leaders and to get church people involved in the organization. The major purpose of the 
recruitment meeting is to establish a personal relationship with a potential leader, to find 
out what the individual really cares about, and to show him or her that there might be an 
effective way to get it through the political process.” These one-on-one’s lead to “house 
meetings,” which are “held in private homes, where organizers get to know people and 
the ideas of the community and, in passing, scout for those who will become the 
community’s leaders” (Greider 1992:225). Through these two strategies (one-on-ones 
and house meetings) OTOC organizers identify what will become the organization’s 
priorities. Next, organizers conduct “research actions” to determine specific, concrete, 
and winnable issues around the community’s concerns; these research actions are then 
followed by community “actions.” An OTOC organizer explained, “Once we discover an 
issue in the community through one-on-ones and house meetings, we research the issues, 
which we refer to as a ‘research action’ and if we gain enough support for the issue, we
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plan an ‘action’” (Interview January 10, 2001). To clarify, he spelled out these four
strategies as follows:
We begin by canvassing the community, conducting one-on-ones with 
individuals. These one-on-ones develop into house meetings and then 
into research actions and actions. For example, one-on-ones with 
individuals in the South Omaha community revealed concerns 
regarding working conditions in the community’s meatpacking plants.
Based on these one-on-ones, we organized house meetings in which a 
number of individuals came together to discuss their working 
conditions. We then carried out research on conditions in the plants, 
which involved a “one-day clinic” in which health care professionals 
screened and documented meatpacking workers’ injuries. The clinic 
was followed by a community rally and prayer service — an “action”
(Interview January 10, 2001).
Throughout their entire organizing processes, OTOC espouses IAF’s “Iron Rule,” which
is “never, ever, do for people what they can do for themselves” (Rogers 1990:15).
Community-Based Efforts to Organize South Omaha’s Meatpacking Workers 
Canvassing the Community and Identifying Issues. Soon after OTOC was 
established, working conditions in South Omaha’s meatpacking plants became one of its 
central priorities. As OTOC organizers canvassed the South Omaha community 
conducting one-on-ones and house meetings, they heard numerous stories about poor 
working conditions in the area’s meatpacking plants. According to Tom Holler, a leading 
OTOC organizer, when OTOC began holding meetings in South Omaha in 1993, “it was 
clear from day one that the major issue in the community was conditions in these plants” 
(Olsson 2002:16).
Spearheading OTOC’s efforts to address working conditions in the South Omaha 
plants has been one of the organization’s member congregations, Our Lady of Guadalupe 
Catholic Church, and its parish priest, Father Damian Zuerlein. The congregation is
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located in the heart o f the Latino community and amidst a number of meatpacking plants.
Ninety-eight percent of the congregation’s estimated 6,000 members are Latinos, 25 to 30
percent o f which have some connection to meatpacking (Walton 1999a). Father Zuerlein
was instrumental in bringing OTOC to Omaha and since the organization’s founding he
was involved with organizing meatpacking workers at his parish. A common concern he
identified among these workers was the conditions at their place of employment. In an
effort to address these concerns, Father Zuerlein and OTOC organized meetings with
meatpacking plant employers and managers to discuss working conditions. However,
these efforts failed when the managers reacted defensively. For example, Father Zuerlein
explained that when he asked if workers could be trained to do other jobs to reduce the
number of repetitive motion injuries, the typical response by plant managers was, “You
just don’t understand the industry. This can’t be done” (Hendee 2000:24). Bacon (2002)
has documented Father Zuerlein’s efforts as follows: •
Zuerlein began organizing workers at the Greater Omaha Packing Co. 
meatpacking plant in 1996. “We were able to get them together very 
quickly, because the conditions in the plant were so bad....People weren't 
getting bathroom breaks, and even urinated in their clothes on the line. The 
line speed was tremendous, and lots of workers showed symptoms of 
carpal tunnel syndrome. But management sent spies into our group, and 
after a meeting with the plant manager everyone involved in the effort was 
fired. We concluded that we needed to root our organizing deeper in the 
plant, and identify and train leaders willing to make a commitment.
When efforts meeting with meatpacking employers failed, Father Zuerlein and OTOC
tried to find other ways to help workers improve the conditions at their plants.
Workers continued meeting at Our Lady of Guadalupe Church. As a result of
these meetings, a list of specific concerns took shape which included: 1) the speed of the
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production line could be brutal and lead to severe repetitive motion injuries; 2) unjust 
terminations subsequent to injuries were frequent and aimed at minimizing worker’s 
compensation claims; 3) some plants lacked time clocks, leading to discrepancies in pay;
4) patterns of arbitrary wage increases and job advancement created an atmosphere which 
contributed to the sexual abuse and harassment of female employees by their supervisors;
5) lack of an adequate number of bathroom breaks; and 6) the INS being called in to 
intimidate workers (Kuhlmann 2002:1). Subsequently, in April 1997, OTOC organizers 
sponsored a “city council campaign” in which they, together with meatpacking workers, 
raised these concerns with a number of Omaha City Council candidates. As a result of 
the campaign, OTOC secured promises from a number of candidates to address problems 
in the meatpacking plants. For instance, each candidate pledged to organize a public 
hearing on conditions and wages in the plants (Gertzen 1997:11).
Hiring a Community Organizer and Addressing Key Concerns. In the summer 
of 1998, OTOC hired organizer Sergio Sosa. Sosa, a Guatemalan immigrant, had 
experience organizing in his native country as a seminarian as well as a member of a 
radical movement, which organized Mayan peasants during Guatemala’s civil war of the 
1970s and 1980s. Once he was hired by OTOC and completed his IAF training, he was 
appointed to serve the Latino community in South Omaha. Almost immediately, he 
began conducting one-on-ones throughout the community. Over the next several months 
he canvassed the community holding over seven hundred one-on-ones. He explained that 
these encounters revealed how the South Omaha community was organized and three 
primary concerns within the community including: 1) working conditions in the
140
meatpacking plants; 2) problems with the INS; and 3) issues regarding Latino soccer 
teams and their access to Omaha soccer fields (Interview October 5, 2000). 
Subsequently, OTOC began campaigns focusing on each of these three areas. Sosa 
explained:
Latino soccer teams were banned from the City’s soccer league because of 
problems with drinking, littering, etc. So, OTOC helped organize the 
players, their teams, and money to form the Omaha Latino Soccer League.
We organized over 500 players into 32 teams and raised over thirty 
thousand dollars. As a result, the City and the Nebraska Soccer Association 
provided us eight new soccer fields at Dodge Park. This campaign was not 
just about soccer fields; however, it was also a strategy to build trust within 
the Latino community and among the community’s meatpacking workforce 
(Interview June 8, 2001).
Sosa explained that he, and OTOC in general, began to gain workers’ trust as a result of
organizing the Omaha Latino Soccer League; trust that he then utilized to build an
organizational base among South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. Sosa explained, “The
Soccer League and the trust I gained working on this campaign allowed me to connect
with workers, their families, friends, compadres, comadres and their workplaces. These
connections were essential in building a base among meatpacking workers in South
Omaha and eventually forming a worker’s committee” (Interview August 3, 2001).
Interviews with meatpacking workers revealed that a few of them, in fact, became
involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign because of their participation in the
league. For instance, a Nebraska Beef worker with over 15 years of experience working
in South Omaha’s meatpacking plants recounted:
I have been involved in this organizing campaign for a few years now, ever 
since OTOC helped us form our own soccer league. Before that, we didn’t 
really know what OTOC was all about. But after the soccer league was
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formed, we started attending OTOC meetings and building a “workers’ 
committee” (Interview June 8, 2001).
Throughout the fall of 1998, Sosa estimated that he conducted thirty house meetings with
members of the soccer league. He explained:
In conducting these house meetings, I was searching for leadership among 
the players. As a matter of fact, a couple of the players turned out to be 
key leaders who helped organize a number of meatpacking workers 
throughout the league. These leaders were crucial during OTOC’s initial 
efforts to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers (Interview June 8,
2001).
OTOC also took up the Latino community’s concerns regarding the INS, which 
included: 1) the location and size of the local INS office; 2) INS office doors being 
locked during the day because the waiting room was full; 3) INS staff scheduling more 
appointments at one time than the four-person staff could handle; and 4) INS use of 
lawyers and other third parties to arrest undocumented immigrants (Rosman 1998). In 
early to mid-1999, OTOC held press conferences and rallies to publicly criticize the 
service provided by the INS District Office in Omaha. And in June 1999, it initiated a 
postcard campaign aimed at pressuring federal immigration officials to improve services 
at the office. Over 10,000 postcards outlining INS service problems were sent to Sen. 
Bob Kerry (D-Neb), Rep. Lee Terry (R-Neb) and Michael Pearson, an INS executive 
associate commissioner of field operations in Washington, D.C. (Sherry 1999:3). This 
campaign ultimately led to an increase in the INS staff and the expansion of the waiting 
room area at the Omaha office. According to OTOC organizers, the success of this 
campaign also served to establish OTOC’s legitimacy within the Latino community in 
general, and among the community’s meatpacking workers in particular (Interview May
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18, 2000). Moreover, an OTOC organizer claimed, “As a result of this campaign, not 
only did South Omaha’s meatpacking workers become familiar with OTOC, but OTOC 
also became more familiar with workers’ concerns and needs” (Interview January 8, 
2001).
Organizing a “Workers’ Committee” arid the “Meatpacking Workers’ B ill o f
Rights. ” Concurrent with these campaigns, Sosa built a committee of workers
representing several meatpacking plants in South Omaha. He explained, “Through the
Soccer League and INS campaigns, as well as the one-on-one and house meeting
campaigns in South Omaha, I was able to identify several leaders within the meatpacking
plants. Together we [Sosa and these leaders] built a multi-plant committee of workers as
well as several in-plant committees” (Interview May 25, 2000). He clarified:
The multi-plant committee consists of leaders and workers across several 
different meatpacking plants, while the in-plant committees consist of leaders 
and workers within each of the different plants. Whereas the in-plant 
committees identify issues specific to their respective plants, the purpose of 
the multi-plant committee is to identify and address common issues and 
problems across a number of South Omaha packing plants and to build a 
broader base among South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. It is important to 
have a multi-plant committee so that workers remain involved as they move 
from one plant to another (Interview May 25, 2001).
In July 1999, a number o f workers from these committees met with OTOC
representatives and decided to form a “Temporary Workers Committee” (TWC) and
explore the possibility of building a workers’ association. This association would work
to resolve workplace disputes as well as inform members of their rights, and provide
them services, such as language and citizenship classes and a credit union. Over the next
several months, OTOC developed a number of strategies to facilitate the TWC’s
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organizing efforts. For example, OTOC, with the help of the Nebraska Appleseed Center 
for Law in the Public Interest (a non-profit, non-partisan law project committed to social 
and economic justice), brought working conditions in South Omaha’s meatpacking plants 
to the attention of the local media and public officials.
During the months of July and August, OTOC organizers and workers from 
several South Omaha meatpacking plants met with a journalist from The Lincoln Journal 
Star (Nebraska’s capital city newspaper), to share stories about working conditions in the 
plants. Subsequently, The Lincoln Journal Star published a series of articles highlighting 
workers’ experiences in the South Omaha meatpacking plants. On Sunday, September 5, 
1999, for example, journalist Don Walton published an article entitled, “Critics:
Hispanics Exploited in Omaha Meatpacking Jobs” featuring workers’ experiences 
regarding their poor wages and working conditions. These articles, the September 5th 
article in particular, caught the attention of Nebraska Governor Mike Johanns. “Johanns 
said that he was ‘very disturbed’ by what he read in a Sunday Journal Star story detailing 
conditions Hispanic workers say they encounter during long hours at hazardous and 
swift-moving production lines” (Walton 1999c). Consequently, Johanns assigned 
Nebraska Lt. Governor Dave Maurstad to investigate working conditions in the state’s 
meatpacking plants. Maurstad explained, “My goal was to determine whether there was 
legitimacy behind the concerns of workers as outlined in the September 5, 1999 edition 
of the Lincoln Journal Star and subsequent articles in that and other newspapers” 
(Maurstad 2000a).
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In the months that followed, Maurstad met with OTOC, the TWC, and hundreds 
o f workers during a series of meetings at Our Lady of Guadalupe Church. In his effort to 
investigate working conditions in Nebraska’s meatpacking plants, Maurstad met with 
workers from a number of South Omaha plants, including Greater Omaha Packing Co., 
Nebraska Beef, ConAgra’s Northern States and Quality Pork International. He also 
visited these four plants and held meetings with their executives and managers.
In January 2000, after his four-month investigation, Maurstad issued a report to 
Governor Johanns, stating that workers’ concerns fell into four general areas: 1) abusive 
and discriminatory language and behavior by supervisors; 2) inadequate communication 
of company policy and inadequate training; 3) unsanitary working conditions; and 4) 
unsafe working conditions (Maurstad, 2000b). Maurstad also issued the following six 
recommendations to Governor Johanns: 1) the Nebraska Department o f Labor should 
develop a “Meatpacking Industry Workers Bill of Rights” for employers to adopt and 
post prominently in the workplace; 2) state and federal regulatory agencies should 
encourage workers to report violations as few workers now take those complaints to the 
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); 3) the Nebraska 
Department of Labor should support an OSHA experimental program to help reduce 
injuries; 4) employers should be encouraged to establish “Community Liaison” programs 
to help workers find services for personal issues in the community; 5) the Nebraska 
Department of Labor should develop a partnership with the Safety and Health Council of 
Greater Omaha on a “Safety-Awareness Training Program”; and 6) OSHA should be
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encouraged to undertake a legitimate study of the speed of the production line in 
meatpacking plants, with industry cooperation (Nebraska Department of Labor 2000).
On February 1, 2000, in a meeting arranged by OTOC, Governor Johanns met 
with about 40 South Omaha meatpacking workers and their supporters in the basement of 
Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church. During the meeting workers described to the 
Governor their arduous and dangerous working conditions. One of the workers actually 
stood up and demonstrated for the Governor the various cuts and motions he makes every 
30 seconds as the meat passes by him on the disassembly line. “During the meeting 
Johanns told workers that they could be instruments for change.. .That they needed to 
continue to cooperate with one another like they are doing through Omaha Together One 
Community Organizing Committee” (Sherry 2000). Moreover, he told workers, “You 
must find a way to organize amongst yourselves. You can’t let this drop” (Sherry 2000).
On June 28, 2000, following the first of the six recommendations proposed by Lt. 
Gov. Maurstad, Johanns released the “Nebraska Meatpacking Industry Workers Bill of 
Rights.” It lists the following rights: 1) the right to organize; 2) the right to a safe 
workplace; 3) the right to adequate facilities and the opportunity to utilize them; 4) the 
right to adequate equipment; 5) the right to complete information; 6) the right to 
understand information provided; 7) the right to existing state and federal benefits and 
rights; 8) the right to be free from discrimination; 9) the right to continuing training 
including supervisor training; 10) the right to compensation for work performed; and 11) 
the right to seek state help. Governor Johanns also appointed Jose Santos, a seven-year 
employee of the Nebraska Department of Labor, to serve as “Meatpacking Industry
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Workers Rights Coordinator.” As Coordinator, Santos is responsible for inspecting and 
reviewing the practices and procedures of Nebraska’s meatpacking operations to ensure 
that the rights outlined in the Governor’s “Meatpacking Industry Workers Bill of Rights” 
are enforced. In addition, Governor Johanns sent posters listing the “Bill of Rights” 
along with letters to all of Nebraska’s meatpacking plant employers asking that they 
voluntarily post them at their plants in an effort to better inform workers of their rights as 
employees.
The labor representatives and organizers that I interviewed were generally
unimpressed with the “Meatpacking Industry Workers’ Bill of Rights.” In fact, they
believed it lacked enforcement and therefore was essentially useless. For instance, an
AFL-CIO representative stated:
That Worker’s Bill of Rights is all bullshit. Everything spelled out in that 
bill is already state and federal law, but the Department of Labor doesn’t 
enforce the law. They won’t enforce the bill of rights...there will be 
absolutely no enforcement of any of those so-called rights. The only way 
workers are going to improve their working conditions is through 
unionization. There is no other way. And if they are going to unionize, it 
will take the courage of workers themselves not a Republican Governor.
The Bill of Rights is a damn joke (Interview June 8,2000).
Likewise, a UFCW organizer claimed:
The “Bill of Rights” is a joke. The “Rights” outlined in the “Bill” are 
already laws. They just aren’t enforced. Santos is not going to enforce 
them. He’s a ghost. He hasn’t been to any plant that I know of to make 
sure that the companies are upholding these rights and the laws are 
enforced (Interview January 18, 2001).
Despite these limitations, some community organizers and workers believed the bill had
some redeeming value. An OTOC organizer, for example, claimed, “Even if only for
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symbolic reasons, the ‘Bill of Rights’ has facilitated organizing efforts among South
Omaha’s meatpacking workers” (Interview March 4, 2001). He explained:
The “Bill of Rights” informs workers about their access to existing state 
and federal laws, like their right to a safe work environment and their right 
to workers compensation if they are injured while working and, perhaps 
most importantly, their right to organize. Some immigrant meatpacking 
workers did not even know they had the right to organize before they heard 
about the “Bill of Rights.” It has encouraged these workers to get involved 
in our organizing efforts (Interview March 4, 2001).
Another OTOC organizer asserted:
Workers were encouraged by their meetings with Governor Johanns and 
his new “Bill of Rights.” The fact that he established a “Bill of Rights” for 
the meatpacking industry alone has validated workers’ concerns and their 
need to organize. It has helped them work through their fears and given 
them the confidence they need to move forward with their organizing 
efforts (Interview June 11, 2001).
In addition, a Northern States worker with over a decade experience working in South
Omaha’s meatpacking plants expressed a similar view:
Thanks to this Bill of Rights, meatpacking workers finally really 
understand their rights as workers. And they will be reminded of these 
rights every time they pass by where they are posted in their meatpacking 
plants. The “Bill of Rights” has encouraged them to organize and fight for 
the enforcement of these rights (Interview June 18, 2001).
Addressing Workers*Injuries: A  “One-Day Clinic”fo r  Workers as an
Organizing Tool. An additional strategy OTOC used to help build support for the TWC
was to sponsor a “One-Day Clinic” for meatpacking workers. On Sunday, April 30,
2000, a clinic was held at the Indian-Chicano Health Center in South Omaha. Its purpose
was to document repetitive motion injuries and other work-related injuries affecting
meatpacking workers, and also to provide them with information on how to prevent such
injuries. In addition to documenting injuries, OTOC organizers explained that the
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purpose of the clinic was also to build solidarity among the workers by showing them 
they share similar problems and build support for their organizing efforts (Interview May 
11, 2000).
According to OTOC organizers, approximately 145 workers from 13 different 
meatpacking plants came to the free clinic to be screened by volunteer health 
professionals, including physical and occupational therapists from Creighton University 
(Interview May 9, 2000). The clinic was followed by an hour-long interdenominational 
prayer service and rally at Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church, which was attended 
by over 300 workers and their supporters. An OTOC organizer explained that the clinic 
not only succeeded in publicly exposing the injuries meatpacking workers suffer, but also 
in facilitating organizing efforts among the meatpacking workers (Interview August 17,
2000). A number of the workers, in fact, indicated that they initially became involved in 
the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign as a result. For example, a ConAgra Northern 
States worker with 20 years experience working in South Omaha meatpacking plants 
stated:
OTOC held a clinic for meatpacking workers who were injured on the job.
The clinic demonstrated the need for workers to organize and change their 
working conditions. It also demonstrated to our employers that we were 
organized and committed to improving our working conditions. After the 
clinic, I was committed to organizing (Interview April 16, 2001).
Another Northern States worker claimed:
They announced at church [Our Lady of Guadalupe] that OTOC was 
sponsoring a clinic for meatpacking workers. Since I had been 
experiencing problems with my wrist, I decided to go to the clinic. At the 
clinic they performed a bunch of tests on my wrist and the results weren’t 
good. It was that day when I first heard that OTOC was organizing a
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workers’ committee. And it was then that I decided I wanted to be 
involved in the committee (Interview February 26, 2000).
Similarly, an Armour-Swift-Eckrich worker explained, “At the clinic, Sergio [Sosa] was
sitting with a group of workers around a table talking about organizing a workers’
committee and I happened to be sitting at the table. After listening to Sergio and the
other workers talk, I decided that I needed to get involved” (Interview June 11, 2001).
Initial Conversations with the UFCW: The Beginning o f  a Collaborative
Organizing Campaign. While the “Temporary Workers’ Committee” was gaining
members and momentum, IAF, OTOC, AFL-CIO and UFCW representatives were
meeting to discuss their “potential collaboration.” Unfortunately, I was not privy to the
meetings and/or discussions that took place amongst these representatives and therefore
cannot speak authoritatively about the terms of their collaboration. In fact, I experienced
some resistance from both organizations (OTOC and the UFCW) when questioning them
about the details of their collaboration. Interviews with organizers and representatives
from both organizations produced contradictory claims. For instance, UFCW
representatives claimed that they were approached by OTOC and vice versa. I was only
able to ascertain that at least a year prior to going public with their alliance OTOC and
UFCW representatives had begun meeting to discuss the possibility and details of their
alliance to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. In addition, UFCW
representatives revealed that as part of their contract with OTOC, their union financed the
leasing of an office as well as the hiring of an OTOC organizer assigned full-time to the
South Omaha campaign (Interview January 19, 2001). An OTOC representative
confirmed that the UFCW financed the establishment of a sub-office of Local 271 in
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South Omaha. However, this representative claimed that the UFCW also paid OTOC to 
find, hire and supervise two local organizers to assist in the campaign. They were to be 
trained by the IAF. Nonetheless, prior to their formal collaboration, OTOC organizers 
and the TWC organized a number of meetings in order to decide whether or not such 
collaboration was in their best interest. Ultimately, they decided that it was. Sosa, 
explained:
The idea of collaborating with the UFCW in our efforts to organize was 
proposed to the TWC. The committee held several meetings to decide 
whether or not they wanted to work with the UFCW. It was their decision; 
it was their committee. They decided that in order to make the right 
decision they needed to meet with UFCW representatives and have some 
questions answered. The UFCW agreed to meet with them. In preparing 
for the meeting, the TWC came up with a list of over 100 questions they 
wanted to ask the UFCW. I met with them [the TWC] and helped them 
reduce the number of questions to about 25, a more manageable number. 
Then, on June 7, 2000, approximately 25 workers met with UFCW 
representatives, including the President of Local 271, the Regional Director 
and a few others from the International. After the workers finished 
questioning the UFCW representatives, they met amongst themselves and 
democratically decided that it was in their best interest to collaborate with 
the UFCW. The workers, however, were divided on the issue. A handful 
of them opposed the collaboration and threatened to withdraw their support 
if the TWC decided to work with the UFCW. They voted against the 
collaboration. However, they were outnumbered in their vote by at least 2 
to 1. After the vote, these workers left the meeting and never returned 
(Interview August 5, 2001).
Labor-Community Alliance: The UFCW Joins OTOC in a Campaign to Organize 
Meatpacking Workers
After OTOC and the UFCW decided to collaborate, UFCW International and
regional representatives quickly established themselves and their “campaign
headquarters” at a local hotel. When asked why the campaign was not being conducted
from Local 271’s office in downtown Omaha and by the Local’s representatives, an
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International representative explained, “The Local does not have an ‘organizing division’
or the manpower to run an organizing campaign. Plus, Donna McDonald is a relatively
new Union President and she is working without a Secretary-Treasurer” (Interview
January 18, 2001). He continued, “A number of organizers are needed to run the
campaign, especially bilingual organizers. The International is helping the Local out by
bringing in bilingual ‘spurs’ from around the region to work on the campaign and
sponsoring a number of Union Summer Interns” (Interview January 18, 2001). When
asked to clarify what he meant by “spurs,” the UFCW representative explained, “Spurs
are essentially workers who are paid to take a leave of absence from their work in order
to help us organize. They move from campaign to campaign as needed.” The UFCW
International Union has a “Special Project Union Representation” (SPUR) program.
According to the Union:
This program makes organizing more effective and less costly for local 
unions. Members are on leave from their jobs for up to a year while 
working on behalf of the union. The local union pays their expenses and 
their wages are paid by the International Union. Members undergo training 
and then work with experienced organizers before working on their own.
The SPUR program allows local unions to take on organizing drives that 
may otherwise be out of their reach (United Food and Commercial 
Workers Local 1000a 2004).
During the course of the UFCW/OTOC South Omaha campaign a number of “spurs”
moved in and out o f the area. In fact, during the first year of the campaign, at least 17
different organizers from the International and Regional Union as well as the SPUR
program participated in the campaign. These organizers were in addition to the ten AFL-
CIO Union Summer Interns the UFCW sponsored to help with the campaign.
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As part of the national AFL-CIO Union Summer program, ten interns spent the 
month of June participating in the UFCW/OTOC campaign, mostly assisting the UFCW 
by “handbilling” and “housecalling” meatpacking workers. A UFCW organizer 
explained, “At least half of these interns were bilingual which made our job of 
communicating with the Spanish-speaking meatpacking workers and translating union 
material, such as handbills, from English to Spanish easier” (Interview February 13,
2001). After their four-week internships with the national AFL-CIO were completed, a 
few of these interns stayed in South Omaha for an additional two to three weeks assisting 
in the campaign (Interview February 13, 2001). The International UFCW also hired one 
of the interns as a full-time organizer with the International and subsequently assigned 
him to the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign.
Building on OTOC’s Organizing Efforts: The Role o f  the Church 
On June 20, 2000 the UFCW and OTOC publicly announced their collaborative 
campaign to organize South Omaha’s predominantly Latino immigrant meatpacking 
workforce. Although the campaign officially began in June 2000, it is evident from the 
previous discussion that OTOC had in fact laid the groundwork for this campaign much 
earlier. OTOC organizers and members, such as Sergio Sosa and Father Zuerlein, spent 
several years prior to the UFCW/OTOC campaign building an organizational base among 
South Omaha’s meatpacking workers and helping these workers form their own 
“Temporary Workers Committee.” The TWC played a crucial role in mobilizing workers 
for the UFCW/OTOC campaign. A UFCW organizer explained, “This campaign would 
never have happened if it wasn’t for the hard work and determination of OTOC. They,
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along with the workers’ committee they helped form, are the ones who are really 
responsible for this campaign” (Interview February 26, 2001). Moreover, Mark 
Lauritsen, a UFCW organizer based in Washington, D.C. and dispatched to South Omaha 
by the International for the campaign, explained, “This is not a union-instigated drive.
The workers are doing this. We are just lucky enough to be the union they chose”
(Walton 2000).
The majority of the workers that I interviewed (17 out of 23) indicated that they 
were involved in OTOC’s organizing efforts among South Omaha meatpacking workers 
prior to the campaign that began in the summer of 2000. These workers indicated that 
they had participated in a number of OTOC’s organizing efforts including: 1) one-on- 
ones and house meetings; 2) the Omaha Latino Soccer League; 3) the One-Day Clinic for 
workers; 4) the Temporary Workers Committee; and 5) meetings at Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Catholic Church with government officials from the Nebraska Department of 
Labor and OSHA, as well as meetings with Nebraska Governor Mike Johanns and Lt. 
Governor Dave Maurstad.
In addition to the workers mentioned previously, who explained that they became 
involved in OTOC’s organizing efforts as a result of their involvement with the Latino 
Soccer League and the One-Day Clinic, others explained they became involved with 
OTOC’s efforts to organize meatpacking workers as follows:
• I became involved with OTOC when Sergio [Sosa] came to my home to 
talk to me about the conditions in my meatpacking plant. He got my name 
from Sister Janet at Our Lady of Guadalupe Church. After talking to 
Sergio, I started going to the meetings he was having with workers at the 
Church (Interview May 10, 2001).
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• At church workers were talking about meetings they were having with the 
Governor to discuss working conditions in the packing plants. Once I 
found out about these meetings, I became involved (Interview April 6, 
2001).
• One of my co-workers is very active in OTOC. She invited me to go with 
her to a meeting they had at the Church [Our Lady of Guadalupe]. I went.
After that, I started attending most of the meetings they had at the Church 
(Interview March 31, 2001).
Moreover, nearly half of the workers interviewed (11 out of 23) indicated that they were
members of the TWC. For example, a Nebraska Beef worker explained:
I had friends working at Greater Omaha Packing and OTOC was 
organizing them. I started going to their meetings even through I wasn’t 
working at Greater Omaha. I was at ConAgra. I decided that we needed to 
do something about the working conditions at ConAgra too. So, I started 
getting more involved with OTOC and organizing ConAgra workers. Later 
on, OTOC formed a committee of workers from several plants. I was 
involved with the committee before they joined up with the union 
(Interview May 24, 2001).
Other examples included:
• At Our Lady of Guadalupe one Sunday they announced the worker’s 
committee. That’s how I first learned about the committee and became 
involved (Interview with a Nebraska Beef Worker March 31, 2001).
• A good friend of mine that I worked with at ConAgra was one of the chairs 
of the committee. He kept bugging me about getting involved. And I 
finally did (Interview with a ConAgra Northern States Worker May 4, 
2001).
Just six of the 23 meatpacking workers interviewed indicated that they had begun 
participating in the campaign after June 2000 when OTOC and the UFCW started 
collaborating. Two of these workers explained that they had been recruited to the 
campaign as a result of organizers handbilling their plants, and another claimed that he 
became involved after organizers visited his home. The following explanation provided
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by a Nebraska Beef worker with 13 years of experience in South Omaha meatpacking
plants exemplifies how these three workers were drawn to the UFCW/OTOC campaign:
Several months ago there were organizers handing out flyers outside the 
plant. I took one of them and just threw it away. The next day they were 
outside the plant again. This time, when the organizer handed me a flyer, 
he started asking me a bunch of questions. I was tired from working, so I 
just gave him my phone number and address. A few days later, he showed 
up at my house. After our conversation, I decided to get involved in the 
campaign (Interview July 2, 2001).
Two other workers explained that they joined the organizing effort after a rally for
ConAgra’s Northern States workers at the company’s headquarters in downtown Omaha.
One of them, a Latina with over a decade of experience working in South Omaha plants,
described how she became involved after attending the rally:
I became involved in the campaign after going to the rally for workers 
downtown. See, I am an active member in the Church [Our Lady of 
Guadalupe]. One day last fall after church there was a bus taking people 
from the church to the rally downtown. So, I got on the bus and went to 
the rally. At the rally I met a woman who was also a meatpacking worker.
She told me about the benefits to having a union and about her experience 
with unions in California. That’s when I started becoming involved in the 
campaign (Interview April 3, 2001).
The other worker explained that after hearing about this event, she contacted the
President of UFCW Local 271 asking for union authorization cards to distribute to
workers at her plant (Armour Swift-Eckrich [formerly Cudahy]). She stated:
I called Donna McDonald at Local 271 and told her that workers at Cudahy 
were interested in organizing our plant. Donna said that she would get us 
some authorizations cards. So, a maintenance worker at our plant went 
downtown to the Local’s office and picked up the cards. He brought them 
back to the plant and we divided them up and started passing them around 
to the workers (Interview February 25, 2001).
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And a Nebraska Beef worker revealed that he became involved in the UFCW/OTOC
campaign after he was fired from his job. He explained:
I supported the organizing campaign by signing an authorization card back 
in October when the UFCW was handing them out to workers outside the 
plant. But I wasn’t involved in the campaign until after the raid [the INS 
raid at Nebraska Beef on December 5, 2000]. A couple of days after the 
raid I was fired for complaining about the speed of the line and not having 
enough workers on the line. The union filed charges against the company 
to help me get my job back. Since then, I have been going to union 
meetings and helping build support for the campaign by getting other 
workers to come to the meetings and sign cards (Interview April 3, 2001).
Overall, interviews with workers revealed that the UFCW had been conspicuously
absent from South Omaha’s meatpacking plants for a number o f years prior to the
UFCW/OTOC campaign. A few of the workers explained that the last organizing effort
they remembered in South Omaha was in the early 1980s when workers at the Cudahy
(now Armour Swift-Eckrich) plant went on strike. They indicated that they were
working at the plant at the time of the strike. One of them explained:
The last time I remember the union involved in the meatpacking plants in 
South Omaha was around 1982, when we went on strike at Cudahy. The 
union and the company were facing a deadline for contract negotiations, 
and when the contract expired and the negotiations weren’t getting us 
anywhere, we decided to strike. We were making over Si 1.00 an hour.
The company put an ad in the newspaper advertising our jobs at $7.25 an 
hour. At $7.25/hour, there were a lot of local residents who were willing to 
take our jobs. That was really the last of the union in South Omaha 
(Interview F ebruary 22,2001).
Aside from workers at the Millard Processing Services (MPS) plant, one of whom 
did not even realize the plant was unionized, only one other person I interviewed recalled 
union organizing activities in South Omaha plants. He claimed, “One day a few years 
ago, probably 1997, there were union organizers outside the plant handing out fliers, but
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after that day I never saw them again” (Interview June 26, 2001).8 Furthermore, when 
asked about previous union organizing activities at their plants, the most common 
response workers gave was that this campaign is the first they have known about and/or 
participated in. Responses similar to the following provided by a Northern States worker 
were typical, “In the nine years and three different South Omaha meatpacking plants I’ve 
worked, I’ve never once witnessed an attempt to organize workers until OTOC came 
along” (Interview February 1, 2001). These were workers with years of experience 
working in several different South Omaha plants. For instance, the majority of the 23 
workers interviewed have worked an average of seven years and in three South Omaha 
meatpacking plants.
Workers’ perceptions of limited past union organizing efforts were supported by
statements made by UFCW representatives familiar with efforts in the area. When asked
about the previous attempts to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers, for
example, a UFCW representative explained:
We have been in and out of the area trying to organize over the years, but 
not on the scale we are now. This campaign represents the single largest 
union effort to organize Omaha’s packing plants since probably the 
1980s....We have really never before put together the effort we have here 
now. Never before have we had the “person power” we have here now.
Never before have we put together the resources needed to organize 
Omaha’s packing plants until this June (Interview January 18, 2001).
8 Perhaps due to the relative absence of the UFCW at MPS, one of the MPS workers I interviewed 
was not aware that the plant was unionized until it was revealed to her during the process of being 
interviewed. When it was explained to her that MPS is a unionized plant, her response was: 
“There is no union at MPS. I work there. I know there is no union there. I’ve never seen nor 
heard anything about the union and I’ve worked there for eight months. Besides, I don’t know 
any workers at MPS who belong to the union” (Interview May 10,2001).
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A common theme emerged among workers5 explanations of why they were 
participating in the UFCW/OTOC campaign; they were not familiar with the UFCW, but 
supported the organizing effort because of OTOC and/or the Church. Moreover, most of 
the workers explained that their first contact with the UFCW was through OTOC. 
Workers explanations included the following:
• We [the TWC] didn't know much about unions until OTOC started having 
meetings with us to discuss the UFCW. Then we [the TWC] decided to 
have a meeting with the UFCW and learn more about what they were about 
and how they could add to our campaign. It is through OTOC, and the 
workers5 committee, that I learned how unions could help us, and what 
having a union in our packing plants would mean (Interview March 31, 
2001).
• I didn't really know anything about unions, just what I was hearing from 
my co-workers. Many of them were saying they did not trust unions. I 
tried to explain to them that this union [the UFCW] is different because 
OTOC is involved and that they could trust OTOC (Interview May 4, 
2001).
• I joined the campaign because of OTOC and the church. During mass one 
Sunday, the priest made an announcement about the organizing campaign 
at Northern States and after mass, OTOC organizers where handing out 
cards to sign. I wasn't working at Northern States, but I signed a card 
anyway and just wrote “Cudahy55 on it....I don’t really know any of the 
UFCW organizers and haven’t really spoken to any of them. If I have 
questions, I ask the OTOC organizers (Interview May 10, 2001).
• I was motivated to support the union because OTOC and the priest and 
nuns at my church [Our Lady of Guadalupe] support the union (Interview 
June 8, 2001).
• Most of my co-workers at Northern States signed authorization cards 
because they recognized OTOC. They were not familiar with the UFCW.
If it would have been just the UFCW, only about 10 to 15 percent of the 
workers would have signed authorization cards (Interview February 1, 
2001).
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• The only reason workers know about the union is because of OTOC. 
Without OTOC, the union won’t be successful (Interview April 6, 2001).
The Trajectory of the UFCW/OTOC Organizing Campaign
When asked to describe the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign in South Omaha,
a UFCW organizer outlined the following:
The first step is to handbill the plant. Organizers gather outside the plant 
gates and distribute handbills to workers between the workers’ shifts. The 
handbills basically explain what the union is all about and usually has an 
authorization card attached to it. After that, we evaluate the results of the 
handbilling. For example, we determine how many cards have been signed 
and returned. If there are a good number of cards returned the union will 
continuing handbilling the plant and schedule a meeting with the workers. 
Usually we decide on a date and time for the meeting and then distribute a 
handbill announcing the meeting. Once a meeting is organized, the union 
will begin a “full organizing program,” which includes housecalling and 
organizing workers into a committee. This committee will distribute 
authorization cards to their co-workers and get them “signed up.” The next 
step is for the union to file for an election with the National Labor 
Relations Board. Generally, we will file for an election once 70 percent of 
workers have signed authorization cards. We wait until we have at least 70 
percent of the workers signed up because we will lose about 18 to 20 
percent of them once the election is announced, due to the company’s anti­
union tactics. The last step is to educate and prepare the workers for what 
to expect from the company as its anti-union campaign and tactics begin 
(Interview January 18, 2001).
The organizing campaign described by this UFCW organizer, as well as the way in which
the UFCW/OTOC campaign in South Omaha actually proceeded, for the most part
reflects a prototypical union organizing campaign. The strategies utilized in the
campaign are those traditionally used by AFL-CIO affiliated unions during the course of
an organizing campaign and are reflective of those regularly taught at the AFL-CIO’s
Organizing Institute. The typical union organizing campaign proceeds as follows. First,
the union makes contact with the workers. Throughout the campaign this is “an ongoing
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process of identifying and meeting workers who might be interested in trying to form a 
union” (Diamond 1992:10). Making contact with workers usually begins with leafleting, 
or what is commonly referred to as “handbilling,” workers right outside their workplace. 
Second, the union begins “list building,” which is a process of assembling names and 
addresses of the workforce so that the union organizers can communicate with them 
regarding unionization and enroll them in the campaign (Diamond 1992:10). During the 
list building phase, union organizers ask their initial contacts, who are usually workers 
who have signed and returned authorization cards, for the names and addresses of their 
co-workers. Third, the union conducts “housecalls” and begins building “a committee” 
(Diamond 1992:10). Diamond explains, “By meeting with individuals in the workforce, 
often though house visits, the organizer answers questions about the union, gets 
information about the workforce, and identifies individuals who might be willing to join 
an organizing committee” (1992:10). Fourth, the union organizes committee meetings in 
which it, along with workers, strategizes how to get a majority of the workforce to sign 
union authorization cards (Diamond 1992:10). Once the union has succeeded in signing 
up a majority of the workforce, it asks the employer to voluntarily submit to “card check 
recognition” in which a neutral third party examines the signed authorization cards to 
determine their legitimacy and the number of cards signed. If the employer agrees to this 
procedure and a majority of the workforce has signed cards, then the employer is required 
by law to bargain with the union (Diamond 1995:18).9 If card check recognition fails,
9 As explained in a “Labor Law Handbook” produced by the AFL-CIO:
Voluntary recognition can occur where the employer agrees to recognize the union 
based upon cards signed by a majority of employees. If the union persuades the
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then the union petitions the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for an election.
Once the union wins recognition, either through the “card check” process or a NLRB
election, a committee is selected to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement or “union
contract” (Diamond 1992:10-12).
By and large, once OTOC began collaborating with the UFCW the organizing
campaign in South Omaha began to take the form of a traditional union organizing
campaign, structured around the goals of winning NLRB representation elections and
successfully negotiating union contracts. OTOC organizers as well as workers explained
that the campaign went from being a multi-plant organizing effort to one that focused
primarily on one plant at a time, moving from plant to plant with NLRB representation
elections. For instance, a worker who was involved in the TWC explained:
The union prefers to go about the campaign plant by plant rather than using 
the multi-plant strategy we began with. I think the multi-plant strategy is 
more effective because meatpacking workers move from plant to plant.
For example, when workers go back to Mexico for the holidays, they get 
fired for taking more days off than they are allowed. Also, in the summer, 
workers leave their meatpackering jobs for construction jobs. Construction 
jobs are better jobs, but they are only temporary. If workers can’t get their 
old jobs back at the end of summer, they just look for jobs at another 
meatpacking plant. Or, if we hear working conditions are better at another 
plant, like the line is running slower, we check it out (Interview January 30,
2001).
employer to agree to a “card check,” a third party, such as a member o f the clergy, 
arbitrator, or any other individual, can examine the cards to verify majority support. 
Once an employer agrees to a card check -  and review o f the cards indicates that 
there is a majority support -  the employer is required by law to bargain with the 
union (Diamond 1995:18).
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An OTOC organizer described the disappointment some workers felt when the
organizing efforts at their plant were largely put on hold so that the UFCW and
OTOC could focus the campaign on the Northern States plant. He stated:
After we began focusing our campaign on Northern States, workers from 
Greater Omaha approached me complaining that we had abandoned them 
and our organizing campaign at their plant. They were complaining 
because a bunch of workers at their plant had signed cards and organized a 
committee, and then we just abandoned their plant for Northern States 
(Interview April 6, 2001).
After June 2000, OTOC began following the UFCW’s lead in the campaign,
adopting the union’s organizing strategies and tactics such as handbilling, housecalling,
and collecting signed authorization cards. However, OTOC organizers modified these
strategies to make them more in line with their own organizing culture. In addition,
OTOC complemented the campaign with its own organizing strategies, including
postcard and letter-writing efforts, prayer services and community rallies. As one of the
organizers explained:
We have adopted the UFCW’s organizing strategies, but we have also 
modified them to reflect our own organizing culture and strategies. For 
example, when housecalling workers, our “housecalls” reflected “one-on- 
ones” rather than the union’s “housecalls.” Also, in housecalling and 
committee meetings, we continue to practice the ‘Iron Rule’ of never doing 
for others what they can do for themselves (Interview March 6, 2001).
Likewise, another organizer described the different approaches the two organizations use
when visiting workers’ homes:
They [UFCW organizers] do “housecalls” and we [OTOC organizers] do 
“one-on-ones.” When they visit workers’ homes, they talk about the union 
and only the union. They do not get to know the workers like we do. They 
just talk about the benefits of having a union and try to get workers to sign 
authorization cards. We talk to workers about their lives and experiences, 
and also search for leadership among the workers. We take time with each
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of the workers we visit and really get to know them and understand their 
concerns and needs. Workers open up more when you show them that you 
are not just trying to sell them something, but are actually interested in 
them as people. I believe one-on-ones are more effective at gaining the 
workers’ trust and support (Interview June 11, 2001).
Workers’ comments confirmed a difference in the way they were approached by UFCW
and OTOC organizers. For instance, an ASE (Cudahy) worker, who was a member o f the
TWC and had accompanied both UFCW and OTOC organizers on their visits to workers’
homes, claimed, “The way the UFCW approaches workers is all about unionizing. They
are not interested in building leadership in the plants and community. OTOC spends time
with workers and tries to find and build leaders, both in the plants and community”
(Interview February 25, 2001). Similarly, a Northern States worker explained:
Workers from the committee [the workers’ committee at Northern States] 
paired up with people from the UFCW and OTOC to housecall Northern 
States workers. Once, I was paired with a UFCW organizer and a student 
[Union Summer Intern] and another time with a Deacon from the church 
[Our Lady of Guadalupe]. During the housecalls, UFCW organizers didn’t 
really seem interested in the workers the same way the Deacon 
was....UFCW organizers did all the talking during their housecalls. They 
were not interested in hearing what the workers had to say (Interview July 
2 , 2001).
In addition, a Nebraska Beef worker who helped UFCW organizers map out the different
departments and workers at his plant explained:
The goal of housecalling is to determine whether or not workers support 
the union and to get them to sign union cards. After finishing a housecall, 
the UFCW records whether or not the worker signed a union card and 
assigns them a color based on how strongly they do or don’t support the 
union (Interview April 6, 2001).
A visit to the UFCW’s campaign headquarters verified this worker’s comments. Here, a
UFCW organizer revealed the union’s diagram of Nebraska Beef in which workers were
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mapped out according to their respective departments in the plant and color-coded rating
their degree of support for the union (Interview January 18, 2001).
When asked their opinion regarding OTOC’s collaboration with the UFCW,
workers’ responses where mixed. While several were indifferent, a few were pleased,
and a few others expressed their frustration with the collaboration. A Northern States
worker, for example, stated:
I was thrilled when the UFCW joined OTOC in organizing meatpacking 
workers. We [workers] need all the support we can get. With the two 
organizations working together, we have more support and more power.
Plus, the union has taught us new ways to organize like having an election 
and getting a contract (Interview March 31, 2001).
Conversely, a Nebraska Beef worker who was a member of the former TWC stated,
“Once we started working with the union all we talked about was getting cards signed
and elections. OTOC was not about cards and elections; they were about teaching
workers how to be organized and how to improve their working conditions” (Interview
April 6, 2001). Another worker and former TWC member stated:
It made a huge difference once OTOC started working with the UFCW. It 
was like we [the TWC] did a one hundred and eighty degree turn. The 
whole campaign changed at that point. We were not organized anymore.
The UFCW started having meetings with us, but they didn’t bring 
professional people to talk to us and to represent us like OTOC did. They 
brought these young people, who didn’t know what they were talking 
about. All they talked about was “the union.” They didn’t know anything 
about us [meatpacking workers] and our work. All they cared about is 
whether we supported the union and that we signed a union card. I just 
signed one so that they would leave me alone....Once the UFCW came 
along, we [the TWC] stopped talking about OTOC and our committee and 
all we talked about was “the union” (Interview April 16, 2001).
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Plant-by-Plant Organizing: The UFCW/OTOC Campaign Zeros In  On
ConAgra’s Northern States
Within approximately a week of going public with their campaign, UFCW and 
OTOC organizers began focusing their organizing efforts on ConAgra’s Northern States 
plant. According to organizers of both groups, they zeroed in on this plant because it had 
the most established workers’ committee, which had been formed at least a year earlier 
with the help of OTOC organizers and the relentless efforts of one individual who co­
chaired the workers’ committee. A UFCW organizer explained, “OTOC had established 
workers’ committees in a number of the South Omaha meatpacking plants. The Northern 
States committee was the strongest of these committees and they felt it was time to 
advance the campaign at their plant” (Interview January 18, 2001). Likewise, an OTOC 
organizer expressed:
The decision to focus the campaign on the Northern States plant came from 
workers. The plant’s workers’ committee indicated that they were ready to 
move forward with their campaign. They believed that a majority of their 
co-workers supported unionization and would vote for the union in an 
election (Interview February 6, 2001).
A member o f the workers’ committee at Northern States confirmed, “We had been
organizing workers at the plant for months and decided that it was time to move forward,
towards an election” (Interview March 19, 2001).
Prior to the UFCW/OTOC campaign at Northern States, OTOC had laid the
foundation for the effort at the plant. The UFCW came along at the point in which
OTOC had already: 1) made contact with a sizeable number of the plant’s workers
through one-on-ones and house meetings; 2) put together a list of the plant’s workforce;
and 3) built a workers’ committee which attempted to enlist a majority of the plant’ s
166
workforce in the organizing campaign. In other words, going by the union’s campaign 
timeline, the UFCW joined the campaign at a point in which workers were nearly ready 
to either ask for card check recognition from the company or petition the NLRB for an 
election. A member of the TWC explained, “When we started working with the UFCW, 
we handed everything over to them, including our lists of workers and leaders in a 
number of meatpacking plants, including Northern States. As soon as we got them [the 
UFCW] up to date, we started handing out authorization cards and preparing for an 
election at Northern States” (Interview March 19, 2001).
Within a week of going public with their campaign, the UFCW and OTOC, 
together with members of the former TWC and workers, began handbilling Northern 
States. Attached to the handbills were union authorization cards. An OTOC organizer 
explained, “Several OTOC organizers and members, five UFCW organizers, ten Union 
Summer interns and a number of workers began handbilling the Northern States plant as 
workers started and ended their shifts. In the meantime, members of the plant’s workers’ 
committee took a bunch of authorization cards with them into the plant and started 
distributing the cards to their co-workers” (Interview February 12, 2001). According to 
OTOC and UFCW organizers, this initial handbilling effort resulted in at least 30 percent 
of the plant’s workforce signing authorization cards, which is the amount required to 
petition the NLRB for an election.
Addressing Employer Resistance. Organizers and workers explained that as soon 
as the effort focused on Northern States, specifically handbilling at the plant, the 
company responded with an anti-union campaign. For instance, in response to union
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handbills, the company stapled letters to workers’ paychecks. For example, on Friday
June 23, 2000, the company attached a letter to workers’ paychecks addressed “Dear
Fellow Employees,” signed by the company’s Vice President and General Manager and
entitled “Look Before You Leap!” It stated:
Recently a labor union has been passing out some information to 
employees at several Omaha meat processing facilities, including our 
facility. These handbills tell you to sign an authorization card and promise 
good things if you do sign. You should know the company’s position on 
this union. Simply stated, we do not believe a union is needed in our 
facility. When I started here as the General Manager six months ago, it 
was clear that we had opportunities to make our plant a better place to 
work for everybody. I believe we have made progress. Do we do things 
exactly right? No, of course not. However, we sincerely believe that any 
problems or issues that we may have can best be addressed without the 
involvement of an outside third party who has different interests (i.e., union 
dues, etc.) than you....If you are asked to sign a union card, we encourage 
you to ask some questions first....We also want to answer any questions 
that you may have about the organizing process. If you have any questions, 
please feel free to ask your supervisor, Human Resources, my staff or me.
We want you to have all the facts before you make this important decision.
Organizers and workers countered the company’s tactics with some of their own.
For instance, an organizer explained that in response to the letters the company stapled to
workers’ paychecks, organizers and workers met after their committee meetings and
produced a bilingual newsletter, La Neta/The Truth. One of the newsletters they
produced, for example, entitled “ConAgra Beef Begins Its Anti-Union Campaign” read:
This past Friday, we were given a small yellow sheet with our checks 
telling us why we shouldn’t sign any more cards or ask for union 
representation.
We the workers say: Let’s tell THE TRUTH.
Fellow co-workers, let us be clear about something, we are the 
union!
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THE TRUTH: it’s true, they increased the size of the cafeteria and the kill 
floor, but they also increased the chain speed, which increases their profits.
THE TRUTH: it’s true, they increased our wages 80 cents, but let’s look at 
this a bit closer.
80 cents = faster line speed
80 cents = more cows slaughtered per hour
80 cents = more accidents and...
THE TRUTH: the raise is turning out to be costly.
Organizers and workers alike claimed that as soon as the campaign at Northern States
was underway, the company began intimidating and threatening workers who openly
supported unionization. They claimed that among the company’s threats were firing
union supporters, calling in the INS to check workers’ legal status, and closing the plant.
A worker with several years experience at the plant stated:
Our managers and supervisors started asking us whether or not we 
supported the union and to name our co-workers at the plant who did.
They also started searching our lockers for union handbills and 
authorization cards. They told us that if we signed authorization cards, the 
INS would check the cards to make sure we were documented. They also 
told us the plant would close if it became union (Interview April 4, 2001).
As a result of these tactics, on June 20, 2000 the UFCW filed charges with the NLRB
against the company for “unlawfully interfering with the union campaign” by: 1)
conducting surveillance on its employees; 2) creating the impression of surveillance on
its employees; 3) searching employees’ lockers for union literature and authorization
cards; 4) confiscating union literature and authorization cards from employees; and 5)
interrogating employees about their union sympathies (Interview January 18, 2001). The
same day the UFCW filed these changes with the NLRB, the union also sent a letter to
the INS informing it that “labor disputes” (organizing campaigns) existed at a number of
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South Omaha meatpacking plants, including the Northern States plant. As previously
explained, under INS policy, the agency’s officials are prohibited from engaging in any
enforcement activities when aware of union organizing efforts.
Building Momentum. In the weeks that followed, organizers and workers
continued handbilling and housecalling, holding organizing meetings, and gathering
signed authorization cards. An OTOC organizer summarized how the campaign
proceeded as follows:
We [OTOC organizers] helped the UFCW chart out the plant’s workforce 
by departments. For each department we made a list of workers’ names, 
their position in the department, whether they had signed an authorization 
card, whether they supported the union, and whether they were a member 
of the plant’s worker’s committee. We did this in order to determine how 
many and which workers supported the union. Then, we took workers 
addresses from their authorization cards and separated them according to 
zip codes. We divided up the task of housecalling according to the different 
zip codes (Interview June 6, 2001).
When these efforts produced signed authorization cards for a majority of the plant’s
estimated 550 workers, the campaign turned to gaining “card check recognition.” On
September 20, 2000, nearly two months after the UFCW/OTOC went public with the
campaign, UFCW Local 271 President, Donna McDonald, sent a letter to Stan Wells, the
general manager of ConAgra Inc., formally asking the company to recognize the union as
the bargaining agent for workers at the Northern States plant (Taylor 2000c). Meanwhile,
OTOC distributed postcards addressed to ConAgra’s CEO, Bruce Rohde, calling on the
company to recognize the UFCW as bargaining agent for the workers at its Northern
States plant without an NLRB election. As explained in a UFCW press release:
Mark Darby, co-chair of OTOC, set forth a charge to Omaha clergy and 
community members, “We are spreading the word with postcards
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addressed to ConAgra calling on the company to turn over a new leaf and 
respect workers’ rights. Postcards and fliers will be distributed in 
congregations across the city. We are committed to take action until we 
have justice for these workers” (United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union 2000).
These postcards stated:
Dear Mr. Rohde:
The faith traditions of Omaha Together One Community 
congregations support the rights of workers to organize unions for the 
purpose of collective bargaining. The laws of our nation protect and 
promote that right as well.
I support OTOC's call for ConAgra to recognize the Omaha 
ConAgra Beef Workers through voluntary recognition commonly called 
“card check.” They are entitled to a safe work place and just compensation. 
These men and women are members of our congregations. We stand with 
them in their efforts to gain recognition from ConAgra.
Signed______________________ Congregation________________________
The same day the union sent a letter to ConAgra, UFCW and OTOC organizers and
nearly fifty workers, accompanied by their supporters, rallied in front of the Northern
States plant to formally request card check recognition. Julio Gonzales, chairman of the
OTOC/UFCW organizing committee at the plant, addressed the rally with the following
statement:
For weeks we have talked with workers about forming a union so we can 
have a voice on the job. We’ve met in workers’ homes, during our lunch 
breaks, after work and in the evenings. We are here to announce we have a 
majority, over 50 percent, of our fellow workers that have signed 
authorization cards. We want to be clear. We are the union. We represent a 
majority of workers in this plant and we authorize the United Food and 
Commercial Workers as the collective bargaining agent. We are calling on 
ConAgra management to give us recognition through a voluntary process 
referred to as “card check.” That is, once it is verified by a neutral third 
party that a majority of workers have signed cards, negotiations between 
our UFCW committee and ConAgra management can begin. This would 
be the best way for labor and management to work together. We know we 
have strong community support for our effort. Next Wednesday,
171
September 27, we will hold a rally of union, church and community leaders 
at ConAgra’s headquarters in downtown Omaha. We call on all of Omaha 
to support us. We hope ConAgra agrees to this process. We are confident 
this will be a more productive and profitable plant if the management 
recognizes our union and deals squarely with our collective interests.
There are many issues related to the organization of our work, the 
compensation paid and the health and safety conditions in the plant that 
need addressed (Interview September 20, 2000).
Both UFCW and OTOC organizers confirmed that approximately 385, or 70 percent, of
the plant’s estimated 550 workers had signed authorizations cards.10 Nevertheless, the
company refused the UFCW’s request for card check recognition. A UFCW organizer
explained that ConAgra’s Vice President of Labor Relations, Doug Schult, sent a letter
back to the UFCW declining the union’s request for voluntary recognition and suggested
that it file for an election with the NLRB (Interview January 18, 2001). As a result, on
September 27, nearly 300 people marched through downtown Omaha converging on
ConAgra’s headquarters to protest the company’s refusal to voluntarily recognize UFCW
Local 271. And, the UFCW filed a petition with the NLRB for an election and was
subsequently granted separate union representation elections for the maintenance workers
and production workers at the plant.
The Company Steps Up Its Anti-Union Efforts. In the days leading up to the
elections, organizers and workers claimed that the company intensified its anti-union
campaign. For instance, they claimed that in an effort to undercut unionization, the
company made a number of improvements at the plant. Workers explained that the
company raised their wages, improved their benefits, specifically their health insurance
10 When petitioning the NLRB for an election, the union must submit authorization cards signed 
by at least 30 percent o f the bargaining unit.
172
benefits, slowed down the speed of the production line and promised them a new 
cafeteria. A Latina with eight years experience working at the plant explained, “Before 
the union campaign, the speed of the line was really fast and then all the sudden, once the 
campaign started, the company slowed it down. The only reason they slowed it down was 
so workers would be content and wouldn’t see the need for a union” (Interview March 31, 
2001). Another worker claimed, “After the union announced they were having an election 
at the plant, the company made us all kinds of promises. They promised to improve our 
working conditions, but they were just trying to pacify us so we would vote against the 
union in the election” (Interview February 8, 2001).
On November 15, 2000, just two days before the scheduled elections and just 
before the “24-Hour Rule” went into effect, company executives including the Vice 
President of ConAgra’s Red Meats Division visited the plant delivering captive audience 
speeches. Basically, what is commonly referred to as the “24-Hour Rule” is a provision 
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which maintains that within twenty-four 
hours prior to an NLRB election, management is prohibited from holding meetings with 
their employees (Diamond 1995:16). Organizers and workers explained that just before 
this “24-Hour Rule” went into effect, workers at Northern States were assembled into the 
plant’s lunchroom, where managers had set up a microphone and speakers for a thirty- 
minute meeting. According to UFCW organizers, corporate executives intimidated 
workers with last minute scare tactics. A UFCW organizer explained, “During this 
captive audience meeting corporate executives threatened workers with wage cuts and loss 
of benefits if they voted for the union. They also threatened workers with the plant’s
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closing if the union won the election” (Interview January 18, 2001). Similarly, a member
of the plant’s workers’ committee claimed:
In his speech, the Company’s Vice-President made both promises and 
threats. He promised to improve our working conditions. He asked us for 
our forgiveness and to have patience with the company as they made 
changes that would eventually lead to better working conditions at the 
plant. He also threatened there would be consequences if we voted in favor 
of the union. For example, he threatened to cut our wages and benefits and 
even close the plant if we voted for the union (Interview January 23, 2001).
Dealing with Defeat On November 17, 2000, the NLRB elections took place at
the plant. In the elections, production workers voted 238 to 150 against unionization,
while a smaller contingent of the maintenance workers, comprising a separate bargaining
unit, voted 20 to 13 in favor of union representation.11 Immediately following the NLRB
elections, UFCW Local 271 filed a petition with the NLRB listing 23 instances of
“objectionable conduct” by Northern States representatives including company managers
and supervisors before and during the union’s campaign. The UFCW alleged that the
company created an environment that violated workers’ rights to a fair election. Among
the UFCW’s list of objections were that company representatives: 1) threatened workers
with the plant’s closing if they voted for the union; 2) threatened wage cuts and loss of
11 On July 9, 2001, nearly eight months after they won their election, maintenance workers at 
ConAgra’s Northern States plant ratified the first union contract in the plant’s history. This three- 
year contract brought an immediate across the board 50-cent per hour wage increase for the 50 
workers it covered. According to the UFCW, other contract highlights include: 1) a defined 
grievance and arbitration procedure that gives workers the opportunity to solve problems through 
a neutral third-party; 2) a 401(k) plan for workers to invest in their retirement security; 3) 
improvements in vacation leave and life insurance; 4) a bidding procedure for new jobs that gives 
everyone a fair chance for advancement; and 5) new defined skill grades in the jobs, along with 
further training, so that workers have more opportunity for promotions and raises (United Food 
and Commercial Workers 2001c).
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benefits if the union won the election; 3) promised workers that they would be given a 
raise or other benefits if they voted against unionization; and 4) conducted surveillance of 
workers’ union activities (Taylor 2000e:20). However, the following month, December 
2000, the UFCW withdrew its “objections to the election” and replaced them with “unfair 
labor practice” charges. According to UFCW representative Greg Denier, the union 
withdrew its objections to the election “so it could proceed with the certification of the 
maintenance workers” (Taylor 2000f:14). A UFCW organizer claimed that it was a 
“tactical decision” to withdraw the objections to the election and file unfair labor practice 
charges. He explained, “By filing unfair labor practices charges, we can petition for 
another election at the plant after waiting a year, whereas if we pursue the objections to 
the election, it could take a number of years before getting another election at the plant”
I 7(Interview January 18, 2001). He spelled out:
The remedies are greater for unfair labor practices. If we win on the 
grounds of unfair labor practices, we will gain better access to the plant and 
its workforce. If we win on the grounds of objecting to the election, we 
will just be granted a new election at the plant. We can file for another 
election after a year anyway. We are better off trying to gain access to the 
plant and just filing for another election in a year (Interview January 18,
2001).
The organizers and Northern States workers I interviewed universally attributed 
the union’s loss among production workers at the plant to the company’s anti-union 
campaign. For instance, an OTOC organizer explained:
12 On March 27, 2002, nearly fifteen months after the election, UFCW Local 271 filed a petition 
with the NLRB for a second election at the Northern States plant. Approximately, five weeks 
later, on May 3, 2002 the plant’s production workers voted in a NLRB election 252 to 126 in 
favor o f union representation.
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This was our [OTOC organizers] first union election. It was also the first 
union election for a majority of the workers. We were not familiar with the 
process and therefore not prepared for the company’s anti-union tactics.
These tactics intimidated a lot of the workers. And we were simply not 
prepared. Now we know what to expect and will be better able to prepare 
workers for what the company is likely to do before and during a union 
election (Interview February 6, 2001).
Similarly, a member of the workers’ committee at the plant stated:
The company fooled lots of workers. They fooled them into believing that 
they would improve conditions at the plant without a union. They bribed 
them by slowing the line speed, increasing wages and building a new 
cafeteria. The workers the company couldn’t bribe, they scared. They 
scared them by telling them the company would close the plant and they 
would lose their jobs (Interview February 11, 2001).
Another Northern States production worker affirmed:
I suppose we [production workers] lost the election because of the 
company’s efforts against the union. They were able to get enough 
workers to vote against the union. Workers were afraid of what might 
happen if they voted for the union, mostly that the company would close 
the plant. Because that’s what they were telling us they would do. I’d say 
that just before the election, the day the Vice President from ConAgra 
came to the plant, is when workers changed their minds about voting for 
the union. They believed what the Vice President was saying. That day 
really turned things around (Interview March 6, 2001).
Finally, when questioned why the maintenance workers voted in favor of union
representation while the production workers voted against union representation, UFCW
organizers explained that the maintenance workers comprised a much smaller bargaining
unit and therefore were easier to organize. In addition, they explained that several of the
maintenance workers had union experience and thus were more receptive to unionization.
As reported by a UFCW organizer:
We were successful with the maintenance workers because a number of 
them had prior union experience and were able to persuade their co­
workers that voting for the union was in their best interest. Plus, the size of
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the bargaining unit matters. There were less than fifty workers in the 
maintenance bargaining unit, so they were easier to organize than the 
production workers. It is just easier to organize and build solidarity among 
50 workers than it is among 400 workers (Interview February 4, 2001).
Moving On: The Northern States Campaign Inspires Armour Swift-Eckrich Workers
On November 15, 2000, just two days before the elections at Northern States, the
UFCW filed for an NLRB election at the Armour Swift-Eckrich (ASE), formerly
Cudahy, meatpacking plant in South Omaha. And almost immediately after losing the
union representation election among production workers at Northern States, the
UFCW/OTOC campaign shifted to the ASE facility. When asked why their efforts
shifted to this particular plant, both UFCW and OTOC organizers explained that workers
at ASE had been organizing amongst themselves for a couple of months and by the time
of the Northern States elections, a majority of the ASE workforce had signed
authorizations cards. A UFCW organizer explained:
While our efforts were focused on winning the Northern States elections, 
workers at Cudahy were organizing themselves. They basically organized 
the plant on their own. Back in September, they [Cudahy workers] 
approached the Local [UFCW Local 271] wanting us to unionize their 
plant. We gave them authorization cards and they started signing up their 
co-workers. By the time we finished with the elections at Northern States, 
they had a majority of their workforce signed up (Interview January 18,
2001).
Similarly, an OTOC organizer stated:
There was a lot of publicity surrounding the Northern States campaign.
This publicity generated organizing efforts among Cudahy workers. 
Basically, when Cudahy workers heard about what was going on at 
Northern States, they started organizing their own plant (Interview March 
15, 2001).
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Likewise, an ASE worker described that after the UFCW/OTOC rally at ConAgra’s
headquarters in September 2000, she contacted UFCW Local 271 explaining that workers
at her plant wanted to unionize. She confirmed:
I called Donna McDonald at Local 271 and told her that workers at Cudahy 
were interested in organizing our plant. Donna said that she would get us 
some authorizations cards. So, a maintenance worker at our plant went 
downtown to the Local’s office and picked up the cards. He brought them 
back to the plant and we divided them up and started passing them around 
to the workers (Interview February 25, 2001).
An OTOC organizer with experience working at the plant explained:
The organizing campaign at Cudahy really began after OTOC and the 
UFCW held a rally in front of ConAgra’s headquarters. There were lots of 
Cudahy workers at the rally and others who heard about it. After they 
realized what was going on at Northern States, they started an organizing 
campaign at their plant. They were ready for a union. Many of them have 
worked at the plant for a long time and remember what it was like when it 
was union. They know the difference a union can make and were ready to 
be a union again (Interview June 11, 2001).
Anti-Union Campaign Aimed at Latino Workforce. Similar to the 
Northern States campaign, once a majority of ASE’s estimated 175 workers had 
signed authorization cards, the UFCW formally asked the company for voluntary 
recognition. Not surprisingly, the company declined the UFCW’s request and so 
the union filed for an NLRB election at the plant. As expected, the company 
responded by initiating an anti-union campaign. A UFCW organizer explained 
that ConAgra also owns the ASE plant and therefore the anti-union tactics the 
company employed during the ASE campaign were very similar to those they 
used at Northern States. However, this organizer also indicated that because the 
workforce at ASE was much more ethically diverse than the Northern States
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workforce, the company’s efforts focused primarily on the Latino workers. He 
explained:
Whereas the vast majority of Northern States workers are Hispanic, a 
significant proportion of the workers at Cudahy are Anglo, Black and 
Asian. Several of these workers have been at the plant since back when it 
was union. These workers know what it means to be union, so the 
company figured its anti-union strategies wouldn’t intimidate them. They 
thought the Hispanic workers would be easier to intimidate (Interview 
January 18, 2001).
Likewise, another UFCW organizer affirmed:
The workforce at Cudahy is unique compared to other packing plants.
There are a lot more native-born, long-term workers at Cudahy. These 
workers are more likely to have union experience and thus support 
unionization. The company knows this, so they tried to resist unionization 
by focusing on the immigrant Latinos (Interview February 6, 2001).
Both organizers and workers suggested that the demographics of the workforce at ASE
differed from the other South Omaha meatpacking plants, because the working conditions
and wages here were relatively better. For instance, A UFCW organizer claimed:
The composition of Cudahy’s workforce is unusual because it is one of the 
better meatpacking plants to work for in South Omaha. Cudahy has less 
worker turnover and so there are more long-term employees at the plant.
These long-term employees are more likely to be native-born workers 
(Interview February 6, 2001).
Organizers and workers alike stated that as workers circulate through South 
Omaha’s meatpacking plants searching for the most favorable working conditions, if they 
manage to gain employment at ASE (Cudahy), they usually stay put. As explained by an 
OTOC organizer, “Latino workers generally rotate through the packing plants in South 
Omaha looking for the best possible plant. Once they get hired at Cudahy, they usually 
stay there since it has the best wages and working conditions” (Interview March 11,
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2001). A worker with experience at a number of plants in South Omaha indicated,
“Before Cudahy [ASE], I worked for Greater Omaha, Nebraska Beef, MPS and IBP.
Cudahy is the best of these plants because the pay is better and the work is easier”
(Interview March 8, 2001). In addition, an OTOC organizer observed:
Workers favor working at Cudahy over other plants because it offers them 
better working conditions. There’s no slaughtering or kill floor at Cudahy.
It’s just a processing plant. So, generally speaking, the work is less 
physically demanding than other plants. Also, Latino workers have 
explained to me that working conditions are better at Cudahy because 
there are Anglos working at the plant who are accustomed to better 
working conditions and wages and are more familiar with their rights as 
workers. Therefore, the Anglos put pressure on the company to maintain 
better working conditions and wages and to uphold their rights. Basically, 
they claim that Anglos are less likely to be exploited than undocumented 
workers who feel they have no rights. So, the meatpacking plants that 
have a greater number of Anglos and fewer undocumented workers are 
likely to have better working conditions, and visa versa (Interview April 
13,2001).
Organizers and workers described that the Company focused its anti-union 
campaign on the plant’s Latinos because it assumed that they would be easier to 
intimidate and more receptive to anti-union rhetoric than other workers. An OTOC 
organizer claimed, “The company focused on the Latinos mainly because they assumed a 
couple of things: 1) that Latinos would be easier to intimidate than their Anglo, Asian and 
African American counterparts; and 2) that Latinos were not familiar with unions and 
therefore would be easier to persuade against unionizing” (Interview March 11, 2001).
He clarified:
The company assumed that some of its Latino workers were 
undocumented, especially Latinos from the second shift, and therefore 
could be intimidated by INS threats. They also assumed that the Latinos 
knew less about unions than their counterparts and therefore would be 
easier to convince that having a union was not in their best interest. They
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figured the Latinos would believe what they were telling them about 
unions, like “unions are corrupt,” “unions only want your money,” and 
“unions cause plants to close.” Things like that. The company also knew 
that many of its Latino workers had worked at other meatpacking plants 
and preferred working at Cudahy. They used this information to try to 
convince them they didn’t need a union (Interview March 11, 2001).
Likewise, a Caucasian worker with nearly two decades experience working at the plant
explained:
The Company held meetings with just the Hispanic workers. They brought 
in this Hispanic lady from the corporate office to talk to them and try to 
convince them that the union was corrupt. The Company targeted them 
because most of them were unfamiliar with the union and they thought they 
could manipulate them (Interview February 25, 2001).
According to organizers and workers, the company’s anti-union tactics included 
holding captive audience meetings with just the Latino workers at the plant and also 
meeting with these workers on a one-on-one basis in order to determine whether or not 
they were union sympathizers and to intimidate them accordingly. A UFCW organizer 
explained, “The Company held captive audience meetings with the plant’s Latino 
workforce, during which they tried to intimidate these workers by talking about the INS 
and plant closure” (Interview January 18, 2001). Additional organizers, as well as 
workers, claimed that during these meetings with the Latino workers, company 
representatives implied that if the plant became union, two things were likely to happen:
1) the INS would check the workers’ legal status; and 2) the plant could face closure. For 
instance, an ASE worker with several years at the plant reported, “At these meetings, our 
managers threatened to call in the INS to check our papers and they threatened to close 
the plant down, like what happen at Beef America. They also told us that the only thing 
the union was interested in was union dues” (Interview April 3, 2001). ASE workers also
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explained that a ConAgra representative took the Latino workers aside one at a time in an 
effort to intimidate them. One of the workers stated, “She asked me if I supported the 
union and I told her ‘no.5 I just said ‘no5 so she would leave me alone, because the real 
answer was ‘yes5 55 (Interview March 19, 2001). Moreover, organizers and workers 
described how ASE managers singled out Latino workers with questionable legal status 
and told them that the INS would check their status if they signed authorization cards.
An OTOC organizer explained, “Managers selected workers they thought might be 
undocumented, especially workers from the second shift, and threatened them with the 
INS. Plus, they told them that because they were undocumented they wouldn't be able to 
find another job as good as their job at Cudahy55 (Interview April 6, 2001).
The Significance o f  the Religious Community. Interviews with organizers and 
ASE workers indicated that OTOC's member congregations, particularly Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Catholic Church, played a crucial role in building union support among the 
workers, especially Latinos, and also helping to mitigate the company's anti-union 
tactics. Both organizers and workers explained that because the Latino workers knew 
church backed the organizing campaign, they were willing to support unionization and 
participate in the campaign. As an ASE worker explained, “The company really tried 
hard to intimidate us, but they couldn't because we had the church's support. With the 
church's support, we weren't intimidated" (Interview April 3, 2001). Another ASE 
worker stated, “Knowing the church was behind us gave us the courage we needed to 
support the union" (Interview April 6, 2001). Similarly, an OTOC organizer claimed, 
“The religious community's involvement in the campaign helped minimize workers'
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fears” (Interview May 7, 2001). Moreover, an OTOC organizer with experience working
at the plant claimed:
Support from the church and community has been very important in this 
campaign, especially for the Latino workers. Latino workers fight when 
they know that the church and community are behind them. The support 
workers received from the priests and nuns has been important. When 
they knew the priests and nuns were behind them, they had the courage to 
support the union. The church created a sense of security for the workers.
They needed that security to participate in the campaign (Interview June
11, 2001).
On December 8th, a week before the plant’s NLRB election, Father Damian
Zuerlein and Sister Janet Horstman of Our Lady of Guadalupe Church sent letters to the
ASE workers stating:
A few days from now, on Friday December 15th, you will have an 
opportunity to vote and be represented by the United Food and Commercial 
Workers Union....OTOC and Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish support you 
and your co-workers in this election....We have been helping workers to 
organize in some Omaha packing plants because you deserve better wages, 
better working conditions and a voice in the workplace; the only way this 
can happen is through union contracts.
According to ASE workers, and the organizers I interviewed, this letter encouraged many
of the ASE workers to vote for the union. For instance, one worker indicated, “I was not
sure what to think about the union, but when I received a letter from Father Damien and
Sister Janet pledging their support for the union, I was 100 percent convinced that it was
something I needed to support too” (Interview March 30, 2001).
In addition to sending letters to the ASE workers, just days before the election
OTOC member congregations organized a “phone bank.” An OTOC organizer
explained:
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Just before the election we organized an effort to phone all of the Cudahy 
workers and let them know that the community was behind them in the 
union election. The diversity of these workers, including Latinos, Anglos, 
Blacks and Asians, meant that they belonged to different communities. So 
in order to reach them all, OTOC pastors and leaders from different 
congregations throughout Omaha called workers from their respective 
communities. For example, Baptist Ministers from congregations in North 
Omaha called the black workers, while Catholic Priests and Nuns from 
Our Lady of Guadalupe in South Omaha called the Latino workers 
(Interview January 22, 2003).
Workers described how these letters and phone calls gave them the confidence they
needed to support the union. For instance, an ASE worker observed:
As it came closer and closer to the day of the union election, our managers 
started putting more and more pressure on us. They were trying to 
intimidate us and make us uneasy about the election and the union. 
Workers at the plant were mostly afraid of losing their jobs if they voted 
for the union. But once we received letters and phone calls from the 
church and knew that the church and community were supporting us, we 
had the support and courage we needed to stand up to our managers and to 
vote for the union (Interview April 3, 2001).
Another ASE worker stated:
The day before the election I received a phone call from someone from the 
church [Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church]. They called to tell me 
that the church was supporting me and my co-workers in the election and 
that they were praying for us. That is the first time in my 25 years as a 
meatpacking worker that I had ever heard of anything like that 
happening.. .the church getting involved in a union election. Knowing the 
church was behind us and supported our efforts really made a difference. It 
boosted my morale and gave me confidence that we were going to win the 
election. I believe it made quite a difference for a lot of workers (Interview 
February 25, 2001).
The Importance o f  “Indigenous99 Organizers: The Role o f  Latino Immigrant
Meatpacking Workers as Organizers. Organizers and workers also indicated that an
OTOC organizer with experience working at the ASE plant played a vital role in helping
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build support for the campaign among the plant’s Latino workforce. As explained by an 
OTOC organizer:
Marcella was crucial in building support among the Latino workers and 
bridging the cultural divide that existed among the ethnically diverse 
workers. Many of the Latino workers at the plant were not familiar with 
unions or the UFCW, but they knew Marcella and trusted her because she 
used to work with them. She helped them to understand unions and 
encouraged them to support the campaign. Because of her hard work, 
many of the workers who probably wouldn’t have supported the union, 
did. She was also crucial in building relationships and trust among the 
culturally and ethnically divided workers. She explained to the Latino 
workers that their Anglo and Black co-workers supported the union 
because they had union experience. She encouraged these workers to 
share their union experiences with the Latino workers and help them 
understand why it was important to win the campaign (Interview April 9,
2001).
Likewise, a UFCW organizer stated:
Marcella’s outreach to the Latino workers at the plant made a huge 
difference in this campaign. She knew many of these workers because she 
used to work with them at the plant. She really did a great job helping 
them understand the unionization process and bringing them into this 
campaign (Interview February 8, 2001).
Four of the six ASE workers that I interviewed mentioned that they supported the union
because of this particular person. For instance one reported, “Marcella knows what it is
like working for Cudahy. So, if she thinks we need a union, then we need a union”
(Interview April 3, 2001). In addition, a Caucasian ASE worker stated, “The Latino
organizers and the Latino workers who supported the union talking to the other Latinos at
the plant really convinced them that we needed a union. Latinos talking to other Latinos
is what really got them to support the union” (Interview February 25, 2001).
The Union Wins and the Retaliation Begins. On December 15, 2000, almost a
month after the elections at Northern States, ASE workers voted 90 to 65 in favor of
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union representation. Immediately following the election, according to both organizers
and workers, the company retaliated against its workers. A UFCW organizer claimed:
After the union won the election, the company began retaliating by: 1) 
eliminating its perfect attendance bonus; 2) eliminating its boot and shoe 
allowance; 3) changing its vacation policy; and 4) introducing new 
company polices, like making workers punch out for their lunch breaks 
(Interview February 6, 2001).
Subsequent to these changes in company policy, on January 23, 2001, the UFCW filed
charges against ASE for retaliating against workers as a result of their choosing union
representation. However, an organizer explained that these charges were resolved
between the union and the company during contract negotiations.
Organizers and workers alike attributed the union’s success at ASE to two key
factors: 1) the stability and diversity of the plant’s workforce; and 2) the support provided
by OTOC’s member congregations and organizers. Organizers and workers claimed that
the relatively low turnover rate among ASE workers and the fact that many of the plant’s
long-term employees had prior union experience facilitated the success of the organizing
campaign. For instance, an OTOC organizer explained:
We won the election at Cudahy because there were many white and black 
workers at the plant who had been there for a long time. Many of them were 
there when the plant was union so they were familiar with unions and could 
appreciate the benefits of working at a union plant. The Latino workers at 
the plant, for the most part, followed their lead. When the Latinos realized 
that the whites and blacks were pro-union, they figured that these workers 
knew what they were doing and so they followed their lead (Interview June
11, 2001).
Similarly, a UFCW organizer stated:
Because worker turnover at this plant is low, at least compared to other area 
plants, there were a number of workers who had been working at the plant 
while it was unionized. These workers not only supported unionization, but
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also helped us gain the support of their co-workers, who were without union 
experience (Interview February 6, 2001).
Finally, an ASE worker, who had been at the plant since the early 1980s claimed, “I
believe that having the church involved made all the difference. I really don’t think we
could have won the election without OTOC and the church” (Interview February 15,
2001).
INS Raid and Hot Shop Organizing: The Campaign Shifts to Nebraska Beef
On December 5, 2000, just days before the union election at ASE, the INS raided 
the Nebraska Beef meatpacking plant in South Omaha. The raid resulted in the 
deportation of over 200 workers, despite the fact that the INS has internal operating 
procedures directing its agents not to initiate immigration enforcement actions during 
union organizing campaigns. The INS defended the raid, arguing that its investigation at 
the plant began prior to the campaign (Taylor 2000b). Two days after the raid, workers at 
the plant stopped production, protesting their working conditions. As a result of this 
protest, seven meatpacking workers were fired. One of the fired workers explained the 
events as follows:
After the raid we were doing the same amount of work with a couple 
hundred fewer workers. The managers didn’t slow down the line speed 
and the meat was piling up. We were working as fast and as hard as we 
could, but we couldn’t keep up. So, about half of us [an estimated 400 
workers] just stopped working. We walked off the line and into the 
cafeteria. Our supervisors and managers followed us into the cafeteria, 
where we asked them to slow down the line speed and give us a raise.
After they agreed to give us a 50-cent an hour raise, most of the workers 
returned to the line. A few of us, however, stayed behind in the cafeteria, 
and were fired for doing so. The managers said we were fired for “inciting 
a riot” (Interview April 3, 2001).
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Moreover, a UFCW organizer reported:
Workers at Nebraska Beef were frustrated with the insufficient number of 
workers on the line and their increased workloads following the raid and 
responded to these conditions by organizing and protesting. Several 
workers were fired in the process. After they were fired they came to us 
[the UFCW] for help and we filed charges on their behalf (Interview 
January 18, 2001).
In defense of the fired workers, the UFCW filed unfair labor practice charges against
Nebraska Beef, alleging that the workers were fired for engaging in a protected activity
(protesting working conditions) and seeking to get them reinstated with back pay.
As a result of the raid and firings, the UFCW/OTOC campaign shifted to the
Nebraska Beef plant. Within approximately a week of the union election at the ASE
plant, UFCW and OTOC organizers began meeting with Nebraska Beef workers and
agreed to step up organizing efforts at the plant (Interview January 18, 2001). An OTOC
organizer explained:
Following the raid and the firings, Nebraska Beef workers were very 
agitated. They began organizing themselves. Then they came to OTOC 
and the UFCW looking for support and signifying that they wanted to 
unionize their plant. So, we [OTOC and the UFCW] decided to focus our 
immediate attention and efforts on Nebraska Beef. It became our highest 
priority. Organizers and workers gathered outside of the plant gates daily 
in between shifts to handbill and talk to workers. The discontent among 
workers at the plant allowed us to intensify our efforts and gain the 
required authorization cards to petition for a union election (Interview 
February 23, 2001).
UFCW and OTOC organizers claimed that they were able to utilize the situation at 
Nebraska Beef to build support for their campaign. For instance, a UFCW organizer 
claimed that because of the raid and firings “there was increased discontent among 
workers at Nebraska Beef, which created a basis upon which we were able to build
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support for our campaign at that plant” (Interview January 23, 2001). Moreover, several
of the Nebraska Beef workers I interviewed commented on how the raid and firings at the
plant changed their attitude about the UFCW and the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign. For instance, one of them stated:
I supported the organizing campaign by signing an authorization card back 
in October when the UFCW was handing them out to workers outside the 
plant. But I wasn’t involved in the campaign until after the raid. A couple 
of days after the raid I was fired for complaining about the speed of the line 
and not having enough workers on the line. The union filed charges 
against the company to help me get my job back. Since then I have been 
going to union meetings and helping build support for the campaign by 
getting other workers to come to the meetings and sign cards (Interview 
April 3, 2001).
Approximately four months after the raid and firings, in April 2001, the NLRB 
ruled in favor of the seven fired workers and sent Nebraska Beef a settlement offer that 
called for the workers to be reinstated and paid their back wages. When the company 
failed to respond to the NLRB letter, the Board issued a complaint against the company 
and scheduled a hearing for October 10, 2001 (Walton 2001:4A) ,13 According to 
organizers this victory for the fired workers facilitated the UFCW/OTOC campaign at 
Northern States by demonstrating to the workers not only that the UFCW was committed 
to them, but also the material benefits of union representation. For example, a UFCW 
organizer claimed, “Workers at the plant realized that we were committed to them” 
(Interview February 26, 2001). Likewise, another organizer stated, “This demonstrated
13 According to a UFCW representative, just a few days before the scheduled hearing the 
company reached a settlement with the workers and the UFCW in which they agreed to reinstate 
the workers and compensate them for their lost wages.
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our commitment to them. It demonstrated that even though they are not union members 
we are committed to fighting for them” (Interview January 18, 2001).
After several months of handbilling and housecalling, Nebraska Beef workers 
organizers claimed that 70 percent of the 800 to 850 workers at the plant had signed 
authorization cards indicating that they wanted union representation. Therefore, on June 
18, 2001, in an effort analogous to the one the union utilized during its campaigns at 
Northern States and ASE, UFCW Local 271 president Donna McDonald wrote a letter to 
Nebraska Beef officials asking the company for card check recognition. And similar to 
the response of the other two companies, Nebraska Beef representative Dean Miller 
declined the UFCW’s request, stating that he did not agree that a majority of Nebraska 
Beef employees had designated UFCW Local 271 as their bargaining agent (Taylor 
2001a:33). Moreover, he stated, “Employees should be given the opportunity to choose 
whether they want union representation. The procedures which provide for secret ballot 
elections under current federal law would seem to be in the best interest o f all concerned” 
(Taylor 2001a:33).
On June 19, 2001, the UFCW and OTOC held a press conference at Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Parish Hall to celebrate the first anniversary of Gov. Johanns’ “Meatpacking 
Industry Workers’ Bill of Rights.” There, the union announced it would file a petition 
with the NLRB for a union representation election. It also reported that it had filed 
charges with the NLRB against Nebraska Beef for illegally interrogating workers as to 
their union sentiments and conducting surveillance of them (Taylor 2001 a:33). A UFCW 
organizer claimed, “The Company’s managers and supervisors have been coercing
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workers by creating the impression that their union activities are being kept under
surveillance and by interrogating workers regarding their union activities (January 18,
2001). Likewise, an OTOC organizer explained how one of the Nebraska Beef managers
owned a store that was located across the street from an office the UFCW and OTOC
leased in South Omaha and kept surveillance from there as Nebraska Beef workers
visited the UFCW/OTOC office. This organizer claimed:
He had people at the store spying on workers when they came to our 
office. Because the store is literally less than fifty feet from our office, 
they were able to see who was coming to our meetings. Workers told me 
that they were also taking down license plate numbers to figure out which 
workers were coming to our meetings. When workers figured out what 
was going on, they were concerned about being seen at our office. So, we 
decided to move our meetings to the church [Our Lady of Guadalupe 
Catholic Church], where we used to have meetings before we leased the 
South Omaha office and where workers were more comfortable 
(Interview, March 9, 2001).
Moreover, a Nebraska Beef worker explained, “When organizers are outside our plant
handing out fliers, our supervisors go out to the parking lot and sit in their cars to write
down the names of workers who take the fliers and stop to talk to the organizers”
(Interview April 6, 2001). Organizers and workers claimed that these were just a few of
the many tactics the company used to intimidate workers and resist unionization. They
claimed that the company also made threats in relation to the INS deportations, job
terminations and plant closure.
Another tactic the company used in its opposition to unionization and one that
several workers commented on was to provide its workers with a 36-page plastic cover,
spiral bound notebook containing anti-union material in both English and Spanish. The
notebook, with which a worker provided me, contained a list of UFCW officials’ salaries
191
ranging from the UFCW International President’s salary of $368,747 to an International 
Representative’s salary of $50, 226. With this, the company claimed, “The union 
officials need your initiation fees and monthly dues to pay the high salaries they pay 
themselves.” In the notebook, the company also accused the UFCW of embezzlement 
and corruption. For example, the company claimed, “The UFCW is based on the east 
coast and has a recent history of embezzlement, corruption and mismanagement both in 
their National official and Omaha office Local 271.” In support of these accusations, the 
company reproduced newspaper articles related to union embezzlement. The notebook 
also contained statements and articles regarding plant strikes and closures, particularly 
the UFCW Local 271 strike at Beef America and the plant’s closure in 1998. The 
company claimed, “What happened at Beef America? July 13 UFCW Local 271 calls for 
strike to begin. Union strike forces 1,100 employees off their jobs....July 28 Plant closes 
permanently and 1,100 people lose their jobs.” In addition, the notebook included several 
pages listing the benefits the company offers its workers. For instance, one of these 
pages reads:
The company understands that employees may need extended time away from 
the company. An example of this would be employees visiting Mexico. The 
company understands the importance of these visits to employees and has 
implemented a flexible re-hire policy to accommodate these circumstances.
In preparation for the NLRB election, which was scheduled for August 16, 2001,
UFCW and OTOC organizers continued concentrating most of their organizing efforts on
handbilling and housecalling, holding organizing meetings, gathering signed
authorization cards and countering the company’s anti-union tactics. Meanwhile, contract
negotiations were underway at the ASE plant.
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From Mobilization to Business Unionism: Contract Negotiations at ASE
A couple of weeks after the December 15, 2000 union election at the ASE plant,
UFCW Local 271 president Donna McDonald sent letters to the ASE workers informing
them that as soon as the union received official certification from the NLRB it would
begin contract negotiations. A UFCW organizer summarized the contract negotiations
process as follows:
First, workers will nominate and elect the workers they want to serve on 
the negotiating committee. Next, we [the UFCW] will survey the workers 
to see what they want in their contract proposal. Then, we [the UFCW 
and the negotiations committee] will take the contract proposal to the 
company. It usually takes several months and several meetings negotiating 
with the company before we are able to finally come up with a contact.
After that, we will take the contract back to the workers and they will vote 
whether or not they want to ratify it (Interview April 19, 2001).
The UFCW held a meeting in early February 2001 to elect workers for the contract
negotiations committee and to be union stewards at the plant. There, it also distributed
questionnaires to ASE workers in order to determine what issues they wanted addressed
in their contract. An ASE worker explained, “The union gave the workers that were at
the meeting questionnaires to take back to the plant and give to their co-workers. These
questionnaires listed a handful of items and asked us to rank them according to how
important they were to us” (Interview, April 18, 2001). A questionnaire provided by this
ASE worker, entitled “UFCW Local 271 Membership Contract Questionnaire,” states:
Please weight the issues from the following list by using an assigned 
points system. You may assign as many points (or no points) to any issue 
as you desire, keeping in mind that the maximum for any single issue is 50 
points and the combined total must add up to 100 points.
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1. Improved wage structure  pts.
2. More paid holidays  pts.
3. More vacation time pts.
4. Improved medical coverage  pts.
5. Improved pension benefits  pts.
6. Improved sick leave plan  pts.
7. Better seniority protection  pts.
8. Improved grievance procedure  pts.
9. Better work schedule  pts.
10. Better health and safety protection  pts.
According to an organizer, the results of these questionnaires indicated that the issues
workers were most interested in addressing in their contract were improvements in: 1)
wages; 2) pension benefits; 3) medical coverage; and 4) sick leave (Interview April 6,
2001). Based on these issues and working from existing UFCW contracts covering
similar sausage processing plants, the union drafted a contract proposal and began
negotiating with the company in late February. An ASE worker who was on the
negotiating committee explained, “We used a contract at Cudahy’s sister plant in Chicago
and a contract from a sausage plant in St. Charles, Illinois as models for our contract
proposal and negotiations” (Interview February 25, 2001).
There were three ASE workers on the negotiating committee, all of who were
native-born workers from the first shift. An OTOC organizer reported:
There were approximately 40 workers at the meeting in which the 
negotiations committee and union stewards were elected. Consequently, 
only these 40 workers had the opportunity to vote for the workers they wanted to 
represent them during contract negotiations and as union stewards. They elected 
two Anglos, one o f which was female, and a Hispanic male to be on the 
negotiations committee. They also elected five union stewards including an 
Anglo female, an African American male, a Hispanic male, and two 
Latinas. A ll of these workers, the committee members and stewards, were 
from the first shift (Interview January 25, 2001).
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Likewise, an ASE worker stated:
I attended the first meeting the union held after we won the election. There 
were only two of us from the second shift at the meeting. At the meeting, 
we elected a contract negotiating committee and plant stewards. The two 
of us from the second shift proposed a couple of workers from our shift 
who weren’t at the meeting. The union took their names, but they weren’t 
elected (Interview March 31, 2001).
I interviewed two of the three workers that were on the negotiating committee and they
explained how they were selected. One of them indicated:
There are three of us on the committee and I am the only Hispanic arid also 
the only one that is bilingual. That is really the only reason I am on the 
committee, because I am bilingual. Workers want someone on the 
committee that is bilingual so that they will know what is happening during 
negotiations (Interview February 22, 2001).
Another explained:
I was not elected to the committee. It was a big misunderstanding. I told 
everyone that I didn’t want to be a union steward because I don’t have 
enough time to take on that responsibility. I did however want to be on 
the negotiations committee. Meanwhile, one of my co-workers wanted to 
be a union steward, but she didn’t want to be on the negotiations 
committee. After she was elected to be a negotiator, Donna [the President 
of Local 271] called me and asked me why I didn’t want to be part of the 
negotiations committee and I explained to her that I did in fact want to be 
on the committee just not a union steward. That is when the three of us,
Donna, my coworker and myself, discussed the situation and worked it out 
so that I would be on the committee and my coworker would be a union 
steward. Plus, Donna wants me on the negotiations committee because I 
am outspoken and won’t put up with the company’s crap (Interview 
February 25, 2001).
Several of the ASE workers I interviewed mentioned that they were upset with the
fact that the second shift had no one serving on the negotiations committee or as union
stewards. For instance an ASE worker from the second shift complained:
There are only three workers on the negotiations committee and they are 
all from the first shift. There is not a single worker from the second shift
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on the committee, so who is going to speak for our concerns? The 
concerns of the second shift workers are going to be ignored in 
negotiations (Interview March 9, 2001).
Another second shift worker stated:
We need someone on the committee to represent workers on the second 
shift. Workers on the second shift don’t know what’s going on with the 
committee and the union. No one is telling us what is going on. We also 
need stewards on the second shift. What are the workers on the second 
shift supposed to do when we encounter problems? Who is going to 
represent us? (Interview March 31, 2001).
When asked whether there is a limit to the number of workers that can be on the
negotiating committee, an organizer explained, “Since the union is paying for the lost
wages of those workers who participate in negotiations, the union limits the number of
workers on the negotiating committee” (Interview March 19, 2001).
Interviews with ASE workers and OTOC organizers revealed that workers were 
frustrated with the contract negotiations, as well as the UFCW and OTOC. For instance, 
ASE workers stated the following:
• I attended the first meeting the union held after we won the 
election....Since the first meeting nobody has told me, or any of the 
workers I have talked to, what’s happening. Workers are upset because we 
didn’t know what’s happening. The union isn’t telling us anything 
(Interview with a Latina from the second shift March 31, 2001).
• I don’t know what is going on with the negotiations, none of us know. No 
one from the second shift knows what is going on. Maybe if  I asked 
someone from the first shift they might know, but I’m not sure because 
there are lots of workers from both shifts asking “What happened to the 
union” and “What happened to our union contract” (Interview with a 
Latina from the second shift April 6, 2001).
• Since we won the election, I haven’t seen anybody from the UFCW or 
OTOC. I haven’t heard of any meetings. They have done a poor job of 
communicating with us since the election. They haven’t been in contact
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with us regarding the contract, but I have a friend on the contract 
committee and she told me that it “looks pretty good” (Interview with a 
Latina from the first shift April 12, 2001).
When asked why the workers were not aware of what was happening in contract
negotiations, an OTOC organizer claimed:
A UFCW organizer explained to me that the workers on the negotiations 
committee were instructed not to tell their co-workers what was going on 
in negotiations. He said to me “Workers on the negotiations committee 
were instructed not to say anything to their co-workers about what was 
going on.” The reasoning he gave me was that workers would be 
disappointed with the union if they lost something that was initially in the 
proposal. The example he gave me was that if the union proposed two 
holidays and then eliminated one of these holidays in exchange for an 
increase in wages, workers would be pissed off at the union because they 
lost one of the holidays (Interview April 19, 2001).
Moreover, this OTOC organizer stated:
I believe workers would understand if the union would just explain to them 
how the negotiations process works. Unions just need to educate workers 
about the process. I believe workers should be informed and participating 
in the process. I do not agree with the union’s approach (Interview April 3,
2001).
Another OTOC organizer acknowledged that the OTOC organizers were inexperienced 
when it came to NLRB elections and contract negotiations. However, this individual 
claimed that they [OTOC organizers] wanted to be more involved in the negotiations in 
order to gain a better understanding of and some experience with the process, but were not 
allowed. He stated, “We would have liked to have been more involved in the contract 
negotiations, but when we asked to participate in the negotiations the UFCW refused our 
request, claiming that it was against the NLRB’s policy to have us on the negotiations 
committee” (Interview May 15, 2001).
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Although OTOC organizers were essential in mobilizing workers up through the 
union representation election, they were restricted from playing an active role in the 
process of negotiating a union contract. OTOC organizers explained their predicament as 
follows:
• The contract negotiations have created problems between workers and
OTOC organizers because we [OTOC organizers] are not exactly sure
what’s going on with negotiations. ...Workers don’t know what is going on 
either and so they are frustrated. They come up to me at church and ask 
what’s going on with the union and the contract. All I can tell them is that 
I don’t know and then they become frustrated with me. When I ask the 
UFCW organizers they tell me “negotiations are going good.” What does 
“good” mean? I have no idea (Interview June 18, 2001).
• Workers come fo me and want to know how things are going. They look to
me for answers, but I don’t have the answers. I’m afraid that if workers are 
not happy with their contract and their representation, they will blame me 
and the other OTOC organizers. We are going to the ones that workers 
hold responsible. It is our faces they see, not the faces of the UFCW 
organizers. We are the ones that live in the same community, go to the 
same church, shop in the same stores and eat in the same restaurants.
When the UFCW organizers move on to another organizing campaign, 
we’ll be the only ones around. We’ll be the ones that workers come to 
with questions and complaints (Interview March 9, 2001).
Moreover, reflecting on the contract negotiations at ASE, an OTOC organizer explained
his plan for keeping workers informed and involved during future contract negotiations.
He explained, “I plan to have ‘an overview committee,’ which would serve as an
intermediary between the negotiations committee and the larger workforce. The members
of this ‘overview committee’ would be kept aware of how the negotiations were
proceeding and in turn would be responsible for keeping the rest of the workforce aware
of the status of the negotiations” (Interview May 18, 2001).
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Accommodating Organizing Cultures: Incorporating Immigrant-Specific
Language into Collective Bargaining Agreements. On August 2, 2001, after
approximately six months of negotiations and nearly eight months after the union
election, ASE workers ratified a three-year union contract covering approximately 160
workers. A UFCW press release explains:
The ASE employees had worked 11 years with a total of a dollar increase 
in their wages. The new contract will give workers a dollar raise over the 
next three years....Other highlights include: 1) an improved health care 
plan that includes prescription, vision, and dental coverage at a fixed rate 
of three dollars per week for single coverage and six dollars per week for 
families; 2) a safety committee in which workers will have an equal voice 
with management to address safety issues in the plant; 3) a defined 
grievance and arbitrations procedure that gives workers the opportunity to 
solve problems through a neutral third-party; 4) an improved 401(k) plan 
for workers to invest in their retirement security; 5) double the amount of 
life insurance previously provided to workers; and 6) a bidding procedure 
for new jobs that gives everyone a fair chance for advancement (United 
Food and Commercial Workers 200Id).
Although this contract represents significant gains for ASE workers, interviews 
with immigrant Latino workers at ASE, as well as OTOC organizers, revealed that the 
contract left much to be desired. They suggested that the contract questionnaire and 
ultimately the union contract itself defined workers’ issues too narrowly and assumed that 
the universal desires of all workers, including immigrant Latinos, were so-called bread- 
and-butter issues such as wages and working conditions. When in fact, there were a 
number of issues specific to the immigrant workers at the plant that could have been 
addressed in the contract. Workers and OTOC organizers suggested that in order to make 
unionization more appealing to the immigrant Latino workers, the UFCW could have 
incorporated contract language that dealt with specific concerns of these workers.
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A number of progressive unions throughout the United States, which represent
industries dependent on immigrant workers, have in fact incorporated such language into
their contracts. Unions such as the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union
(HERE) and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), along with several other
AFL-CIO affiliates, have immigrant-specific language into their collective bargaining
agreements. Such language includes provisions that guarantee that workers do not lose
their seniority, compensation and/or benefits due to any changes in their names or social
security numbers. These provisions protect immigrants who use false names and social
security numbers before they receive their legal immigration status. Unions have also
included provisions in their contracts to protect immigrant workers in the event of INS
audits and/or raids, as well as provide legal assistance, citizenship preparation and
English language training.
In addition, some contracts provide for extended leave policies, so that
immigrants will not be terminated when they fail to return “on time” after visits to their
native country to tend to their relatives or other responsibilities. An OTOC organizer
observed that immigrant meatpacking workers with extended ties to relatives abroad
would also benefit from such extended leave policies in their union contracts. For
example, this organizer stated:
In order to confront the issue of back-and-forth migration among 
meatpacking workers who have extended families and responsibilities in 
their home countries, policies regarding the issue should be incorporated 
into union contracts. Such policies would be useful so that immigrant 
workers don’t lose their pay, benefits, and seniority when they take leave, 
or in some cases quit, to return home for an extended period of time. Such 
policies would also benefit unions in at least two ways. First, unions 
wouldn’t lose their members when they are fired for taking extended leave.
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And second, by having such policies in their contracts, unions would be 
more appealing to immigrant workers (Interview June 25, 2001).
Some meatpacking employers in South Omaha such as Nebraska Beef and
Greater Omaha Packing that are not unionized had such policies for their employees. For
example, in the previously mentioned spiral-bound notebook that Nebraska Beef handed
out to its employees, the company explains its policy as follows:
The company understands that employees may need extended time away 
from the company. An example of this would be employees visiting 
Mexico. The company understands the importance of these visits to 
employees and has implemented a flexible re-hire policy to accommodate 
these circumstances.
Some UFCW Locals also have included such immigrant-specific language. For 
instance, UFCW Local 428 in San Jose, California has a section entitled, “Rights of 
Immigrant Workers,” in some of its contracts. It states:
(a) Should the INS or any other government agency contact the Employer 
regarding the work authorization status of any bargaining unit employee, 
the Employer shall notify the Union by the next business day.
(b) The Employer shall not reveal confidential information concerning 
employees to the INS or its agents, except as required by law. Confidential 
information includes employees’ names, addresses, Social Security 
Numbers, or immigration status.
(c) The Employer shall grant up to seven days absence without pay with a 
minimum of seven days notice where possible and proper INS notification, 
for INS proceedings.
(d) The Employer shall comply with requests of workers to change their 
names and Social Security Numbers in the Employer’s records with 
appropriate documentation, without prejudice to their seniority or other 
rights under this agreement.
(e) The Employer shall not request information or documents from 
employees or applicants for employment as to their work authorization or 
identity, except as required by law. The Employer shall not retain in its file
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copies of the identity and work authorization documents presented by the 
employee.
(f) Nothing herein shall require the Employer to violate the law, abridge 
its legal responsibilities, or circumvent any ordinances or laws.
(g) The Employer shall not participate in any computer verification of 
immigration or work authorization status, except as required by law.
(h) If the Employer receives notice from any government agency other than 
the INS regarding employee work authorization or identification, the 
Employer may inform the affected employee(s) so that they may take 
action on an individual basis (The National Immigration Law Center 2004).
While the UFCW Local 271’s contract questionnaire results suggested that ASE
workers were mostly interested in improvements in their wages, pension benefits and
medical coverage, immigrant-specific issues were not part of the questionnaire. As a
result, it is difficult to say where these issues might have ranked among the workers’
interests. Still, there is reason to believe that the results of the questionnaire are more
representative of the interests of the first shift workers, whom often were native-born,
long-term employees, than the second shift workers since the first shift was more likely
to complete and return the questionnaire. Workers and organizers alike indicated that the
second shift workers, most of whom were immigrant Latinos, were less involved in both
the process of drafting and negotiating the contract. Only two of the six ASE workers I r
interviewed mentioned wages and pensions as important benefits of unionization. Both
of them were native-born, long-term workers. They had worked at the plant since at least
the early 1980s when it was unionized and therefore had experienced over two decades of
declining real wages and were thinking about retirement.
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Employer Offensive Ends in Union Defeat: The Election at Nebraska Beef
On August 16,2001, just two weeks after the contract at ASE was ratified, the 
UFCW/OTOC campaign suffered a major setback when workers at the Nebraska Beef 
plant voted 452 to 345 against the union. The UFCW attributed this loss to the 
company’s intense antiunion campaign and subsequently charged the company with 
numerous violations of federal labor law in its campaign (Reed 2002:3). In a petition 
filed August 22, 2001 with the NLRB’s regional office, the UFCW listed 41 objections to 
the election and requested another election at the plant. Among these violations, 
according to the UFCW’s petition, Nebraska Beef:
• Threatened employees by telling them the plant would close if they 
selected the union as their collective bargaining representative;
• Interrogated employees regarding their union sympathies;
• Created the impression of surveillance and conducted surveillance on 
its employees;
• Applied work rules in a discriminatory manner;
• Enforced its no-solicitation/no-distribution rule in a discriminatory 
manner;
• Threatened employees with stricter enforcement of work rules if they 
selected the union as their collective bargaining representative;
• Threatened employees with a change in working conditions if they 
selected the union as their collective bargaining representative;
• Threatened employees with overtime if they selected the union as their 
collective bargaining representative;
• Threatened employees with the loss of employment benefits if they 
selected the union as their collective bargaining representative;
• Threatened workers with immigration-related reprisals if they selected 
the union as their collective bargaining representative;
• Threatened employees with job loss if they supported the union;
• Discharged workers because of their union sympathies;
• Refused to hire employees sympathetic to the union;
• Promised employees benefits, including a bonus and a raise, if they 
voted against the union.
• Failed to provide the union with a list of eligible voters;
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• Hired additional employees just before the election solely to increase 
the size of the bargaining unit and thus lessen the union’s chances of 
success;
• Permitted supervisory and non-bargaining unit employees to vote in 
the election; and
• Allowed some employees to vote more than once.
The number of violations, later reduced to 32, became the basis of a six-day NLRB 
hearing held in mid-October 2001 at a federal courthouse in Omaha. (Taylor 2002). An 
NLRB administrative law judge, Francis Molenda, conducted the hearing in which 14 
Nebraska Beef workers testified against the company (Reed 2002:3).
Nearly two months later, on December 20, 2001, Molenda sided with the UFCW 
on seven of the violations and tossed out the remaining 25 (Taylor 2002). He agreed with 
the union on the following allegations: 1) Nebraska Beef interrogated employees 
concerning their union sympathies; 2) the company enforced an overly broad rule against 
workers wearing pro-union stickers on their clothing , which caused substantial 
disruption in the workplace on the day before the election; 3) the company threatened 
employees with job losses if they selected the union as their collective bargaining 
representative; 4) the company threatened employees with the loss of employment 
benefits if they selected the union; 5) the company threatened employees with stricter 
enforcement of work rules if they selected the union; 6) the company threatened 
employees with a change in working conditions if they selected the union; and 7) 
Nebraska Beef failed to provide the union with an accurate list of eligible voters and their 
addresses (Taylor 2002). Moreover, Molenda recommended that a new election be 
organized (Reed 2002:3). As the UFCW explained in a press release dated January 10, 
2002:
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A Hearing Officer of the National Labor Relations Board recommended 
overturning the results from the August 16, 2001 vote in which workers faced 
a vicious anti-union campaign by company management....Nebraska Beef 
waged an aggressive program to intimidate, coerce and harass employees 
from standing up for a voice on the job. The Labor Board official cited the 
following actions as cause to overturn the results of the election: 1) Illegal 
interrogation of employees concerning their union sympathies; 2) Illegal 
threats of job losses or loss of benefits if workers selected the union as their 
collective bargaining representative; and 3) Illegal threats to change working 
conditions if they selected the union. Nebraska Beef workers will have the 
opportunity to hold another union election (United Food and Commercial 
Workers 2002).
The company subsequently appealed Molenda’s ruling invalidating the results of the 
election and ordering a new one. As Reed (2002:3) explained, “The Company has filed 
‘exceptions’ to the hearing officer’s findings with the regional NLRB in Kansas City, 
asking the labor board to overturn the opinion.” According to organizers, the workers at 
Nebraska Beef are still awaiting a final ruling by the NLRB (Interview December 22, 
2003).
“We Won9t Be Fooled Again The Campaign Returns to Northern States
Shortly after losing the election at Nebraska Beef, the UFCW/OTOC campaign 
returned to ConAgra’s Northern States plant, where it had lost an election 17 months 
earlier, when production workers rejected union representation 238 to 150. When asked 
why they returned to this plant rather than focusing on another South Omaha plant such 
as Greater Omaha Packing, both UFCW and OTOC organizers explained that it had been 
their intention all along to return to Northern States after waiting out the 12-month NLRA 
requirement. As previously mentioned, under the NLRA, unions must wait at least
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twelve months after a NLRB election before filing for another election at the same
plant.14 An OTOC organizer explained:
We had already planned to go back to the Northern States plant after the 
Nebraska Beef election when Northern States workers came to us [OTOC 
and the UFCW] wanting to reorganize their plant and wanting another 
union election. They realized that the company had fooled them during the 
last campaign at their plant and so they wanted another election. So, we 
decided to combine our organizing efforts among Nebraska Beef workers 
and Northern States workers. The strategy was to organize both plants at 
the same time. So, we made handbills for Nebraska Beef in which 
Northern States workers told how they were fooled by the company into 
believing they didn’t need a union to improve conditions at their plant. 
Northern States workers helped us handbill and housecall Nebraska Beef 
workers. They also started coming to our meetings with Nebraska Beef 
workers. During these meetings the Northern States workers explained how 
the company fooled them and how they wanted another chance to vote for 
the union. By the time the election at Nebraska Beef was over with, we 
had already rebuilt our workers’ committee at Northern States and had a 
sizable number of authorization cards signed at the plant (Interview 
January 22, 2004).
After losing the Nebraska Beef election and while awaiting the NLRB’s final ruling 
on the union’s objections to the election, the UFCW and OTOC once again concentrated 
their organizing efforts on the Northern States plant. As a result, by the end of March 
they had enough signed authorization cards to petition the NLRB for another election. 
On March 27, 2002, after the company once again denied the UFCW’s request for 
voluntary recognition, the UFCW and OTOC held a rally outside the plant’s main 
entrance to announce that they had filed a petition with the NLRB for another election.
14 An election may not be held in a bargaining unit where a valid election was held during the 
preceding 12-month period. However, the petition for a new representation election can be filed 
within the existing 12-month period. The date that starts the 12-month period is the date of the 
election (Diamond 1995:12).
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Organizers claimed that this time, Northern States workers were easier to organize 
because they realized that they had been deceived by the company during the previous 
campaign. Workers’ statements aired on an Omaha Spanish-language radio station, La 
Maquina Musical 1420AM, a week before the scheduled election revealed their 
sentiments this time:
• My name is Olga Espinoza. I have eight years working for ConAgra Beef 
in the kill floor. Workers from ConAgra will have an election this Friday.
We will vote yes because the company will not fool us again. Enough 
with the false promises, enough with low wages, enough having co­
workers injured! We value our work, let’s make our vote count. Unity 
makes us strong -  vote yes! (La Maquina Musical 1420AM April 29,
2002).
• My name is Ruben Sandoval and I have worked at ConAgra Beef for the 
past twenty years. We were fooled in the election. The company lowered 
the chain speed just before the election only to raise it up again after the 
votes were counted. We reorganized to get a union in our plant and make 
changes at work. We will have another election on May 3rd....We will 
succeed this time. Vote union yes! (La Maquina Musical 1420AM April 
29, 2002).
• Hello, my name is Trinidad Arias. I have worked at ConAgra Beef for two 
years. We will vote yes for the union in our election. In the past election, 
the company organized a meeting where they made many promises and 
many people were fooled. We lost that election. The company didn't make 
good on their promises. This time we will not be fooled... (La Maquina 
Musical 1420AM April 29, 2002).
On May 3, 2002, production workers voted two to one, 252 to 126, in favor of union 
representation. This election brought the UFCW and OTOC their biggest victory since 
their collaborative campaign began in the summer of 2000. Approximately five and a 
half months later, on October 23, 2002, the production workers ratified their first-ever 
union contract. As the UFCW explained in a press release dated October 24, 2002:
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The production workers overwhelmingly ratified a new two-year agreement 
that brings significant gains for the 500 workers and their families. The 
contract, ratified at meetings late last night, provides a real wage increase for 
workers that will improve their standard of living. The production workers 
will receive 350 an hour raise this year and 350 an hour more the following 
year. Both 2nd and 3rd shift workers will receive an additional 150 per hour 
premium. The first contract for the production workers lays the groundwork 
for the future — one where workers have a voice over important workplace 
issues. It provides:
• Affordable, quality health insurance for workers and their families.
• Retirement security through a 401 (k) savings with a 3% employer match.
• Improved vacation pay.
• A Safety and Ergonomics Committee appointed and trained by the 
UFCW.
• Two pair of safety work boots per employee per year.
• ConAgra will contribute $10,000 per year to the UFCW Multicultural 
Fund to help educate and assist workers in the community with language, 
safety and citizenship education.
The new ConAgra contract provides unprecedented protections against 
discrimination and abuse for new immigrant workers. Workers now have the 
opportunity to take up to 30 days unpaid leave of absences for situations that 
involve long-distance travel. UFCW Local 271 also won the right to provide 
additional orientation training for new hires and in-plant representatives 
(United Food and Commercial Workers 2002).
When questioned why the UFCW incorporated immigrant-specific language into this
union contract and not the ASE (Cudahy) contract, an OTOC organizer explained:
We learned from our mistakes at Cudahy. Unlike Cudahy, there were Latinos 
elected to the contract negotiations committee at Northern States. Workers at 
Northern States were also much more involved in the contract negotiations 
than workers at Cudahy. Immediately after the UFCW won the election and 
before they had a chance to distribute their contract survey, Northern States 
workers began meeting amongst themselves to come up with a list of issues 
they wanted in their union contract....They organized themselves into two 
groups, one of kill floor workers and the other of production workers. In these 
two groups, they came up with a list of issues they wanted in their contract. 
Basically, leaders from each of these groups organized house meetings wherein 
they discussed what issues they wanted to see in their contract and then they 
organized larger meetings with their respective group of workers and discussed
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these issues. Each group eventually came up with a list of issues. Then they 
organized a meeting with UFCW representatives from both the International 
and Local, OTOC representatives and organizers and Northern States workers.
At the meeting, the leaders from each group presented their list of issues and 
then these issues were openly discussed. Workers eventually combined the two 
groups’ lists into one list, which they turned over to the president of UFCW 
Local 271. She thanked them for their list and then gave them the union 
contract survey to supplement their list of issues. At the meeting workers also 
elected workers to represent them on the negotiations committee. They elected 
five production workers and two kill floor workers. These seven workers were 
later appointed to serve as union stewards (Interview January 22, 2004).
Perhaps also influencing the incorporation of immigrant-specific language into 
the union contract at Northern States was a grant the UFCW International Union received 
from the Office of Special Council for Immigration Related Unfair Employment 
Practices (OSC) and the subsequent training the UFCW Local staff members received 
regarding how to protect immigrant members through contract language. On October 23, 
2000, the UFCW International Union received a $95,000 grant from the OSC, which is 
affiliated with the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. With the 
funds from the OSC, the UFCW developed an anti-discrimination training program. As 
explained in a UFCW press release, “The UFCW’s new training program is designed to 
give immigrant workers and union staff members education and tools to reach out to 
protect themselves and other workers who are vulnerable to discrimination” (United Food 
and Commercial Workers 2000c). Moreover, it stated, “Immigrant meatpacking workers 
in Omaha, Nebraska will be a focal point of this program, with regional training 
conferences also being held in Dallas, Texas and Gainesville, Georgia.” (United Food 
and Commercial Workers 2000c). At these regional training conferences, UFCW staff 
members received training on how to protect immigrant members through contract
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language. Perhaps this program prompted UFCW Local 271 to incorporate immigrant- 
specific language into its contract at ConAgra’s Northern States.
Regardless of why and how the immigrant-specific language actually was 
incorporated into this contract, the fact that such language exists suggests that the UFCW 
is beginning to acknowledge immigrant workers’ need for special protection and 
assistance. Moreover, it suggests the ways in which the immigrant composition of the 
meatpacking workforce in South Omaha has reconfigured the language of contracts and 
expanded them beyond the narrow bread-and-butter issues of wages and working 
conditions to address the particular concerns of immigrant workers. Hopefully, these 
changes in union contractual provisions will carry over into changes in the union’s 
organizational structure and practices, making the union more representative of, and 
appealing to, immigrant workers.
Conclusions
Since the UFCW/OTOC campaign began in June 2000, three new bargaining 
units from South Omaha’s meatpacking plants have been added to the ranks of the 
UFCW Local 271.15 These three bargaining units include approximately 400 production 
workers and 50 maintenance workers at ConAgra’s Northern States and 160 workers at 
Armour Swift-Eckrich. As a result, Local 271 gained hundreds of new union members 
and hundreds of meatpacking workers have gained the security and benefits that 
unionization provides. Based on both workers’ and organizers’ accounts, the success of
15 Subsequent to concluding my research, on September 23, 2003, the UFCW/OTOC campaign 
successfully unionized a group of 250, mostly immigrant workers, at Casa de Oro, which is a 
tortilla factory in South Omaha (Rottach 2003).
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this campaign was predicated on OTOC’s organizing efforts among the workers 
throughout the 1990s and OTOC’s collaboration with the UFCW. As a UFCW organizer 
appointed to the South Omaha campaign by the International acknowledged, “This 
campaign would not have been successful without OTOC” (January 18, 2001).
In short, OTOC’s grassroots organizing efforts among the meatpacking workers 
in South Omaha laid the foundation for a successful UFCW/OTOC campaign. OTOC 
had spent several years prior to the campaign building an organizational base among the 
workers and helping these workers form their own workers’ committee. This committee 
played a vital role in engendering workers’ support for the UFCW and ultimately the 
success of the UFCW/OTOC campaign. As explained by a UFCW organizer, “This 
campaign would never have happened if it wasn’t for the hard work and determination of 
OTOC. They, along with the workers’ committee they helped form, are the ones who 
are really responsible for this campaign” (Interview February 26, 2001);
The UFCW’s organizing efforts among meatpacking workers in South Omaha 
were few and far between in the years prior to collaborating with OTOC. It was not until 
OTOC had built a substantial organizational base among these workers that the UFCW 
appeared in South Omaha. The UFCW arrived after OTOC made contact with a sizeable 
number of workers through one-on-ones and house meetings, and succeeded in 
establishing a workers’ committee, which was in the process of forming a workers’ 
association. A representative from the UFCW International explained the union’s
-N.
I
relative absence from South Omaha in the years preceding the UFCW/OTOC organizing 
campaign as follows:
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We have been in and out of the area trying to organize over the years, but 
not on the scale we are now. This campaign represents the single largest 
union effort to organize Omaha’s packing plants since probably the 
1980s....We have really never before put together the effort we have here 
now. Never before have we had the “person power” we have here now.
Never before have we put together the resources we needed to organize 
Omaha’s packing plants until this June (Interview January 18, 2001).
Another UFCW organizer claimed, “There has been a lot of apathy within the union
when it comes to organizing meatpacking workers” (Interview February 13, 2001).
Moreover, he maintained that the UFCW, in fact, needed OTOC to organize the
meatpacking workers in South Omaha (Interview February 13, 2001).
Nonetheless, there were complementary strengths that both organizations added to
the campaign. The UFCW International, for example, committed extensive financial and
legal resources to the campaign. It brought in ten AFL-CIO Union Summer Interns and
over a dozen bilingual individuals from its SPUR program to work on the campaign. It
also set up a “campaign headquarters” at a local hotel and leased office space in South
Omaha for the campaign. Perhaps most important, the union offered the experience
needed to ensure representation was achieved, contracts were signed, and improvements
were made in wages and working conditions. Given OTOC’s lack of familiarity with
labor laws and collective bargaining, the UFCW’s expertise regarding the NLRA and
NLRB was indispensable during the course of the campaign. Essentially, OTOC was
headed into uncharted waters when it began collaborating with the UFCW. However,
given its roots in the community and emphasis on one-on-one contact, education, training
and leadership building over an extended period of time, OTOC offered many workers a
friendly, more familiar face than the UFCW. Whereas many of the meatpacking workers
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considered UFCW organizers outsiders, they were very familiar with OTOC. Its 
organizers belonged to the same community and institutions as many of the meatpacking 
workers. As one of the organizers explained, “We...live in the same community, go to 
the same church, shop in the same stores and eat in the same restaurants” (Interview 
March 9, 2001). A few of the OTOC organizers even had worked in South Omaha 
meatpacking plants alongside the workers they were now helping to organize.
It is understandable why many Latino meatpacking workers would perceive the 
UFCW organizers as “outsiders,” given that the union’s organizing efforts were managed 
in a top-down manner by the International UFCW rather than Local 271. For the most 
part, the UFCW representatives and organizers assigned to the campaign were from 
outside the Omaha area. Meanwhile, the OTOC organizers working on the campaign 
were mostly from within the South Omaha community. Moreover, since UFCW Local 
271 did not have its own organizing department or organizers, there were mostly 
International and Regional UFCW organizers working on the campaign. During the first 
year of the campaign alone, for example, at least seventeen different organizers and ten 
Union Summer interns, assisted the UFCW in its campaign. Meanwhile, OTOC had the 
same three immigrant Latino organizers.
Even with the resources the UFCW invested in the campaign, based on both 
workers’ and organizers’ accounts, it is very doubtful that it would have been successful 
without the help of OTOC and its organizers. Workers were not familiar with the UFCW 
like they were with OTOC. They trusted OTOC and its organizers, who spoke their 
language and belonged to their community. They welcomed OTOC organizers into their
213
homes and confided in them. For instance, one OTOC organizer described the way
workers responded to OTOC organizers as opposed to UFCW organizers:
A couple of the union organizers went to this worker’s house and when they 
arrived, they called her up on her telecom and introduced themselves. They 
asked the worker if they could come in and talk with her about the union. The 
worker told them to go away, that she was not interested in what they had to 
say. A couple of days later, I went back to this worker’s house. When I 
called up to her and told her my name and that I was a community organizer, 
and was interested in talking with her, she let me right in (Interview June 11,
2001).
Clearly, OTOC helped establish the UFCW’s credibility among meatpacking workers in 
South Omaha. The union needed this credibility in order to be successful. Overall, 
workers’ accounts of why they supported unionization and/or the UFCW/OTOC 
campaign revealed that the majority of them were not familiar with the UFCW, but 
supported the union and the campaign because of OTOC and/or the Church.
Both organizers and workers explained that the number one obstacle they had to 
overcome during the campaign was opposition by the meatpacking employers to 
unionization. According to organizers and workers, every employer targeted by the 
campaign, including ConAgra’s Northern States, Armour Swift-Eckrich (ASE) and 
Nebraska Beef, violated federal labor law in their efforts to resist unionization. However, 
organizers and workers alike explained that OTOC’s member congregations, particularly 
Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church, played a central role in helping workers, 
especially the immigrant Latino workers, overcome their fear of employer opposition. 
They observed that because the workers knew the Church was backing the organizing 
campaign, they were willing to participate in the campaign. As one OTOC organizer 
explained, the religious community’s involvement in the campaign helped workers
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overcom e their fear o f  reprisals by their employers for supporting unionization (Interview  
M ay 7, 2001). A s a worker herself stated, “K nowing the Church was behind us gave us 
the courage w e needed to support the union” (Interview April 6, 2001).
Ultim ately, the findings o f  this research suggest that the changing demographics 
o f  the meatpacking workforce in South Omaha has fostered changes within the UFCW . 
The fact that UFCW  Local 271, for example, has begun incorporating im m igrant-specific 
language into union contracts, indicates that the immigrant com position o f  the workforce 
has influenced the UFCW  to address the particular needs and concerns o f  immigrant 
workers. Perhaps the changes that have occurred in union contractual language w ill lead  
to broader changes within the union, making it more representative of, and appealing to, 
immigrant meatpacking workers.
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Chapter VI 
Conclusions 
Si, Se Puedel: Organizing the “Unorganizable”
M ilkman (2002:115) explains that the conventional w isdom  is that immigrant 
workers are vulnerable, docile individuals who are intensely fearful o f  any confrontation 
w ith authority, who accept substandard w ages and poor working conditions because their 
standard o f  comparison is drawn from their home countries, and who therefore are 
extrem ely unlikely to actively seek unionization. This case study, o f  the UFCW /OTOC  
organizing campaign in South Omaha, challenges such “conventional w isdom .” It 
suggests that unionization among contemporary immigrant workers, specifically  Latino 
immigrant meatpacking workers, depends less on their social characteristics and more on  
the organizational commitment and capacity o f  unions to organize them.
This study exam ined the follow ing individual and group characteristics o f  
immigrant workers suggested in the literature as affecting unionization: 1) legal status; 2) 
length o f  time residing in the United States and intended length o f  stay in the country; 3) 
social networks; 4) previous union experience; and 5) demographic characteristics such 
as nationality, gender and age. A nalysis o f  in-depth interviews with a cross-section o f  23 
meatpacking workers, the majority (over 90 percent) o f  w hom  were Latino immigrants, 
suggests that regardless o f  any o f  these characteristics, Latino immigrant workers are 
highly receptive to unionization.
The legal vulnerability o f  undocumented workers is often cited as a significant 
barrier to unionization in industries such as meatpacking where a substantial portion o f
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the workforce is  comprised o f  undocumented workers. It is generally assumed, in fact, 
som e labor scholars and organizers argue that because o f  their vulnerability to 
deportation, undocumented workers have a negative impact on unionization. D elgado  
(1992:131) explains, “They [undocumented workers] are said to act as deterrents to 
unionization, since their fear o f  apprehension and deportation by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) purportedly forces them to tolerate very low  w ages, abusive 
treatment by supervisors, and poor working conditions.” This study suggests that 
regardless o f  their legal status, the majority o f  Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in  
South Omaha supported unionization.
In addition, this study suggests that even those meatpacking workers w ho were 
relatively recent arrivals to the United States and/or view ed their migration to the country 
as temporary were receptive to unions. It also shows that the majority o f  immigrant 
Latino m eatpacking workers in South Omaha have had little to no union experience prior 
to the UFCW /OTOC organizing campaign, yet this lack o f  experience did not affect their 
w illingness to support unionization. Moreover, the findings o f  this study do not reveal 
differences in whether these workers supported unionization based on their nationality, 
gender or age. The fact that Latino immigrants belong to extensive social networks and 
live in ethnically concentrated areas, however, played a fundamental role in the success 
o f  the UFCW /OTOC campaign.
The results o f  this study are in line with those o f  M ilkman (2002, 2000), D elgado  
(2000, 1993) and Zabin (2000), who suggest that Latino immigrants’ social networks 
facilitate unionization. M ost o f  South Omaha’s meatpacking workers belong to extensive
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social networks, w hich are based on their family, friendship and cultural ties, and these
ties make the process o f  labor organizing easier. Organizers explained that these ties
were fundamental in reaching meatpacking workers and recruiting them into the
campaign. They explained, for exam ple, how  the workers’ social networks were used to
get information, handbills and authorization cards circulated and signed throughout the
meatpacking plants and community. As one UFCW  organizer explained, “A t every level
o f  this campaign, from handbilling to housecalling workers, to getting authorization cards
signed and m eetings organized, the workers’ fam ily and friendship ties have been
essential” (Interview February 8, 2001). Similarly, an OTOC organizer stated:
M eatpacking workers in South Omaha are already highly organized based  
on their immigrant social networks. W e just need to find leadership within  
these social networks and explain to these leaders the benefits o f  
unionization and they w ill go back and talk to the rest o f  their friends and 
fam ilies. They w ill organize them selves (Interview March 17, 2001).
The findings o f  this study suggest that the ethnic and residential concentration o f
Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in South Omaha also facilitated unionization.
The ethnic and residential concentration o f  these workers not only helps maintain and
solid ify their social networks, but also made the union’s task o f  organizing the workers
easier. G iven that labor organizing requires visiting workers in their hom es, the fact that
they lived in an ethnically concentrated area made the task o f  these visits much easier and
less time consuming. Moreover, organizers explained that this residential concentration
made their efforts to locate and recruit additional workers into the campaign easier. As
explained by a UFCW  organizer:
During a typical organizing campaign, w e w ill map out the plant and then  
identify workers on each line, in each department, etc. Once w e ’ve
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identified these workers, w e try and find out where they are living in order 
to do housecalls. This process can be very difficult. However, that has not 
been the case with meatpacking workers in South Omaha. It has been  
rather easy obtaining the names and addresses o f  workers for this 
campaign. Because m ost o f  the meatpacking workers live in the same 
neighborhoods, i f  you ask them to list other workers on their lines, in their 
departments, or working at their plants, not only can they tell you the 
names o f  additional workers, but they can also tell you where they are 
living. For the m ost part, they are concentrated in South Omaha 
neighborhoods (Interview January 18, 2001).
Another U FC W  organizer explained:
The fact that m any o f  these workers live in the same neighborhoods and 
even the same houses has made housecalling less difficult. For exam ple, I 
had the address o f  a guy working at Nebraska B eef. W hen I arrived at his 
apartment I found four other meatpacking workers living there and several 
additional workers living in the same apartment com plex. B y the time I 
concluded m y housecall, I had authorization cards signed by seven workers 
from three different plants. These workers also gave m e the addresses o f  a 
handful more o f  meatpacking workers living in the neighborhood  
(Interview January 25, 2001).
In sum, organizers suggested that because o f  the meatpacking workers’ extensive 
social networks and residential concentration, they were able to reach a majority o f  them  
relatively easily. Furthermore, this study suggests that the success o f  the UFCW /OTOC  
campaign had to som e extent depended on the organizers’ ability to tap into these social 
networks to m obilize workers and build support for their campaign. The fact that the 
majority o f  meatpacking workers are concentrated in South Omaha also means that many 
o f  them attend the same Catholic Church. In this study, 70 percent o f  the meatpacking 
workers that I interviewed were members and/or attended religious services on a regular 
basis at Our Lady o f  Guadalupe Church, which played a pivotal role in the success o f  the 
UFCW /OTOC campaign. First, the church functions as a m echanism  through which  
Latino immigrant social networks are built and maintained, w hich in turn facilitates the
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process o f  unionization. Second, by actively participating in the UFCW /OTOC  
organizing campaign, priests, nuns, and other clergy members provided support and lent 
legitim acy to the effort. N ot only were clergy members outspoken in their support for the 
UFCW /OTOC campaign, but they also participated by: 1) writing letters and making 
phone calls to workers, employers and public officials; 2) visiting workers in their homes 
and/or assisting organizers w ith their housecalls and one-on-ones; 3) holding m eetings 
w ith workers and their fam ilies, as w ell as other community members; and 4) dedicating 
m asses, hom ilies and other religious services to the workers and their struggle to 
unionize.
Immigrant Latino meatpacking workers in South Omaha proved to be highly  
receptive to unionization, yet prior to OTOC’s grassroots organizing efforts among these 
workers the UFCW  showed relatively limited interest in organizing them. The initiative 
for this campaign came from OTOC and the meatpacking workers them selves, rather 
than the UFCW . In fact, OTOC and the workers’ initial efforts were met w ith  
considerable skepticism  by the UFCW . For example, an OTOC organizer explained that 
w hen he told a UFCW  organizer about OTOC’s organizing efforts among the workers 
and the organization’s temporary workers’ committee, his response was, “Those workers 
can’t be organized” (Interview March 11, 2001). According to labor scholars such as 
K im  M oody, this is a fairly common response. M oody explains that help has not always 
been forthcoming from U .S . unions, w hose leaders and members have often view ed  new  
immigrants as ‘unorganizable’ (1997:166).
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OTOC’s grassroots organizing efforts among the meatpacking workers in South 
Omaha laid the foundation for the UFCW /OTOC campaign. OTOC spent several years 
prior to this campaign building a substantial organizational base among the workers and 
assisting them in forming their own workers’ committee. It w as not until OTOC had 
built this base and formed the workers’ committee that the UFCW  committed to the 
campaign. This is not to im ply that the UFC W ’s commitment to the campaign was not 
essential to its overall success. The success o f  the campaign was predicated on OTOC’s 
grassroots organizing efforts and the efforts o f  the meatpacking workers them selves, as 
w ell as a significant commitment on the part o f  the UFCW . The International, for 
exam ple, provided extensive financial resources as w ell as legal expertise and assistance 
to the campaign. The union offered the resources, experience and expertise needed to 
ensure representation was achieved, contracts were signed, and improvements were made 
in w ages and working conditions. Given OTOC’s relatively lim ited familiarity with  
labor law  and collective bargaining, the union’s expertise in these areas w as fundamental 
to the cam paign’s success. OTOC, on the other hand, engendered support for 
unionization in general, and the UFCW  in particular, among South Omaha’s meatpacking 
workers.
Whereas m any o f  the meatpacking workers in South Omaha were not familiar 
w ith the UFCW , they were, however, familiar with OTOC w hich had established a 
presence in South Omaha’s Latino community over the years and participated in a 
number o f  efforts aimed at addressing pressing issues in the community. For example, 
OTOC assisted the com m unity in: 1) forming their own Latino Soccer League; 2)
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improving the service provided by the local INS office; 3) calling attention to working 
conditions in the area’s meatpacking plants by sponsoring a “O ne-Day C linic” for 
meatpacking workers; and 4) pressuring public officials to establish a “M eatpacking 
Industry’s Workers B ill o f  Rights.”
OTO C’s role in engendering trust in the union cannot be understated. M any  
meatpacking workers had considered the UFCW  and its organizers as “outsiders.” One 
reason meatpacking workers may have had this perception is due to the union’s “top- 
dow n” approach to organizing, in that their organizing campaign in South Omaha was 
managed by the International UFCW  rather than Local 271. For the m ost part, the 
U FC W  organizers assigned to the campaign were from outside the Omaha area and were 
constantly in and out o f  the area. During the first year o f  the campaign alone, for 
exam ple, at least seventeen different organizers and ten U nion Summer interns assisted  
the U FCW  in the campaign. M eanwhile, OTOC had the same three Latino immigrant 
organizers assigned to the campaign, all o f  w hom  were from the area. In fact, tw o o f  the 
three were residing in the same community as m ost o f  the Latino immigrant meatpacking 
workers. These tw o individuals also had experience working in the South Omaha 
meatpacking plants alongside the workers they were now  organizing.
The fact that OTOC was an established institution in the Latino com m unity and 
that its organizers were from the local community and had experience working in the 
industry cannot be overstated with respect to its relevance to the success o f  the 
UFCW /OTOC organizing campaign. Based on both workers’ and organizers’ accounts, 
it w as the credibility that OTOC built among the meatpacking workers that w as the key
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to the success o f  the organizing campaign. During interviews workers noted, for 
exam ple, that they trusted OTOC organizers because they spoke their language and 
belonged to their community.
Clearly, the involvem ent o f  OTOC and its member congregations, especially Our 
Lady o f  Guadalupe Catholic Church, in the organizing campaign engendered support 
among South Omaha meatpacking workers. OTOC and its member organizations and 
organizers helped establish the U FC W ’s credibility among these workers, which it 
greatly needed to be successful in this campaign. Regardless o f  the U FC W ’s 
com m itm ent and determination to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers, it is 
almost certain that a critical m ass o f  these workers would never have been receptive to 
the union’s organizing efforts without OTOC. Overall, workers’ accounts o f  w hy they 
supported unionization and/or the UFCW /OTOC campaign revealed that m ost o f  them  
were not familiar w ith the UFCW , but participated in the campaign because o f  the trust 
they had in OTOC and/or the Church.16
The success o f  the UFCW /OTOC organizing campaign demonstrates that 
meatpacking workers, m ost o f  w hom  are Latino immigrants, are in fact organizable. It 
also demonstrates that the unionization o f  these workers depends less on their particular 
individual and group characteristics as immigrants and more on the union’s commitment 
and capacity to organize them. This study suggests that in order to effectively  organize
16 Readers should be aware that missing from this thesis is an in-depth critique of OTOC. Future 
research should consider the limitations of community-based organizations, and, more 
specifically, IAF-sponsored organizations, in producing long-lasting worker mobilization and 
political participation.
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immigrant workers, unions must not only com m it to organize them, but also must reach 
out to com m unity-based organizations such as OTOC which have an established  
relationship with the workers.
In addition, this study suggests that the changing demographics o f  South Omaha’s 
meatpacking workforce are fostering changes within the UFCW . For instance, U FCW
i
Local 271 has begun incorporating immigrant-specific language into its meatpacking 
union contracts. This, to some extent, suggests that the union is responding to the 
concerns and needs o f  its new  Latino immigrant members. However, it remains to be 
seen whether or not the union m oves on to the next step, namely, transforming its internal 
organizational structure and practices as w ell as its leadership com position in such a w ay  
as to fully incorporate its new  and growing Latino immigrant membership. In other 
words, it is uncertain whether or not the changes that have occurred in union contractual 
language w ill carry over to broader changes within the UFCW  allowing it to more 
effectively  reach out to and accommodate its new est members. In particular, the local 
union m ust find w ays to adequately represent and service them. M ost importantly, it 
m ust have staff members and plant stewards that are able to communicate w ith the 
workers. Thus, the union needs Spanish-speaking staff members and plant stewards. 
Otherwise, it is likely that OTOC w ill be left w ith the responsibility o f  servicing the 
union’s members.
Finally, it remains to be seen whether or not the UFCW  is able to sustain the 
initial achievem ents o f  this campaign and build a more durable and effective Local. In 
order to do so, unionization must be treated as an ongoing process that does not end with
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the successful negotiation o f  union contracts. A s Jennifer Gordon, the founder o f  the
nationally recognized Workplace Project in N ew  York, w hich organizes low -w age Latino
immigrants, explains:
A  contract is not a substitute for ongoing organizing. Too often unions 
operate on the philosophy that organizing is what you do until you get a 
contract, then you stop organizing and service the contract. That is a real 
waste o f  the leadership and energy that the initial campaign generates. 
Organizing is an ongoing process that should be happening all the time. 
(2001:89-90).
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Appendix. List of Omaha Together One Community Member Institutions
Asbury United M ethodist
Augustana Lutheran
B lessed  Sacrament Catholic
Community Covenant
D ietz United M ethodist
Faith W estw ood United M ethodist
First United M ethodist
First Unitarian
Gethsemane COGIC
Greater N ew  Hope Baptist
Heartland United Methodist, Bellevue
Highlander Neighborhood A ssociation
H oly Fam ily Catholic
H oly N am e Catholic
K ing Solom on Baptist
Lutheran Metropolitan Ministries
M aplew ood United M ethodist
Mt. N ebo Baptist
Old Zion Baptist
Omaha Friends M eeting
Omaha Latino Soccer League
Our Lady o f  Guadalupe Catholic
Pearl M emorial United M ethodist
Pilgrim Baptist
Prince o f  Peace Baptist
Resurrection Episcopal
Rockbrook United M ethodist
Sacred Heart Catholic
St. Benedict the M oor Catholic
St. Bernard Catholic
St. Cecilia Cathedral Catholic
St. John (Creighton) Catholic
St. Leo Catholic
St. Francis o f  A ssisi Catholic
St. Margaret Mary Catholic
St. Paul United M ethodist
St. Pius X  Catholic
St. Richard Catholic
St. Stanislaus Catholic
St. Vincent de Paul Catholic
St. W enceslaus Catholic
Second Unitarian
Spirit o f  God AM E Zion
Temple Israel
(Omaha Together One Community 2003)
